The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen

Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Queen effect. The selection pressure to reduce a small amount of noise is less than that to increase recall.     

Siting noxious facilities: A siting lottery with victim compensation

This paper proposes a scheme to facilitate the siting of noxious facilities. A regional government announces that it will (a) use a lottery to choose a site for a noxious facility and (b) transfer income from tenants to host-city landowners to at least partly offset the effects of the noxious facility on local property values. The government will hold the lottery only if all citizens agree, in advance, to abide by the resulting siting decision. The lottery approach is superior to the conventional approach to siting (advance notification) in the sense that the lottery approach achieves unanimous support for the siting decision with less compensation. The compensation scheme can be financed with a regionwide tenant tax or a tax on residents in the nonhost city. For “small” compensation programs, the nonhost tax is superior to the regional tax.     

Structure and understanding: Some observations on current activities in the field of structural modeling

Structural modeling has been under study in recent years as a method for dealing with complex societal problems, and is growing in acceptance as a tool for understanding complex social phenomena. Structural models demonstrate the interactions of the separate elements of a system and their combined overall effect. Thus, the nature of the problem for which this method of analysis is appropriate is different from complex problems of the traditional disciplines which lend themselves to reductionist approaches. This is because complex policy problems of society cannot be “solved” with precise analysis. Kenneth Boulding suggests that there are two ways to cope with a complex policy problem, either to “slice” the problem into partial equilibrium sections or “squeeze” it by aggregating numerous variables into a single index or macho variable. Structural modeling is an approach which comes under the general strategy of squeezing the problem and is promising because of the ability to include a range of macro variables which provide insights about social change. The articles in this issue treat several interesting aspects of this approach. In this article we wish to recall for consideration a central purpose for developing such methods. We have taken a historical approach to indicate some of the roots of the concern for the effect of technological process on social change. Within this context, we discuss the nature of the contributions made by the articles in this issue and what promise the methods offer to addressing the historical concern.     

Inflation And Efficiency In A Search Economy*

We present a model in which purely monetary inflation systematically affects efficiency, welfare, and relative prices. The model focuses on the microeconomics of trade in search markets under inflation. Inflation, by increasing the cost of holding money, undermines the market's ability to sustain long‐term customer relationships. Because those relationships generate the most efficient transactions patterns, overall welfare unambiguously declines.     

Consumer inertia, firm growth and industry dynamics

We develop a model of firm size, based on the hypothesis that consumers are “locked in,” because of search costs, with firms they have patronized in the past. As a consequence, older firms have a larger clientele and are able to extract higher profits. The equilibrium of this model yields: (i) A downward sloping density of firm sizes. (ii) Older firms are less likely to exit than younger firms. (iii) Larger firms spend more on R&D.     

Increasing returns and the new world of business

Our understanding of how markets and businesses operate was passed down to us more than a century ago by English economist Alfred Marshall. It is based on the assumption of diminishing returns: products or companies that get ahead in a market eventually run into limitations so that a predictable equilibrium of prices and market shares is reached. The theory was valid for the bulk-processing, smokestack economy of Marshall's day. But in this century, Western economies have gone from processing resources to processing information, from the application of raw energy to the application of ideas. The mechanisms that determine economic behavior have also shifted--from diminishing returns to increasing returns. Increasing returns are the tendency for that which is ahead to get further ahead and for that which is losing advantage to lose further advantage. If a product gets ahead, increasing returns can magnify the advantage, and the product can go on to lock in the market. Mechanisms of increasing returns exist alongside those of diminishing returns in all industries. But, in general, diminishing returns hold sway in the traditional, resource-processing industries. Increasing returns reign in the newer, knowledge-based industries. Modern economies have split into two interrelated worlds of business corresponding to the two types of returns. The two worlds have different economics. They differ in behavior, style, and culture. They call for different management techniques, strategies, and codes of government regulation. The author illuminates those differences by explaining how increasing returns operate in high tech and in service industries. He also offers advice to managers in knowledge-based markets.     

Locally Greater Vulnerability to Background Risk

Willingness to take on risk is influenced by the presence of fair and unfair background risks for decision makers who are risk vulnerable as defined by Gollier and Pratt [1996], for these decision makers are more risk averse when they possess such an uninsurable background risk. We present an alternative derivation of the index of local vulnerability based on Diamond and Stiglitz [1974] compensated increases in risk, such that risk aversion increases with the introduction of any small fair background risk if and only if the index of local vulnerability is positive. We establish that the increase in risk aversion is greater for those who are more vulnerable as measured by the index of local vulnerability.     

Development by Decree: The Limits of ‘Authoritarian Modernization’ in the Russian Federation

The apparent success of state‐managed market economies has challenged the conventional wisdom that liberal democracy is the norm around which all capitalist countries tend to converge. If the link between democracy and development is more tenuous than we often think, the authoritarian variety of capitalism is not without its own problems, especially with respect to political legitimacy, innovation and regional development. This article explores these issues through the prism of ‘authoritarian modernization’ in Russia. We argue that this strategy is unlikely to succeed, even in its own terms, because (1) the political system fails to create favourable institutional conditions for modernization; (2) the economic system is beset by deeply embedded structural problems; and (3) the regional policy apparatus is torn between the goals of spatial equalization and spatial agglomeration. The article focuses on the Skolkovo Innovation Centre, the main symbol of Russian modernization, to demonstrate the territorial repertoire of the mega‐project, a state‐sponsored development strategy to create innovation clusters from above because they cannot emerge from below.