Talent or Not? Employee Reactions to Talent Identification

In this article, we examine the effect of talent identification on employee attitudes. Building on social exchange theory, we analyze the association between employees' perceptions about whether or not they have been formally identified as “talent” and the following attitudinal outcomes: commitment to increasing performance demands, building skills, and supporting strategic priorities; identification with the unit and the multinational enterprise; and turnover intentions. Our analyses of 769 managers and professionals in nine Nordic multinational corporations reveal a number of differences between employees who perceive that they have been identified as “talent” and those who either perceive that they have not been identified or do not know whether they have been identified. We found only limited differences between the two latter categories.     

TECHNICAL NOTE : THE VARIABLE FINANCIAL INDICATOR IRR AND THE CONSTANT ECONOMIC INDICATOR NPV

The IRR (internal rate of return) and the NPV (net present value) are the two most common and important indicators in investment decisions. These two indicators, however, have intrinsic differences between one another. The IRR is a financial indicator and the NPV an economic indicator of a capital investment. The former gives the private investor's point of view and the latter the society's point of view. The value of ERR varies with the change of Financial arrangement of an investment. The NPV, however, does not but remains constant no matter how the financial arrangement changes. This paper uses an illustrative example to show their intrinsic differences and then describes a mathematical proof to substantiate the different natures of IRR and NPV.     

Are Parental Characteristics Important for Child Survival? The Case of Vietnam

While remaining one of the poorest countries in the world, Vietnam's infant and child mortality rates have been much lower than those observed for countries with similar or even higher levels of real income per capita. The paper investigates the role of parents' characteristics in affecting survival of their children, using a logistic discrete-time model and data from the Vietnam Demographic and Health Survey 1988 . It is found that infant mortality is significantly higher for children of mothers with no formal education. However, parents' other socioeconomic characteristics, including mothers attaining levels of education higher than the primary level, are not important for explaining differences in child survival. There is some evidence that children of higher orders of birth face higher risk. Results on the effects of maternal education diverge from findings for other countries, but can perhaps be explained by the country's distinctive features.     

Consumer attitudes toward in-flight shopping

This study examines the relationship between perceived risk, perceived value, convenience and attitudes toward in-flight shopping and behavioral intentions using a sample of international air travelers in Taiwan. The results suggest that both perceived value and convenience have significantly positive effects on attitude, but the path between perceived risk and attitude is not significant. In addition, the findings also demonstrate that attitude has significant effects on customer intention. Specific theoretical and managerial implications are discussed at the end of this work.     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

A policy perspective on incremental innovation in small and medium sized enterprises

The increased importance of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in industrial economies is explained and the very large variance in their degree of participation in the innovation process is established. Evidence from Canadian research clarifies the difficulties that smidl and medium sized firms, even in technology intensive industries, experience in developing new products and implementing new designs. Innovation theory is reviewed and the importance of inputs from specialist consultants is established for SMEs undertaking incremental innovation. Transaction costs concepts are then used to explain the difficulties SMEs encounter in arranging these linkages. A recommended form of policy to help to correct this type of market imperfection is derived and used to describe a gap in Canadian policies and to evaluate initiatives in Australia and UK.     

Politico-economic inequality and the comovement of government purchases

This paper explores the implications of economic and political inequality for the comovement of government purchases with macroeconomic fluctuations. We set up and compute a heterogeneous-agent neoclassical growth model, where households value government purchases which are financed by income taxes. A key feature of the model is a wealth bias in the political aggregation process. When calibrated to U.S. wealth inequality and exposed to aggregate productivity shocks, such a model is able to generate weaker positive comovement of government purchases than models with no political wealth bias. The wealth bias that matches the cross-sectional campaign contribution distribution by income is consistent with the mild positive comovement of government purchases in the aggregate data. We thus provide an empirically relevant example where economic and political heterogeneity matter for aggregate dynamics.