Cultural constraints on the emergence of women as leaders

Women, who have historically been less represented than men in leadership positions, emerge as leaders in some societies more than others. Unlike previous cultural explanations for this effect (rooted in differences in values, practices, or gender roles), we argue that a culture's tightness – its strength of norms and social sanctions – can provoke a resistance to change practices that historically placed men in leadership positions. Tighter cultures will yield fewer women represented among top leadership positions. Moreover, cultural tightness moderates the degree to which egalitarian practices – where individuals from both genders are treated equally – lead women to emerge as leaders. Specifically, differences in egalitarian practices are more likely to predict the emergence of women as leaders among tight rather than loose cultures because such practices are more strongly implemented in tight than weak cultures. Analysis of publicly available data reveals some preliminary support for predictions. This research concludes that loose cultures will be more receptive to changing existing cultural practices, but that tight cultures are more successful in implementing and sustaining such changes.     

Can Bank Lines of Credit Protect REITs against a Credit Crisis?

In a tight credit market, the primary concern of most real estate investment trusts (REITs) is the ability to access capital and maintain adequate liquidity. Bank lines of credit or loan commitments, which are legally binding contracts arranged to provide debt at the call of the borrowers under prespecified terms, have been theorized to provide insurance protection against a credit crisis. This article examines whether bank lines of credit can indeed provide some insurance for REITs and allow them to access credit during bad times. Covering three credit crunch events, both the origination and utilization patterns of commitment loans by 275 REITs publicly traded between 1992 and 2007 are analyzed. We find that bank lines of credit insulated REITs from credit rationing at both the broad market level as well as at the firm level. However, the insurance value is qualified in the case of smaller and risky firms which may not get to extend their credit limit or draw down on their existing credit lines in a credit crisis.     

Rational expectations and the short-run Phillips curves

The purpose of the present paper is to study certain derivable implications of the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) in the context of a simultaneous wage-price model of the U.S. economy and to subject the REH to statistical tests. The empirical evidence indicates that implementation of the REH in the context of these models does wipe out the conventional short-run Phillips curves, and the assumption that public expectations of future rates of inflation are true conditional mathematical expectations based on all available information is indeed borne out quite well against its alternatives.     

Deviation from Purchasing Power Parity: Evidence from Malaysia, 1973–1997

This paper presents an empirical test of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) applied to the Malaysia ringgit for the period from 1973 (CPI) and 1984 (WPI) to 1997. Consistent with other research findings, it is detected that real exchange rate follows a random walk. Using multivariate cointegration methodology for the long-run relationship between real exchange rate and certain macro-economic variables, the study provides evidence supporting a long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and the current account balance and government spending, the last two variables have been not included in previous studies of this economy. The causality test between real exchange rate with the current account balance and government spending, however, does not receive support from the error-correction model. This suggests that both government spending and current account balance are not adequate to explain the changes in ringgit real exchange rate. The puzzle still remains unsolved.     

Moral Hazard, Effort Sensitivity and Compensation in Asset-Backed Securitization

One interesting explanation for asset securitization is the managerial agency theory—where securitization of cash flows that are relatively insensitive to managerial effort reduces the noise for cash flows that are sensitive to managerial effort (Iacobucci and Winter, 2005). This paper extends this concept in several ways. First, we differentiate the effects of noise and effort sensitivity on managerial effort and compensation, underscoring the importance of a less noisy environment. We also carefully delineate the conditions under which asset securitization would improve the welfare of managers and shareholders of the originating company. Second, we relax the assumptions regarding the expected income-producing function and the income variance, and further take into consideration the change of the marginal production of income with respect to effort before and after securitization. Third, under a multitask principal-agent model framework, we explore how the relationship between managerial activities on different assets affects the incentive compensation for the manager of the originating company and the joint surplus for shareholder and manager. This is particularly relevant when entire buildings are securitized as opposed to pools of income-generating assets. Finally, we examine the role of the third-party servicer.     

Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: Evidence from Korea

This paper examines the relationship between corporate ownership structure in Korea and the informativeness of earnings. Korean ownership structure is characterized by the dominance of one primary owner who also participates in firm management. Existing literature offers two alternative perspectives on the behavior of such owner-manager firms, convergence of interests, and management entrenchment hypotheses. We tested the alternative views to see how they are reflected in earnings informativeness. The results show that earnings are more informative as holdings of the owner increase, supporting the convergence of interest explanation for the owner-manager structure. Second, we examine the role of institutional investors and blockholders. On the one hand, institutions/blockholders have incentives to actively monitor management. However, on the other hand, institutions/blockholders may not render effective monitoring because they lack expertise, suffer from freerider problems, or strategically ally with management. These opposing views predict conflicting signs on the relation between the earnings informativeness and holdings of institutions/blockholders. We find that earnings informativeness increases with the holdings of institutions and blockholders. This supports the active monitoring role of institutions/blockholders. Finally, we test the relationship between earnings informativeness for chaebol (Korean business group)-affiliated companies vs. that for nonchaebol-affiliated companies, and find no significant relationship between the owner-largest shareholder's holdings and earnings informativeness. This provides evidence that for chaebol companies, the negative effect of management entrenchment/expropriation of minority shareholders offsets the positive effects. This phenomenon is stronger for chaebol-affiliated companies than for nonchaebol affiliates.     

The impact of divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt

This paper examines the debt ownership structure of firms with corporate governance problems associated with the divergence in the controlling shareholders' voting and cash-flow rights. Previous studies suggest that debt can play an important role in mitigating corporate governance problems. However, not all debt can effectively manage the corporate governance problems associated with the financing of poorly governed firms. In this study, we find that firms with higher divergence in voting and cash-flow rights use significantly more bank debt financing. Moreover, the effect of the divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt is greater in countries with weaker legal protection for investors. Overall, our findings suggest that bank debt has a comparative advantage in financing poorly governed firms.     

Small Hubs,Large Spokes and Overlapping Free Trade Agreements

The proliferation of overlapping free trade agreements (FTA) in recent years has led to pair‐wise hub‐and‐spokes (HAS) throughout the world. Being avid subscribers to FTAs, many countries in the Asia‐Pacific region, including the United States, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Australia, have become trade hubs to their partners who are in turn relegated to spoke status. In this paper, we question whether being a hub is welfare optimal for a small and open economy such as Singapore compared to membership in a single bilateral FTA or a multi‐member free trade zone. Within this context, we use a computable general equilibrium model to examine the welfare implications of the triangular trade relationship of the United States, Singapore and Japan. This is facilitated by the Japan–Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement, the USA–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, and a hypothetical USA–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. The analysis is extended to incorporate ‘super‐hub’ effects, that is, the spoke countries could be trade hubs in other HAS systems. Our experiment reveals that hub status generates positive welfare gain and is the highest Singapore can get from the trade configurations considered. Meanwhile, Japan loses more than the USA when both are relegated to spoke status. These findings prove to be robust under different market structures and production technologies, deeper economic integration, ‘super‐hub’ effects, as well as uncertainty in the key model parameters and the extent of trade liberalisation shocks.