How is suicide different in Japan?

This study investigates suicide rates among OECD countries, with particular effort made to gain insight into how suicide in Japan is different from suicides in other OECD countries. Several findings emerged from fixed-effect panel regressions with country-specific time-trends. First, the impacts of socioeconomic variables vary across different gender–age groups. Second, in general, better economic conditions such as high levels of income and higher economic growth were found to reduce the suicide rate, while income inequality increases the suicide rate. Third, the suicide rate is more sensitive to economic factors captured by real GDP per capita, growth rate of real GDP per capita, and the Gini index than to social factors represented by divorce rate, birth rate, female labor force participation rate, and alcohol consumption. Fourth, female and elderly suicides are more difficult to be accounted for. Finally, in accordance with general beliefs, Japan's suicide problem is very different from those of other OECD countries. The impact of the socioeconomic variables on suicide is greater in Japan than in other OECD countries.     

公司控制权价值:来自中国企业控制权交易案例的证据

公司控制权溢价是否存在及其数量大小在文献中一直被广泛讨论,但很少有处理中国公司状况的文献。本文利用了1994--2004年的95起公司控股权转让数据分析了中国公司控制权的价值。我们发现中国存在着一个正的公司控制权溢价,在平均水平上,控制权股份的交易价格要比非控制权股份交易的价格高14％。回归分析显示,公司控制权价值变化与公司最大股东的控制力成正比;在治理相对糟糕的地方,拥有控制权股份的要价也相对更高。     

Do Free Trade Agreements Increase the New Goods Margin? Evidence from Korea

We analyze the changes in the composition of bilateral trade—and more specifically, in the new goods margin—following the free trade agreements (FTAs) signed by Korea between 2004 and 2008. We find that new goods trade increased disproportionately after the FTAs came into effect, and that least-traded goods (LTG)—those accounting for the lowest 10% of trade prior to the FTAs—ended up accounting for 37% of post-FTA trade with FTA partners. In contrast, the corresponding share for a comparable group of countries that did not sign FTAs with Korea was only half as large, averaging close to 20%. We also find that only less than 2% of all least-traded products accounted for most of the growth in LTG trade, and that those goods tended to be clustered in the same industries as the intensively-traded goods. Furthermore, a larger fraction of LTG became heavily traded for the case of FTA partners than for non-FTA countries. Finally, we find evidence that least-traded imports were subject to higher pre-FTA tariff protection than other products.     

Energy prices, energy conservation, and economic growth: Evidence from the postwar United States

The effects of energy prices and energy conservation on economic growth have been examined empirically for the postwar U.S. economy. A vector autoregressive model includes real GDP, real capital, labor, real energy prices, and the Divisia energy index. A key feature of our finding is that some damaging effects of energy conservation on the macroeconomy are statistically insignificant in the short run, and the insignificant short-run effects are quickly enervated over time. Alternative measures of energy use also suggest that energy conservation has no significant impact on real output growth. The findings are generally consistent with the neoclassical position that real economic growth of the United States is neutral with respect to changes in energy use. One exception is the case that energy prices are omitted from the model.     

Unions, government's preference, and privatization

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework of unionized mixed oligopolies, this study investigates the efficiency of privatization. The results are twofold. First, regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues and the number of private firms, the government and the public firm do not always have an incentive to privatize the public firm even if the government places lesser emphasis on the tax revenues than on social welfare. Second, social welfare increases with an increased number of private firms regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues and decreases with the government's preference for tax revenues regardless of the number of private firms. Hence, the government can use tax more efficiently as a commitment device to control the union's wage demand so as to maintain lower wage level under unionized mixed oligopoly.