A cliometric analysis of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination

In Rome, on 16 March 1978, the Red Brigades kidnapped Aldo Moro. They kept him a prisoner for 55 days, and ultimately killed him. Why did they decide to kill Moro since it appears a posteriori that they did not improve their situation by doing so? Our paper answers this question by building mainly on the model of kidnapping by Selten (A simple game model of kidnapping. In: Henn R, Moeschlin O (eds) Mathematical economics and game theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol. 141. Springer, Berlin, pp 139–156, 1977). We develop an integrated game-theoretic model that reliably captures both the problem of kidnapping for some sort of non-monetary ransom and the problem of assassination of prominent political figures. We embed our model within the historical evidence surrounding the Moro case. We show that, in the Moro case, there is a continuum of equilibria implying the death of the hostage.     

Risk Aversion and the Value of Risk to Life

The standard literature on the value of life relies on Yaari’s (1965) model, which includes an implicit assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life duration. To overpass this limitation, we extend the theory to a simple variety of preferences that are not necessarily additively separable. The enlargement we propose is relevant for the evaluation of life‐saving programs: current practice, we estimate, puts too little weight on mortality risk reduction of the young. Our correction exceeds in magnitude that introduced by the switch from the notion of number of lives saved to the notion of years of life saved.     

Fertility,intergenerational transfers and economic development

This paper develops a model of endogenous growth where agents are altruistic and value both the utilities of their parent and of their children. Individuals endogenously choose the number of their children, and arbitrate between financing education, leaving them some bequest and offering some gift to their parents. We establish the existence of three types of long run regime. Starting from a low level of human capital, an economy converges towards a stationary state associated with a constant output per worker, a high level of fertility and ascendant transfers. If the initial level of human capital is not too low, another stationary state jointly exists with a lower level of fertility and no transfer. Finally, starting from a high level of human capital, the economy experiences a steady growth of output per worker associated with a low fertility level and descendant transfers. We then assume that an economy is initially in the stationary underdevelopment regime with ascendant transfers, and we study the power of different policies to push the economy toward the growth regime. We successively consider a fertility control policy, an education subsidies policy, and the introduction of a pension system for the elderly.     

Persistent and Consistent Poverty in the 1994 and 1995 Waves of the European Community Household Panel Survey

This paper focuses on the mismatch between income and deprivation measures of poverty. Using the first two waves of the European Community Household Panel Survey, a measure of relative deprivation is constructed and the overlap between the relative income poor and relatively deprived is examined. There is very limited overlap with the lowest relative income threshold. The overlap increases as the income threshold is raised, but it remains true that less than half those below the 60 percent relative income line are among the most deprived. Relative deprivation is shown to be related to the persistence of income poverty, but also to a range of other resource and need factors. Income and deprivation measures each contain information that can profitably be employed to enhance our understanding of poverty and a range of other social phenomena. This is illustrated by the manner in which both income poverty and relative deprivation are associated with self-reported difficulty making ends meet.     

The moral potential of individualism and instrumental reason in accounting research

The dominance of positivism in accounting research is at the root of a deep malaise felt by many scholars. Although the methodological limitations of positivist research, as well as the political and cultural foundations of its hegemony, have regularly been highlighted in the literature, the merits of interdisciplinarity are still denied by the major institutions dominating the field. The present paper argues that the case in favor of academic pluralism is nonetheless worth pursuing, because not only it represents a central feature of the interdisciplinary identity, but also because it provides support to those engaged in a relentless (and sometimes successful) bid for greater openness in accounting research. The paper's main goal is to promote and further this endeavor by moving the line of argument off the beaten track of methodology and domination in order to focus on morality. The largely unexplored terrain of morality can be used as a basis for original arguments supportive of intellectual pluralism that may help to raise awareness of alternative research avenues and possibilities – though it is important not to harbor unrealistic hopes. Drawing on Charles Taylors’ view of modernity, we highlight the richer moral background from which the current stress in the discipline on individualistic values and instrumental reason took its rise. As a result, we provide the accounting mainstream with the perspective of an alternative framework for its research agenda by (re)adopting an ethic of compassion. Merchant's (2008) analysis of the marginalization of interdisciplinary research in North America will be used as a critical basis and starting-point for our argument.