Shocks at large banks and banking sector distress: The Banking Granular Residual

Size matters in banking. In this paper, we explore whether shocks originating at large banks affect the probability of distress of smaller banks and thus the stability of the banking system. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. In a first step, we follow Gabaix [Gabaix, X., 2008a. The Granular Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111765] and construct a measure of idiosyncratic shocks at large banks, the so-called Banking Granular Residual. This measure documents the importance of size effects for the German banking system. In a second step, we incorporate this measure of idiosyncratic shocks at large banks into an integrated stress-testing model for the German banking system following De Graeve et al. (2008). We find that positive shocks at large banks reduce the probability of distress of small banks.     

Dominant Firm Pricing with Competitive Entry and Regulation: The Case of IntraLATA Toll

In this paper, we develop a generalized model of a dominant firm-competitive fringe industry in which products are differentiated, costs vary across suppliers, and the dominant firm is subject to alternative regulatory regimes. The model yields an equilibrium condition that can be tested empirically using data on Bell Operating Companies' pricing of intraLATA toll telephone service. Estimation of a reduced form price equation provides strong support for the theoretical model. Of particular interest, the results suggest that dominant firm (Bell Operating Company) toll prices are driven down by the presence of actual and potential fringe competitors (interexchange carriers) when entry is authorized by the state. Additionally, the results fail to provide evidence that the introduction of incentive regulation or price-cap regulation has reduced intraLATA toll prices.     

Economic restructuring and emerging patterns of industrial relations

The Review of Black Political Economy -     

Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation

Models of public utility regulation are often framed, alternatively, as rate-of-return or price-cap regulation. In practice, however, regulators have increasingly adopted a variety of hybrid regulatory constraints that embody elements of both these, and other, regulatory forms. In this paper, we draw upon elements of both the positive economic theory of regulation and standard efficiency-based economic analysis of regulation to develop a model that endogenously yields hybrid regulatory constraints as a regulatory optimum. In this context, the paper further demonstrates that a commonly observed side payment–profit sharing–enhances regulator welfare. The results provide a plausible basis for understanding the pattern of modern regulatory constraints.     

Besting the status quo: the effect of abstract versus concrete mindsets on emotional trade-off difficulty and avoidant coping behavior

Building on past emotional trade-off difficulty and construal level research, we investigate the conditions under which consumers engage in avoidant coping behavior to reduce negative emotions that arise from trading off valued attributes (e.g., quality and price). Results from three studies offer evidence that an abstract (vs. concrete) mindset systematically decreases avoidant coping behavior (e.g., the selection of a status quo option) by reducing the intensity of the negative emotion consumers experience. This effect replicates across construal level manipulations and product categories. Thus, in addition to the harmful effects of negative emotions and coping behavior on consumer choice identified in past research, we find that an abstract (vs. concrete) mindset can help consumers make better (i.e., more normative) choices. Together, these findings have implications for marketers of new or unfamiliar products as well as products that are not incumbents or category leaders (i.e., status quo options) when consumers face difficult trade-offs.     

The impact of state economic differentials on household welfare and labor force behavior

This paper calculates state-specific income expectations for low-income households, using a simultaneous model of household labor force and welfare participation decisions. A variety of simulations indicate the interlocking effects of existing state differences in welfare, wages and taxes on work/welfare choices and income. Significant differences among similar households in different states occur. Equalization of welfare benefits eliminates some but not all of these differences, but generates potentially serious policy problems for the states.