The Effects of Germany's Statutory Minimum Wage on Employment and Welfare Dependency

In January 2015, Germany introduced a federal, statutory minimum wage of 8.50 € per hour. This study evaluates the effects of this policy on regular and marginal employment and on welfare dependency. Based on the county‐level administrative data, this study uses the difference‐in‐differences technique, exploiting regional variation in the bite of the minimum wage, i.e., the county‐specific share of employees paid less than 8.50 € before the introduction of the minimum wage. The minimum wage had a considerable negative effect on marginal employment. There is also some indication that regular employment was slightly reduced. Concerning welfare dependency, the minimum wage reduced the number of working welfare recipients, with some indication that about one half of them left welfare receipt due to the minimum wage.     

Cross-border banking in the EU since the crisis: What is driving the great retrenchment?

Review of World Economics - This paper examines the drivers of the retrenchment in cross-border banking in the European Union (EU) since the global financial crisis, which stands out in...     

Putting the ‘Amsterdam School’ in its Rightful Place: A Reply to Juan Ignacio Staricco’s Critique of Cultural Political Economy

This article responds to Staricco’s critique of cultural political economy (CPE) for being inherently constructivist because of its emphasis on the ontologically foundational role of semiosis (sense- and meaning-making) in social life. Staricco recommends the Amsterdam School of transnational historical materialism as a more immediately productive and insightful approach to developing a regulationist critique of political economy. Both lines of criticism of CPE are addressed. First, Staricco misinterprets the implications of treating semiosis and structuration as ontologically equal bases of social life. Second, Staricco mistakes our criticisms of the ‘Italian School’ in international political economy for criticisms of the Amsterdam School – an approach we have always warmly endorsed. He therefore misses our more nuanced claim that while the Amsterdam School emphasises the importance of semiosis, it has fewer concepts to explain how semiosis matters and why only some imagined class identities and concepts of control are selected, retained, and institutionalised. CPE addresses this lacuna by integrating critical semiotic analysis into political economy. Third, we provide the first detailed comparison of the Amsterdam School and CPE to provide a better understanding of the merits of each approach and to indicate where they might complement each other without claiming one to be superior to the other.     

Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding,Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices*

The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second‐price auctions, regardless of the valuations of bidders. In contrast, in first‐price auctions, there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model, where bidders anticipate (constant) positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing. Even if the emotional (dis‐)utilities are very small, the revenue‐maximizing reserve price might be significantly different from the standard model. Moreover, decreases with the number of bidders.     

Non‐travel by Hong Kong residents

The study examined non‐travel by Hong Kong residents. Cluster analysis was used to segment the non‐travelling population into five groups. Overall, two‐thirds of non‐travellers indicated that taking a pleasure trip each year is unimportant to them. Yet, when asked to identify barriers to travel, lack of interest is cited rarely. Instead, intrapersonal barriers were identified as the most critical barriers by elderly singles and couples with low incomes. Affordability, work and family commitments were identified by all other groups. Non‐travellers simply do not have the travel bug and often have to rely on socially acceptable barriers to rationalise their lack of interest. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Weiner,Richard. Professional's Guide to Publicity. New York: Richard Weiner,Inc., 1975

Abstract

An experiment involving 400 randomly selected professionals from the midwestern United States indicated that the response rate to a mail questionnaire was significantly increased by the use of an enclosed one dollar incentive. Promised incentives of two dollars and entry into a lottery with awards of fifty dollars, thirty dollars, and twenty dollars in return for a completed questionnaire did not significantly change the response rate to the mail questionnaire relative to the no incentive (control) group response rate. The two dollar promised incentive group had a higher response rate than the lottery-type promised incentive group with prizes of fifty, thirty, and twenty dollars.     

Engineering economy as a vibrant and relevant course in the engineering programs of today and tomorrow

Abstract

Engineering economy has been studied by the majority of engineering students for many years, yet its place in engineering education is often misunderstood. Logic suggests that the engineering economy course would be highly valued since it is the only course many engineering students will take related to financial matters, but instead there is evidence that the subject is being marginalized. While pressures to reduce program credit hours and changes to the Fundamentals of Engineering exam may play a role in this, perhaps engineering economy has not sufficiently evolved to meet the needs of students or the realities of the contemporary workplace. What can be done to ensure that engineering economy fulfills its potential as an important part of engineering education? There may be few clear-cut answers, but we believe that engineering economy should shift toward a future characterized by rigorous coursework grounded in engineering design principles and applications of risk and uncertainty. This has been our goal in teaching engineering economy at Western Michigan University for many years. The purpose of this paper is to communicate the essential elements of a strategy that has helped to make the course a vibrant component of several engineering programs.     

Supply Management in Canadian Agriculture: An Assessment of the Economic Effects

Marketing boards with supply management powers have become part of Canadian agriculture, yet whether these boards improve society's welfare is a much-debated issue. This paper reviews both the methodology and the empirical results of studies which have assessed the effects of supply management. All of the studies reviewed show that there is a sizeable income transfer from consumers to producers along with a misallocation of resources as a result of supply management. However, one could easily reverse these conclusions by changing the assumptions upon which past research has rested. Furthermore, additional research is needed on supply management in the context of both a rent-seeking framework and from an industrial organization point of view.
Les commissions de commercialisation possédant des pouvoirs sur la gestion des stocks. sont devenues inhérentes a ľagriculture canadienne; il y a cependant, controverse quant a ľeffet qu'apportent ces commissions sur le bien-être de la société. Cette analyse examine à la fois la méthodologie ulilisée, de méme que les résullats empiriques obtenus selon des études examinées, montrent qu'il y a un transfert considérable de revenu, entre les consummateurs et les producteurs, allant de pair avec une mauvaise répartition des ressources, résultant de la gestion des stocks. Cependant, comme le démontre cette étude, il est facilement possible ďinverser ces conclusions en changeant les hypothèses sur lesquelles la recherche antérieure a été bátie. De plus, une recherche supplément aire, sur la gestion des stocks, dans le contexte ďune structure recherchant un cadre, et du point de vue de ľorganisation industrielle est nécéssaire.     

On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information

Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms' benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve fewer, but never more buyers when there is private information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L12, D45, D82