‘Medical altruism in mainstream health economics: theoretical and political paradoxes’ comments

In this article, which was published in the September 2014 issue of the Review, Batifoulier and Da Silva examine the role of medical altruism in health economics. They argue that abandoning homo economicus and the mainstream practice of incorporating patient well-being in the doctor’s utility function in order to explain the clinical behavior of doctors and switching from profit maximization to medical altruism both lead to a dead end. We agree but the authors leave us with no way out. We argue instead that the doctor’s clinical behavior whether expressed in terms of utility or altruism is not a fit subject for economics. The way out is to restrict economics to health care issues with financial dimensions. In their article, Batifoulier and Da Silva bring their French experience to the table. We bring to the table our American experience with more than 40 years of hands-on care for patients along with the experiences of four other physicians in our extended family. The specialties include intensive care pediatrics, emergency medicine, intensive-care pulmonary medicine, dermatology, and otolaryngology. Our premise in responding to Batifoulier and Da Silva is that apart from payment for services rendered, there probably are no serious differences in the actual practice of medicine in France compared to the United States. And even if there are such differences, they are matters to be taken up by medicine not economics.     

Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs

The hard core of conventional economics consists of a set of four main premises regarding the economy. Simply put they are the law of nature, the individual, certainty, and contracts. Juxtapositioned to these four premises of conventional economics, there are four from personalist economics: institutions, the person, uncertainty and status. In sharp constrast with the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in economics whose views on economic affairs are grounded in individualism, we think about economic affairs in a market system in terms of personalism. Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs. Here our presentation focuses on three central economic activities: consumption, work and leisure. In addressing these activities we emphasize that (1) human persons are materialized spirits and (2) human nature is two dimensional — individual and social. In our remarks we rely heavily on Emmanuel Mounier and John Paul II. Mayo Research Institute In the field of scientific research, a positivistic mentality took hold which not only abandoned the Christian vision of the world, but more especially rejected every appeal to a metaphysical or moral vision. It follows that certain scientists, lacking any ethical point of reference, are in danger of putting at the centre of their concerns something other than the human person and the entirety of the person's life. Further still, some of these, sensing the opportunities of technological progress, seem to succumb not only to a market-based logic, but also to the temptation of a quasi-divine power over nature and even over the human being [John Paul II, 1998, sect. 46].     

Applications of randomized low discrepancy sequences to the valuation of complex securities

This paper deals with a recent modification of the Monte Carlo method known as quasi-random Monte Carlo. Under this approach, one uses specially selected deterministic sequences rather than random sequences as in Monte Carlo. These special sequences are known as low discrepancy sequences and have the property that they tend to be evenly dispersed throughout the unit cube. For many applications in finance, the use of low discrepancy sequences seems to provide more accurate answers than random sequences. One of the main drawbacks of the use of low discrepancy sequences is that there is no obvious method of computing the standard error of the estimate. This means that in performing the calculations, there is no clear termination criterion for the number of points to use. We address this issue here and consider a partial randomization of Owen's technique for overcoming this problem. The proposed method can be applied to much higher dimensions where it would be computationally infeasible for Owen's technique. The efficiency of these procedures is compared using a particular derivative security. The exact price of this security can be calculated very simply and so we have a benchmark against which to test our calculations. We find that our procedures give promising results even for very high dimensions. Statistical tests are also conducted to support the confidence statement drawn from these procedures.     

On Adding-Up as a Validity Criterion for Stated-Preference Studies

Environmental and Resource Economics - The adding-up test, which requires that the value of a bundle of goods or services be equal to the sum of the values of its component parts, has been proposed...     

Deposit insurance and the stock market: evidence from Denmark

Previous studies of the relationship between deposit insurance and bank market values have usually been limited to consideration of minor changes in bank regulations, but the 1987 initiation of deposit insurance in Denmark permits examination of a potentially major policy shift. It is found that the market values of large Danish banks exhibited a modest positive reaction to the announcement of insurance, but that small risky banks responded negatively. These results partially contrast with those previously found for the USA, an outcome that seems likely to reflect the interaction of deposit insurance with the particular characteristics of the pre-existing Danish regulatory system.     

Henry George,Jane Jacobs,and Free Trade

Henry George and Jane Jacobs were both journalists and made a contribution to economics based on their commitment to the original version of free trade, as understood by 19^th‐century liberals, rather than the late 20^th‐century version. The distinctive concept of free trade, as originally understood, was as an instrument for small‐scale producers to break up entrenched monopolies and serve the interests of the ordinary citizen. That was how Cobden used it in the debates over the Corn Laws in the 1840s, and how Ruskin, Gesell, Chesterton, and other critics conceived of economic liberation. In debates over free trade in recent decades, that term has come to mean a defense of power and privilege, the exact opposite of the intent of 19^th‐century liberals. George and Jacobs sought to restore the original meaning by developing theories of development and distribution that would enable the market system to benefit everyone.