With Friends Like These: Endogenous Labor Market Segregation with Homogeneous, Nonprejudiced Agents

In the economics literature, labor market segregation is typically assumed to arise either from prejudice ( Becker 1971 ) or from group differences in human capital accumulation ( Benabou 1993 ; Durlauf 2006 ; Fryer 2006 ). Many sociological studies, by contrast, consider social network structure as an embodiment of various forms of social capital, including the creation of obligations, information channels, and enforceable trust ( Coleman 1988 ; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993 ). When firms hire by referral, social network segregation can lead to labor market segregation ( Tilly 1998 ). Various social network structures may arise from the actions of self-interested individuals ( Watts and Strogatz 1998 ; Jackson 2006 ); by incorporating concepts of social capital into an economic framework of profit-maximizing firms, this article develops a model of labor markets in which segregation arises endogenously even though agents are homogeneous and have no dislike for each other. Firms hire through referrals, and can enforce discipline by bribing a referrer to prevent a hiree from getting any outside job offers from other friends if he or she shirks. This is possible only if social networks are reasonably closed, so that the referee knows a majority of his or her friends' friends. By segregating into small communities, workers can more effectively create closed social networks. Social networks with different reservation wages will receive different wages; firms can induce such segregation and wage discrimination in the interest of profit. Workers may not benefit from such segregation, except as a best response to being in a society where it already exists; the "friends" in these social networks act as a worker discipline device, and in this way treat each other inimically.     

A Review of the Review

In 1997 a process started to review the 1988 Basel I Accord, which ultimately led to the Basel II Accord of June 2004. In this paper Sir Howard Davies, Director of the London School of Economics and Former Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, provides an analysis of this review process. Several issues related to the complexity and implementability of the Accord are discussed. Although the author thinks that Basel II has many appealing aspects (such as the three‐pillar framework), he argues that the outcome is very complicated, it took a very long time, and needs to be adapted in ways not originally envisaged. He calls for a "Review of the Review" to see what lessons can be learnt from the review process which might be helpful for the future.     

'THE LAW OF STORMS': EUROPEAN AND INDIGENOUS RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS IN COLONIAL INDIA, c. 1800–1850

Focusing on collective response to storms and floods in early colonial India, the paper explores obstacles to successful disaster response with one example related to meteorology of cyclones and the other the use of embankments. In both these examples, there was an attempt to build public-private partnerships, which succeeded in the case of weather prediction and failed in river embankment. The failure is explained by two factors. Coordination and contracting were costly when the private partners had variable capacities and interests. Furthermore, whereas meteorology predicted nature, embankments interfered with nature, an intervention which carried social and economic costs.