A New Model of Inflation,Trend Inflation,and Long‐Run Inflation Expectations

This paper develops a bivariate model of inflation and a survey‐based long‐run forecast of inflation that allows for the estimation of the link between trend inflation and the long‐run forecast. Thus, our model allows for the possibilities that long‐run forecasts taken from surveys can be equated with trend inflation, that the two are completely unrelated, or anything in between. Using a variety of inflation measures and survey‐based forecasts for several countries, we find that long‐run forecasts can provide substantial help in refining estimates and fitting and forecasting inflation. It is less helpful to simply equate trend inflation with the long‐run forecasts.     

A free retail investment market?

Retail financial services regulation under the Financial Services Act of 1986 has been a disaster, and Labour plans to reform it promise to be little better. This paper suggests a better approach - a free market approach sbased on the principles of free competition, caveat emptor , utmost good faith, disclosure and summary redress of grievance. This regime would be both efficient and equitable, and the existing army of regulatory bodies could be disbanded.     

An Analysis of the Economic Consequences of the Proportionate Liability Rule*

Major accounting firms in the United States have singled out elimination of joint and several liability as one of the most needed legal reforms in the country. The recent legislation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 replaced joint and several liability with proportionate liability. This paper develops a simple model to analyze the economic consequences of such a change in the legal environment facing public accountants. In particular, we examine the incentive effects induced by the proportionate liability rule on the auditor's effort and financial statement users' litigation decisions. Our analysis demonstrates that replacing joint and several liability with proportionate liability can decrease the equilibrium audit effort, lawsuit probability, market price of the firm, and audit fee. More important, even though the proportionate liability rule reduces the equilibrium audit effort, we show that it can actually increase social welfare.     

虚拟经营条件下企业信息处理的过程分析与建构

虚拟企业信息处理是企业内部和企业之间的信息通过计算机网络途径进行传输的运动过程，形成网络化集成的信息处理过程，是对商品或服务运动状态的直接反映。本文提出虚拟化经营条件下企业信息流的组成和特点，从层次环境和战略规划分析虚拟企业信息处理的影响因素，并对VE信息处理过程进行建模，形成网络化企业组织信息全过程管理的方法体系。     

液相色谱-串联四级杆质谱方法检测动物源性基质中的β2——受体激动剂

利用安捷伦6410高效液相色谱串联质谱（LC／MS／MS）方法快速、准确地测定多种β2-受体激动剂的残留量。串联质谱在电喷雾（ESI＋）,多反应监测（MRM）模式下,进行质谱定性和定量分析,比液相检测方法灵敏、快速。该方法的定量检测限（LOQ）大多在0．5μg／kg以下,完全可以达到欧盟和日本对β2-受体激动剂残留限量的要求。     

我国商业银行资本金补充机制研究

本轮金融危机推动了全球金融监管的改革并催生了<巴塞尔协议Ⅲ>,国际监管改革将作用于国内金融监管以影响中国银行业的经营管理.资本监管是银行审慎监管的核心,资本金补充机制是银行资本金来源的基础,<巴塞尔协议Ⅲ>将推动我国商业银行资本金补充机制的变革和发展.本文通过分析我国商业银行与欧美大银行的资本结构差异,得出二者资本金补...     

Maximum-likelihood based inference in the two-way random effects model with serially correlated time effects

The general case where the time specific effect in a two way model follows an arbitrary ARMA process has not been considered previously. We offer a straightforward maximum likelihood estimator for this case. Allowing for general ARMA processes raises the issue of model specification and we propose tests of the null hypothesis of no serial correlation as well as tests for discriminating between different specifications. A Monte-Carlo experiment evaluates the finite-sample properties of the estimators and test-statistics. We have benefitted from discussions with Pietro Balestra, Marc Nerlove and Peter Schmidt and comments from participants at the Ninth International Conference on Panel Data and the Econometric Society Eight World Congress. Financial support from HSFR, the Swedish Research Council for the Humanities and Soical Sciences is gratefully acknowledged.     

Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information

The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well-known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high-quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high-quality borrowers may put up more collateral.