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181.
182.
CHRISTOPHER M. GUNN 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2018,50(2-3):479-511
I use a financial accelerator model to study interest and prices under boom–busts driven by changes in expectations about total factor productivity (TFP) and credit. I show that inflation falls in the boom phase of the TFP episode and then recovers during the bust, yet rises in the boom phase of the credit episode and then falls during the bust. Furthermore, for both episodes, the overaccumulation of debt relative to capital during the boom is critical for the busts since it implies a fall in credit worthiness. Finally, I show that stricter inflation targeting reduces inefficiencies in all instances but the boom phase of the TFP episode. 相似文献
183.
Existing literature identifies specific situations in which payback methods (PB) can provide precise surrogates for NPV analyses of accept/reject decisions. This paper extends that literature to take explicit account of taxation and of ranking decisions using profitability indices. Nevertheless, NPV can be considered preferable to PB as a basis for maximising stockholder wealth (MSW), because it requires fewer assumptions and provides more information. Yet simple PB continues to be used extensively, which suggests that it has advantages for decision-makers. Some authors suggest that its use reflects managerial short-termism and is inconsistent with MSW. In contrast, this paper proves that (with standard patterns of cash flows, defined risk classes and asymmetrical information) the use of PB instead of NPV should motivate risk-averse subordinate managers to adopt more positive NPV projects. Consequently, the appropriate use of PB can result in more wealth for stockholders than would occur using NPV directly. Furthermore, the use of PB avoids a number of costs and in the appropriate circumstances may therefore be the most cost-effective basis for evaluating investment decisions. 相似文献
184.
STEVEN L. HESTON CHRISTOPHER S. JONES MEHDI KHORRAM SHUAIQI LI HAITAO MO 《The Journal of Finance》2023,78(6):3141-3192
This paper investigates the performance of option investments across different stocks by computing monthly returns on at-the-money straddles on individual equities. We find that options with high historical returns continue to significantly outperform options with low historical returns over horizons ranging from 6 to 36 months. This phenomenon is robust to including out-of-the-money options or delta-hedging the returns. Unlike stock momentum, option return continuation is not followed by long-run reversal. Significant returns remain after factor risk adjustment and after controlling for implied volatility and other characteristics. Across stocks, trading costs are unrelated to the magnitude of momentum profits. 相似文献
185.
We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition deals to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are approximately 40% more mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than expected just below deal value thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve financial and governance contract terms that afford greater scope for negotiating and assigning lower deal values. We also show that the equity values, gross margins, and product prices of acquiring firms and their competitors increase following such acquisitions. Our results suggest that acquirers manipulate M&As to avoid antitrust scrutiny, thereby benefiting their own shareholders but potentially harming other corporate stakeholders. 相似文献