An algorithm for panel ANOVA with grouped data

In this paper, we present an algorithm suitable for analysing the variance of panel data when some observations are either given in grouped form or are missed. The analysis is carried out from the perspective of ANOVA panel data models with general errors. The classification intervals of the grouped observations may vary from one to another, thus the missing observations are in fact a particular case of grouping. The proposed Algorithm (1) estimates the parameters of the panel data models; (2) evaluates the covariance matrices of the asymptotic distribution of the time-dependent parameters assuming that the number of time periods, T, is fixed and the number of individuals, N, tends to infinity and similarly, of the individual parameters when T → ∞ and N is fixed; and, finally, (3) uses these asymptotic covariance matrix estimations to analyse the variance of the panel data.     

Drivers and implications of entrepreneurial orientation for academic spin-offs

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - This paper has been designed with a dual goal. On the one hand, the paper aims to examine the role of management teams, industry agents, and...     

The Endurance and Eclipse of the Controlled Vote: A Formal Model of Vote Brokerage Under the Secret Ballot

Throughout much of mankind's experience with elections, vote brokers – local elites who direct the voting decisions of a subset of the electorate – have been able to make or break political careers. In various polities, brokers have thrived in spite of the secret ballot, a surprising outcome given that vote secrecy would ostensibly allow citizens to pocket the inducements offered by such individuals and vote their consciences anyway. To address this puzzle, we develop a framework for understanding the persistence and demise of vote brokerage under the secret ballot. In our model, a broker contracts with voters using an outcome contingent contract: some fixed benefit is promised to all voters sharing one of several observable profiles should the broker's candidate win the election. Using this framework, we demonstrate that the existence of brokerage depends on the size of the electorate contained within the jurisdiction controlled by the broker, with large jurisdiction sizes tending to drive brokerage out of existence. Moreover, we detail the manner in which the strategies employed by brokers depend on their economic power, the size of social groups, and ideological polarization. Empirical evidence from Minas Gerais, Brazil is used to evaluate the performance of the model.     

Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs

An increasing number of environmental protection programs offers financial compensation to farmers in exchange for conservation services. Incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but the extant literature suggests that outcomes are always second-best so that other instruments (such as conservation auctions) may be preferred. We argue that the claim regarding the first-best solution never being incentive-compatible is correct if all conservation costs are variable in nature; if there are fixed costs too, the first-best compensation scheme may be incentive-compatible after all. Given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation issues, we conclude that incentive-compatible contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce conservation.     

Social capital as a distinctive feature of Social Economy firms

In recent years, the growing importance in developed countries of the Social Economy sector and the contribution of social capital to regional economic development are being studied in depth. Linking these two fields of research, the aim of the present work is to analyse the social capital endowments of Social Economy firms in comparison to those in traditional profit-maximizing firms. To do so, a literature review will be firstly carried out to clarify both the concept of social capital and, more specifically, its relation with entrepreneurship and social enterprises. In the empirical section, the social capital endowments both of social firms (cooperatives and owned-worker enterprises) and traditional firms are compared using data from two surveys conducted in Andalusia, a lagged Spanish region with long tradition in the Social Economy sector. Results show that social capital endowments measured through cooperation agreements and company links with local suppliers and costumers are higher in cooperatives and worker-owned companies. Therefore, Andalusian authorities must continue with its support policy to these enterprises as a mean to reinforce the regional economic development.     

The debt-equity financing decisions of U.S. startup firms

We examine the debt-equity decisions of startup firms using the Kauffman Firm Survey, the largest database of U.S. startups launched in 2004. To control for sample selection bias and the correlation among financing decisions, we employ a Bivariate Probit-Tobit model. Our results show that several firm characteristics such as growth prospects, firm size, tangible assets, and selling products, as well as owner characteristics such as net worth, experience, education and ethnicity explain the debt-equity decisions in the startup year. In addition, for firms that use debt, we document traits that explain the use of a particular type of business versus personal debt. Larger firms use more business debt, whereas home-based and growth firms use more personal sources of debt. Immigrants, owners who lack work experience and those who invest more time in the business tend to rely more on personal sources of debt.     

HR managers in five countries: what do they do and why does it matter?

The 1980s saw the need for change in the organizational role of human resource (HR) professionals, from the traditional employee champion and administrative expert to strategic business partner and change agent. The argument posited was that a more challenging environment compels organizations to turn to managing their HRs as a source of competitive advantage and that means an increasing business partnership for HR professionals. However, very few studies examine the execution of these multiple, sometimes contradictory roles, despite the risk that neglecting traditional roles endanger organizational performance in the long term. This five-country comparative study finds that multiple roles are at least moderately executed, and that these HR roles have different impact depending on the aspect of organizational performance. As well, a more challenging environment, defined here as legal constraints and industry challenges, generally does not have a significant moderating effect on the impact of the different HR roles on organizational performance.     

On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach

Summary We provide an elementary proof showing how in economies with an arbitrary number of agents an arbitrary number of public goods and utility functions quasi-linear in money, any efficient and individually rational mechanism is not strategy-proof for any economy satisfying a mild regularity requirement.The authors wish to thank William Thomson, Salvadpr Barberá, José Angel Silva and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The remaining errors are our exclusive responsibility. Financial support from DGICYT under project PB 91-0756 and the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas is gratefully acknowledged.     

Do employment subsidies work? Evidence from regionally targeted subsidies in Turkey

This paper studies the effects on registered employment and number of registered establishments of two employment subsidy schemes in Turkey. We implement a difference-in-differences methodology to construct appropriate counterfactuals for the covered provinces. Our findings suggest that both subsidy programs did lead to significant net increases in registered jobs in eligible provinces (5%–13% for the first program and 11%–15% for the second). However, the cost of the actual job creation was high because of substantial deadweight losses, particularly for the first program (47% and 78%). Because of better design features, the second subsidy program had lower, though still significant, deadweight losses (27%–46%). Although constrained by data availability, the evidence suggests that the dominant effect of subsidies was to increase social security registration of firms and workers rather than boosting total employment and economic activity. This supports the theory that in countries with weak enforcement institutions, high labor taxes on low-wage workers may lead to substantial incentives for firms and workers to operate informally.