Audit Partner Disciplinary Actions and Financial Restatements

This study investigates the signalling role and rectification effectiveness of an audit partner disciplinary system. The signalling role refers to whether sanctions reflect the poor audit quality of disciplined audit partners, and rectification effectiveness addresses whether disciplinary actions enhance subsequent audit quality. The sample consists of Taiwanese listed companies, in the period 2000 to 2006, where the identities of audit partners who sign audit reports and who are sanctioned are accessible. Empirical results indicate that in the pre‐sanction period, the probability of financial restatements by clients of disciplined audit partners is significantly higher than that of non‐disciplined audit partners. The more severe or frequent the sanctions, the higher the likelihood of financial restatements in the pre‐sanction period. These findings imply that audit partner disciplinary actions can serve as a signal of lower audit quality provided by those partners. The rectification effectiveness of disciplinary actions is examined from two perspectives: (1) the effects on subsequent improvements of audit quality of disciplined audit partners; and (2) audit quality enhancement of successor non‐disciplined audit partners who accept clients from disciplined audit partners. Empirical results show a lower probability of restating financial statements audited by disciplined audit partners after sanctions. We also find a lower likelihood of restating financial statements audited by successor non‐disciplined audit partners in the post‐sanction period. Both findings support our conclusion that audit partner sanctions improve audit quality. Overall, audit partner disciplinary actions can signal lower quality audit partners and are effective in enhancing audit quality.     

Do investors misprice components of net periodic pension cost?

We examine whether and how investors misprice the components of net periodic pension cost under SFAS No. 87 and 158. We find that investors appear to have difficulty in understanding the transitory feature of other net periodic pension cost (PPOPCC) and thus overestimate its persistence, which in turn leads to the mispricing of PPOPCC in the pre‐158 period. We also find that SFAS No. 158 appears to reduce the mispricing of PPOPCC, suggesting a positive effect of SFAS No. 158 on investors' valuation of pension items in the income statement. Additional analysis suggests that investors also overestimate the persistence of, and thus misprice, pension‐related cash flows and accruals in the pre‐158 period and that SFAS No. 158 reduces the mispricing of pension‐related cash flows and accruals.     

The Effects of Executive,Firm, and Board Characteristics on Executive Exit

We estimate a hazard model of the probability of top corporate executives exiting their firms over the period 1996–2010. Our main findings are that: (1) female executives have greater likelihoods of exit than males, (2) the likelihood of exit increases with the independence of the board and decreases with the fraction of the board that is female and the average age of board members, and (3) a higher percentage of independent directors on the board lowers the probability of exit more for females than for males. Further, controlling for exit risk reduces the well‐documented compensation differential between men and women.     

Capacity Investment under Demand Uncertainty: The Role of Imports in the U.S. Cement Industry

Demand uncertainty is thought to influence irreversible capacity decisions. Suppose that local demand can be sourced from domestic (rigid) production or from (flexible) imports. This paper shows that the optimal domestic capacity is either increasing or decreasing with demand uncertainty, depending on the relative level of the costs of domestic production and imports. We test this relationship with data from the U.S. cement industry, in which the difference in marginal cost between domestic production and imports varies across local U.S. markets because cement is costly to transport over land. Industry data for 1999 to 2010 are consistent with the predictions of the model. The introduction of two technologies to the production set—one rigid and one flexible—is crucial to understanding the relationship between capacity choice and uncertainty in this industry because there is no relationship between these two variables in aggregated U.S. data. Our analysis reveals that the relationship is negative in coastal districts, and significantly more positive in landlocked districts.     

Reward for organ donation: is it effective or not as a promotion strategy?

This study aims to investigate the effects of the rewards for organ donation as a promotion strategy, which is part of a campaign to promote organ donation in Korea by the non‐profit organization Korean Network for Organ Sharing. This study examines how the effects of rewards for organ donation differ in terms of reward types, public self‐consciousness, and stages of change. An interaction effect between types of reward, stage of change, and the degree of public self‐consciousness was found. Reward type and stage of change were found to function as moderators of the effect of public self‐consciousness on the intention to register for organ donation. The effect of public self‐consciousness on the intention for organ donation was positive and statistically significant among those who were in the contemplation stage and exposed to non‐material types of reward. On the other hand, the effect of public self‐consciousness on the intention for organ donation was negative among those in the pre‐contemplation stage and exposed to material types of reward. Practical implications for organ donation organizations are suggested. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of internal locus of control on entrepreneurship: the mediating mechanisms of social capital and human capital

This paper proposes the research framework that locus of control enhances entrepreneurship through the mediating mechanisms of increased social capital in interpersonal networks and improved human capital in personal development. We adopted structural equation modeling to examine the research hypothesis. The research participants comprised managers from 14 enterprises in China; a total of 1002 valid questionnaires were collected. The results revealed that social and human capital mediate the effect that internal locus of control exerts on entrepreneurship. This study provides the following research contributions: first, the findings address the gaps in previous studies regarding the effect that a single dimension (i.e. personality traits) produces on entrepreneurship. Second, by employing the social exchange and human capital theories, we integrated interpersonal and individual perspectives into the research framework to explore factors affecting entrepreneurship, identifying that social and human capital are key-mediating mechanisms through which locus of control influences entrepreneurship.     

Taking a Second Look in a Warped Crystal Ball: Explaining the Accuracy of Revised Forecasts

The fundamental questions we address are whether firms with a higher initial forecasting ability are able to accurately revise the exit forecasts of their investments; and how co‐investment partners and value‐adding commitment with their investment influence the main effect. We explore these questions with novel and unique data collected via mixed research methods on venture capital firms’ forecasts of 114 portfolio companies. We find that venture capital firms that are better at making initial forecasts are less effective in revising their forecasts. In addition, while the number of co‐investment partners positively moderate this relationship, venture capital firms’ value‐adding commitment moderates it negatively. Our findings contribute to the literature on organizational forecasting as well as inter‐organizational knowledge transfer and knowledge creation. They also provide novel insights into venture capital literature and practice.     

Financial Participation: Does the Risk Transfer Story Hold in France?

Several articles report a positive effect of financial participation (profit sharing (PS) and employee share ownership) on firms' economic performance. This increase can be obtained in two main ways: by increasing the effort (extrinsic, intrinsic or commitment) of workers, directly or indirectly through worker selection; or by transferring more risk to the workers. The question is, of course, not neutral. Indeed, if the risk transfer story is true then it means that the increase of economic performance is obtained at the expense of workers, who take on the burden of more risks. The question is especially important in France where financial participation is associated with tax exemption for firms and where it is forbidden by law to substitute base wage and PS. The purpose of our article is to use an employer–employee dataset to answer the question of whether financial participation schemes are mainly designed as a risk transfer (from firms to workers) device.     

Going short‐term or long‐term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack

Research summary: We draw on behavioral agency theory to explain how decision heuristics associated with CEO stock options interact with firm slack to shape the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategies (temporal orientation). Our findings suggest CEO current option wealth substitutes for the influence of slack resources in encouraging a long‐term orientation, while prospective option wealth enhances the positive effect of slack on temporal orientation. Our theory offers explanations for non‐findings in previous analysis of the relationship between CEO equity based pay and temporal orientation and provides the insights that CEO incentives created by stock options (1) enhance the effect of available slack upon temporal orientation and (2) can both incentivize and de‐incentivize destructive short‐termism, depending upon the values of current and prospective option wealth. Managerial summary: We explore how compensation design can play a role in affecting the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategic projects. When the CEOs have accumulated option wealth, they are more likely to invest in the long term. Yet when they have a large number of recently granted options with the potential to generate significant wealth in the event of successful risk taking, the CEO is more likely to prefer the short term in order to achieve personal wealth gains more quickly. The more liquid assets the firm holds, the weaker both of the aforementioned effects. An implication for boards is that they should anticipate CEO short‐termism if the CEO has been granted new options, underlining the potential negative consequences of option compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relevance of political affinity for the initial acquisition premium in cross‐border acquisitions

Research summary : In the context of economic nationalism, we investigate the relevance of political affinity between countries to the initial acquisition premium offered in cross‐border acquisitions. Political affinity is defined as the similarity of national interests in global affairs. We argue that political affinity affects how foreign acquirers anticipate their bargaining position in their negotiations with domestic target firms. With decreasing political affinity, the host government becomes increasingly likely to intervene against foreign firms in an acquisition deal. Consequently, foreign acquirers need to provide a more lucrative initial offer to dissuade target firms from leveraging government intervention to oppose the acquisition. Our prediction is supported by strong evidence that political affinity, as revealed by UN general assembly voting patterns, leads to lower initial acquisition premiums. Managerial summary : Media reports suggest that politics plays an important role in international business transactions. However, we still know very little about how bilateral political relations affect corporate decision‐making. In this article, we analyze the influence of the quality of bilateral political relations on the bidding behavior of foreign acquirers in cross‐border acquisitions. We argue that the host government is more likely to intervene against the foreign acquirer during deal negotiations if the quality of bilateral political relations is poor. A lower political affinity between countries therefore decreases the bargaining power of the acquirer and pushes up the initial bid premium the acquirer has to offer to the local target. Our empirical results confirm our argument. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.