EXPERIMENTAL AND SELF‐REPORTED MEASURES OF RISK TAKING AND DIGIT RATIO (2D:4D): EVIDENCE FROM A LARGE,SYSTEMATIC STUDY

We systematically investigate the links between the digit ratio (2D:4D)—a biomarker for prenatal testosterone exposure—and two measures of individual risk taking: (i) risk preferences (RP) over lotteries with real monetary incentives and (ii) self‐reported risk attitude (RA). We find that both the right‐hand and the left‐hand digit ratio are significantly associated with RP: Subjects with lower digit ratios tend to choose riskier lotteries. Neither digit ratio, however, is associated with self‐reported RA.     

State‐Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements

Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.     

Strategic spin-offs of input divisions

When a downstream producer enters backward into the input market, a “helping the rivals effect” exists: Such entry hurts the firm's downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms. This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit from expanding. A spin-off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market, thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively. Spin-offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level. When there is more than one integrated firm, a spin-off by a firm can trigger spin-offs by others that would not occur otherwise.     

Using paradata to collect better survey data: Evidence from a household survey in Tanzania

Data are a key component in the design, implementation, and evaluation of economic and social policies. Monitoring data quality is an essential part of any serious, large‐scale data collection process. The purpose of this article is to show how paradata should be used before, during, and after data collection to monitor and improve data quality. To do this we use timestamps, global positioning system (GPS) coordinates, and other paradata collected from an 800‐household survey conducted in Tanzania in 2016. We demonstrate how key paradata can be used during each phase of a research project to identify and prevent issues in the data and the methods used to collect it. Our results corroborate the importance of collecting and analyzing paradata to monitor fieldwork and ensuring data quality for micro data collection in developing countries. Based on these findings we also make recommendations as to how researchers can make better use of paradata in the future to manage and improve data quality. We argue for an expansion in the understanding and use of varied paradata among researchers, and a greater focus on its use for improving data quality.     

Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool

We study mutual‐aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution‐based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no‐insurance equilibrium while contribution‐based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a “dual interior equilibrium.” That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co‐existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.     

Asymmetric Effects of Exchange Rate Changes and the J‐curve: New Evidence from 61 Malaysia–Thailand Industries

Research on the impact of currency depreciation on the trade balance is now moving in a new direction by incorporating nonlinear dynamic adjustment of the exchange rate and by using a nonlinear approach to error‐correction modeling and cointegration. Using these advances, researchers find not only more evidence of the J‐curve effect, but also new evidence of asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes on the trade balance. We contribute to this line of research by using monthly trade flow data from 61 two‐digit industries that trade between Malaysia and Thailand, and show that not only does currency depreciation have favorable effects on the trade balance of more industries, but the long‐run effects are asymmetric in 26 out of 61 cases. In line with current literature, our nonlinear model performs much better than the linear model when industry level data are used.     

欧元区主权债务危机给人民币区域化带来的启示

2008年世界金融危机后,中国加快了人民币区域化的步伐.在2010年欧元危机爆发之前,理论界一直都将欧元视为人民币区域化可借鉴的模式,而透过对2010年引发欧元危机的欧元区主权债务危机的深入分析,我们将得到一些对正在进行的人民币区域化有益的启示.     

ASYMMETRY OF CUSTOMER LOSS AND RECOVERY UNDER ENDOGENOUS PARTNERSHIPS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

This article is inspired by real‐world phenomena that firms lose customers based on imprecise information and take a long time to recover. If consumers are playing an ordinary repeated game with fixed partners, there is no clear reason why recovery happens slowly. However, if consumers are playing an endogenously repeated game, a class of simple efficient equilibria exhibits the asymmetry of fast loss and slow recovery of customers after a bad signal. Exit is systematic, but formation of a new partnership is random. We also give empirical evidence of our equilibria at an individual‐firm level.     

馆藏图书大规模倒架的探索与实践——以铜陵学院图书馆为例

馆藏纸质图书大规模倒架工作的实践与经验总结,可以拓展、促进图书馆学科的进一步发展。笔者在亲历两次图书馆搬迁,数次的纸质图书大规模倒架实践中,总结出一套简单、实用、有效的方法经验。在此抛砖引玉,以期图书馆提高倒架、搬迁工效,合理布局新库,方便读者借阅。     

Conflict technology in cooperation: The group size paradox revisited

This paper studies the implications of punishment‐induced conflict in a public goods game. It shows, under plausible assumptions, how larger group size sometimes enhances punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence supports higher levels of cooperation. Unlike existing approaches that focus on uncoordinated punishment, I consider punishment as a coordinated activity that may be resisted by those being punished and study the implications of punishment‐induced conflict situations. Developing a conflict model of punishment and combining it with a standard public good game, I show that coordinated punishment can yield the concentration effect of punishment, leading to a larger group advantage; that is, the larger the group, the easier it becomes to organize cooperation. The key idea is that when punishers coordinate their punishment, punishers as a coalition successfully divide defectors and punish each defector one by one. Surprisingly, even when coordination among punishers decays as group size increases, as long as the rate of decaying remains relatively slow the larger group advantage still obtains.