Exchange rate exposure and foreign exchange derivatives: do ineffective hedgers modify future derivatives use?

Recent studies examining the relationship between stock returns and exchange rate changes have provided evidence that the exchange rate exposure of non-financial companies is reduced by the use of foreign exchange derivatives. Building on such research, this study investigates whether past ineffective derivative hedging contributes to explaining future derivatives use. To the extent that companies monitor the effectiveness of their currency risk management practices, past ineffective hedgers can be expected to modify their future use of foreign exchange derivatives accordingly. In our study of 94 non-financial US multinationals, we provide evidence that the change in derivatives use from 1996–1998 to 1998–2000 can be explained in part by the ineffective hedging of currency risk in 1996–1998, controlling for variables associated with theories of optimal hedging. Additional analyses confirm that such primary results are robust to firm size, the level of foreign operations, and the use of derivatives to partially hedge currency risk. Our results imply that as exchange markets and risk management practices change, the use of derivatives to manage exchange rate risk also changes. Our contribution to this field of study is that we find evidence that past ineffective hedgers tend to increase their future use of FXDs.     

Multilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy

The paper analyzes environmental tax policy reform using a competitive model of world trade that includes production‐generated environmental damage (pollution) and trade tariffs. The authors examine the feasibility of Pareto‐improving multilateral reforms of environmental taxes, and show that any environmental tax reform that is mutually welfare‐improving when compensating lump‐sum transfers are assumed is also welfare‐improving when a suitable tariff reform (but no transfers) is combined with the tax changes. Several specific reform proposals are developed. These results expand the feasible set of mutually improving policy proposals for international policy initiatives.     

Productivity Growth and Some of Its Determinants in the Deregulated U.S. Railroad Industry

This study analyzes the effects of an important postderegulation innovation on rail freight productivity: the elimination of cabooses and related crew members. It also analyzes the overall growth of productivity in rail freight between 1983 and 1997 (using a translog rail cost function estimated over a sample of Class I railroads between 1983 and 1997). The results indicate that elimination of cabooses and associated crew members from freight trains reduced costs by 5-8% on the typical Class I railroad in 1997, equivalent to an annual cost saving of $2 billion to $3.3 billion for all Class I railroads. Moreover, if Class I railroads had no other technological advances since 1983, their 1997 costs (with 1997 factor prices) would have been 36-43% higher than they in fact were. Finally, the results show that overall productivity growth in rail freight did not decelerate between 1983 and 1997; if anything, it accelerated slightly.     

Open economy and financial burden of corruption: theory and application to Asia

We discuss why corruption remains high and show that corruption contributes to the Banking distress and to the rapid transmission across international stock and currency markets. Undeveloped ‘derivative securities’ markets make the risk from stress-induced volatility difficult to manage. Vinod’s (1999) closed economy model is extended to indicate the asymmetry of ‘home bias’ and the effect of corruption on the value at risk (VaR). Our theory predicts that capital flight controls will be many, foreign direct investment (FDI) will be low and cost of capital will be high in corrupt developing countries, which is supported by Asian data. We include some policy recommendations regarding financial institutions and markets.     

A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising

This note provides a formal demonstration of the incentive incompatibility problem that exists in franchisor — franchisee relationships. It is shown that incentive incompatibility exists with respect to both price and quality. Several contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate the incompatibility problem are examined.