Bid-Ask Spreads,Information Asymmetry,and Abnormal Investor Sentiment: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Using a sample of closed-end equity funds listed on the NYSE from 1994 to 1999, we investigate differences in spreads and adverse selection costs between the closed-end funds and a matched sample of common stocks. We find that spreads and adverse selection costs for the closed-end funds are significantly lower than those of control stocks. The results are consistent for the subperiods both before and after the minimum tick size change on NYSE on June 24, 1997. The differences of spreads and adverse selection costs cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the closed-end funds and the matched sample of common stocks. Lastly, we find that abnormal investor sentiment and adverse selection costs of closed-end funds are positively correlated over time.     

保险业要么锁定客户，要么收购

贝恩公司调查发现,仅有1／10的保险公司成功地实现连年持续地创造价值。许多公司最终表现欠佳的主要原因在于,他们严重误判自己提供客户所需产品／服务的能力。当高级主管被问及是否认为本公司提供最佳客户体验时,77％的高管自认为是,但仅有6％的客户认同。那么,究竟什么才是保险业实现最佳股东回报的关键呢?     

The effect of communication in incentive systems—an experimental study

In organizational theory, it is a widely accepted postulate that cooperation among subjects is enforceable. This assumption is essential for the evaluation of two frequently discussed incentive systems: team and tournament compensation. Whereas in team‐based pay systems cooperation is highly desired, cooperation in rank‐order tournaments—labeled as ‘collusion’—is regarded as one of the main drawbacks of relative performance evaluation. In this experimental study, two different communication technologies are introduced into both incentive environments. The results indicate that when only limited communication is permitted subjects tend to cheat on each other in the tournament rather than in the team setting. Interestingly, allowing subjects to exchange emails leads to a similarly stable cooperation in both incentive systems. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulierung, Effizienz und das Anreizdilemma bei Investitionen in intelligente Netze

In this paper, we survey from a theoretical point of view to what extend cost-based and incentive-based regulatory regimes stimulate investments. For the purpose of this analysis, we furthermore differentiate by different efficiency measures, i.e. allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency and analyse to what extend each efficiency measure is stimulated by the regulatory regime. Eventually, we analyse to what extend regulatory incentives for network innovation in a smart grid context exist and to what extend different forms of regulation stimulate dynamic efficiency.     

Patterns of business creation,survival and growth: Evidence from Africa

We study firm dynamics using a novel database of all formally registered firms in Cote d'Ivoire from 1977 to 1997, which account for about 60% of GDP. First, we examine entry and exit patterns and the role of new and exiting firms versus incumbents in job creation and destruction. We find that while the rate of job creation at new firms is quiet high – at 8% on average – the numbers of jobs added by new firms is small in absolute terms. Next, we examine survival rates and find that the probability of survival increases monotonically with firm size, but that manufacturing and foreign-owned firms face higher likelihoods of exit compared to service oriented and domestically-owned firms. We find that higher GDP growth increases the probability of firm survival, but this is a broad impact with no firm size disproportionately affected. In robustness checks we find that post-1987, size is no longer a significant determinant of firm survival for new entrants, suggesting that the operating environment for firms changed. Finally, we find that trade and fiscal reform episodes raised the probability of firm exit and attenuated the survival disadvantages faced by smaller firms, but exchange rate revaluation and pro-private sector reforms did not significantly lower the likelihood of exit.     

Critically challenging some assumptions in HRD

This paper sets out to critically challenge five interrelated assumptions prominent in the (human resource development) HRD literature. These relate to: the exploitation of labour in enhancing shareholder value; the view that employees are co‐contributors to and co‐recipients of HRD benefits; the distinction between HRD and human resource management; the relationship between HRD and unitarism; and the relationship between HRD and organizational and learning cultures. From a critical modernist perspective, it is argued that these can only be adequately addressed by taking a point of departure from the particular state of the capital–labour relation in time, place and space. HRD, of its nature, exists in a continuous state of dialectical tension between capital and labour – and there is much that critical scholarship has yet to do in informing practitioners about how they might manage and cope with such tension.