Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options

Summary. In this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value. Received: February 27, 1996; revised version: March 28, 1997     

Simulation theory can provide practical solutions to complex industrial marketing problems

To maintain adequate levels of production and profit despite prevailing economic recession and inflation, many firms have explored various sectors of potential cost savings within the logistics framework. Models, algorithms, and mathematical-solution techniques have been devised and implemented for warehouse layout and/or location, inventory control, and other problem areas. For instance, for many distribution managers the acceptance of the public warehouse and the centralized distribution center as solutions to profit-squeeze problems has brought to the forefront the intricate problems and high costs associated with advanced shipment scheduling and delivery techniques.     

Connections and performance in bankers’ turnover

In this paper we study the impact of the connections of the top executives (Presidents, CEOs and General Managers) of Italian banks on their turnover and on bank performance. We measure managers’ connections by the kilometer distance between the province of the bank's headquarter and the manager's province of birth. We show that top managers tend to be local in the sense that the distribution of this distance is heavily skewed towards zero. On the basis of this evidence we investigate whether connections affect the duration of the appointment at the bank, and whether connections entrench managers at the expense of the bank's performance. We find that connections generally decrease the probability of bank manager’s turnover, and that the positive effect of performance on tenure is strongly attenuated once connections are taken into account. Furthermore we find that for any bank type performance does not increase with connections. On the contrary, we show that having connected managers hurts performance in Mutual, Cooperative and Rural banks. Overall these findings suggest that connections are collusion devices to share and maintain rents at the expenses of bank performance.     

The on-the-run liquidity phenomenon

We test the implications of a model of multi-asset speculative trading in which liquidity differentials between on-the-run and off-the-run U.S. Treasury bonds ensue from endowment shocks in the presence of two realistic market frictions—information heterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed traders—and a public signal. Our evidence suggests that (i) off/on-the-run liquidity differentials are economically and statistically significant, even after controlling for several of the bonds’ intrinsic characteristics (such as duration, convexity, repo rates, or term premiums), and (ii) off/on-the-run liquidity differentials are smaller immediately following bond auction dates, and larger when the uncertainty surrounding the ensuing auction allocations is high, when the dispersion of beliefs across informed traders is high, and when macroeconomic announcements are noisy, consistent with our model.     

Informed and Strategic Order Flow in the Bond Markets

We study the role played by private and public information inthe process of price formation in the U.S. Treasury bond market.To guide our analysis, we develop a parsimonious model of speculativetrading in the presence of two realistic market frictions—informationheterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed traders—anda public signal. We test its equilibrium implications by analyzingthe response of two-year, five-year, and ten-year U.S. bondyields to order flow and real-time U.S. macroeconomic news.We find strong evidence of informational effects in the U.S.Treasury bond market: unanticipated order flow has a significantand permanent impact on daily bond yield changes during bothannouncement and nonannouncement days. Our analysis furthershows that, consistent with our stylized model, the contemporaneouscorrelation between order flow and yield changes is higher whenthe dispersion of beliefs among market participants is highand public announcements are noisy.     

Queues, not just mediocrity: Inefficiency in decentralized markets with vertical differentiation

We analyze a dynamic, decentralized market with endogenous entry, where in each period the active sellers supply one unit of an indivisible service at varying degrees of quality. The customers that have entered the market are randomly matched with the active sellers and prices are set by (complete information) pair-wise bargaining. In its unique steady state, the market leads to an excess diversity of quality and customers may have to suffer costly delays. Notably, efficiency is not regained as per period delay costs disappear. We also show that setting minimal quality standards, such as licensing rules by a professional college, will improve welfare (and even Consumer Surplus), relative to the free market, whenever the inefficiency is caused by a large enough excess supply.     

Robust portfolio estimation under skew-normal return processes

In this paper, we study issues related to the optimal portfolio estimators and the local asymptotic normality (LAN) of the return process under the assumption that the return process has an infinite moving average (MA) (∞) representation with skew-normal innovations. The paper consists of two parts. In the first part, we discuss the influence of the skewness parameter δ of the skew-normal distribution on the optimal portfolio estimators. Based on the asymptotic distribution of the portfolio estimator ? for a non-Gaussian dependent return process, we evaluate the influence of δ on the asymptotic variance V(δ) of ?. We also investigate the robustness of the estimators of a standard optimal portfolio via numerical computations. In the second part of the paper, we assume that the MA coefficients and the mean vector of the return process depend on a lower-dimensional set of parameters. Based on this assumption, we discuss the LAN property of the return's distribution when the innovations follow a skew-normal law. The influence of δ on the central sequence of LAN is evaluated both theoretically and numerically.     

Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterization. The uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of Pareto optimal voting rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule.     

Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration

This paper offers a new explanation of the gender pay gap in leadership positions by examining the relationship between managerial bonuses and company performance. Drawing on findings of gender studies, agency theory, and the leadership literature, we argue that the gender pay gap is a context‐specific phenomenon that results partly from the fact that company performance has a moderating impact on pay inequalities. Employing a matched sample of 192 female and male executive directors of U.K.‐listed firms, we corroborate the existence of the gender pay disparities in corporate boardrooms. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that bonuses awarded to men are not only larger than those allocated to women, but also that managerial compensation of male executive directors is much more performance‐sensitive than that of female executives. The contribution of attributional and expectancy‐related dynamics to these patterns is highlighted in line with previous work on gender stereotypes and implicit leadership theories such as the romance of leadership. Gender differences in risk taking and confidence are also considered as potential explanations for the observed pay disparities. The implications of organizations' indifference to women's performance are examined in relation to issues surrounding the recognition and retention of female talent. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.