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71.
72.
Using a unique high-frequency futures dataset, we characterize the response of U.S., German and British stock, bond and foreign exchange markets to real-time U.S. macroeconomic news. We find that news produces conditional mean jumps; hence high-frequency stock, bond and exchange rate dynamics are linked to fundamentals. Equity markets, moreover, react differently to news depending on the stage of the business cycle, which explains the low correlation between stock and bond returns when averaged over the cycle. Hence our results qualify earlier work suggesting that bond markets react most strongly to macroeconomic news; in particular, when conditioning on the state of the economy, the equity and foreign exchange markets appear equally responsive. Finally, we also document important contemporaneous links across all markets and countries, even after controlling for the effects of macroeconomic news.  相似文献   
73.
We consider an extension of the standard Rubinstein model where both players are randomly allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of known value. We show that, when the value of the outside opportunities is of intermediate size, there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some with delayed agreements. Considering outside opportunities of significant value, we prove that efficient delays arise caused by the bargainers' aspirations, in waiting for their outside, option rather than by threats. Moreover, if taking the outside option decreases the probability that the opponent receives an outside option in the future, then it is possible that exactly two equilibrium payoffs coexist. In this latter case, inefficiencies may be created by agreeing too early.  相似文献   
74.
75.
Our article explores the cultural politics of public space and the placemaking politics of urban redevelopment in the Atlas District of Washington, DC, a popular commercial district undergoing rapid gentrification. The major questions we address are, how do race and class impact the ways public space is controlled and/or managed in the context of rapid changes in the built, economic and social environments of the neighborhood? What role do those narratives play in justifying changes in and management of public space? We focus on uses of public space and describe how various forms of power are linked to the control of space in the context of gentrification. Our analysis focuses on designated public space in the Atlas District—the Starburst Plaza. By analyzing everyday practices around community control at the Starburst Plaza, this case study focuses on the discrete methods by which the symbolic and material inequities promulgated by the neoliberal state are reconfigured through struggles to define and manage contested public spaces.  相似文献   
76.
77.
In this paper, it is analyzed the hypothesis that in R&D the principal researcher (PR) is accepted as the coordinator or project manager (PM), carrying out the search for financing and to manage contracts, resources, cost, time, scope, risk and uncertainty, communication, stakeholders and so on, in addition to internal research activities. Thus, this study tries to verify this hypothesis through a major literature review in different types of projects developed by university, but also with a look to industry and industry-university cooperation. Two case studies are also analyzed, centered in its R&D project management maturity level. It is concluded that there is an important issue in projects’ success and in the time spent by PR in management, work for which they are under trained; while at the industry there is a greater approach to project management by the proximity of the innovation projects to other industrial projects. Following these initial findings and according to the case study results, it is proposed that R&D Projects in universities would be separated into two synergistic knowledge areas: R&D Management and Project Management. It is also recommended to allocate them to two distinct roles, where they could add value to R&D through their better knowledge and skills.  相似文献   
78.
Quality & Quantity - It is widely recognized that the design and application of suitable and robust science, technology and innovation (STI) policies and appropriate STI institutions promote...  相似文献   
79.
Board Efficiency and Internal Corporate Control Mechanisms   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
We analyze the interactions between internal and external control mechanisms in a framework in which the board selects the CEO and then decides whether to retain or dismiss him after observing a signal regarding his ability. The novel aspect of our paper is that we consider both the hiring and the firing of the CEO by the board. The type of board is defined by its ability to select a good CEO, so that the quality of the CEO depends on the type of board. Then, the dismissal-retention decision provides information not only on the quality of the CEO but also on the board's type. We show that the board's behavior depends on the pressure from the takeover market and on whether its type is publicly known. When the pressure from the takeover market is high and the type of board is private information, the board prefers not to dismiss the manager even if it has received a very low signal regarding his quality. Hence, our model endogenously derives a collusion between board and CEO in which the board does not fire a bad CEO. This behavior emerges as an attempt to hide the board's inability to accomplish the first task, CEO selection, by distorting the second task, the CEO retention-dismissal decision.  相似文献   
80.
I use Easley and O’Hara's [1992, Journal of Finance 47, 577–604] private information-based trading variable, PIN, together with a comprehensive public news database to empirically measure the effect of private and public information on the post-announcement drift. I show that stocks associated with high PIN, consensus public news surprises, and low media coverage experience low or insignificant drift. Thus not all information acquisition variables have the same effect on the market's efficiency. Whether information is public or private is irrelevant; what matters is whether information is associated with the arrival rate of informed or uninformed traders.  相似文献   
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