Financial freedom and bank efficiency: Evidence from the European Union

This paper investigates the dynamics between the financial freedom counterparts of the economic freedom index drawn from the Heritage Foundation database and bank efficiency levels. We rely on a large sample of commercial banks operating in the 27 European Union member states over the 2000s. After estimating bank-specific efficiency scores using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we develop a truncated regression model combined with bootstrapped confidence intervals to test our main hypotheses. Results suggest that the higher the degree of an economy’s financial freedom, the higher the benefits for banks in terms of cost advantages and overall efficiency. Our results also show that the effects of financial freedom on bank efficiency tend to be more pronounced in countries with freer political systems in which governments formulate and implement sound policies and higher quality governance.     

Einstieg in die Insulintherapie

Zusammenfassung  Typ-2-Diabetes — Die Behandlung eines Typ-2-Diabetes stellt für die Patienten, aber auch für betreuende Pflegekr?fte in der ambulanten Versorgung, eine Herausforderung dar. Vor allem die Umstellung von oralen Antidiabetika auf Insulin bedeutet für viele Patienten eine gro?e Hürde. Wie kann dem Patient die Angst vor der Insulintherapie genommen werden?     

Zurück zur Sprache

Zusammenfassung  Aphasie – Auf einmal ?ndert sich alles — Unsere Welt ist von kommunikativen und sprachlichen Prozesse gepr?gt – für Menschen mit Sprachst?rungen – beispielsweise nach einem Schlaganfall – entstehen damit umfassende Probleme. Wie und wobei k?nnen Pflegekr?fte helfen?     

Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence

We examine a technology-adoption game with network effects in which coordination on either technology A or technology B constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff dominant. We define a technology’s critical mass as the minimal share of users, which is necessary to make the choice of this technology the best response for any remaining user. We show that the technology with the lower critical mass implies risk dominance and selection by the maximin criterion. We present experimental evidence that both payoff dominance and risk dominance explain participants’ choices in the technology-adoption game. The relative riskiness of a technology can be proxied using either technologies’ critical masses or stand-alone values absent any network effects.     

Top Incomes in Chile: A Historical Perspective on Income Inequality, 1964–2017

We present a novel series of Chilean top-income shares covering half a century, mainly based on income-tax declarations and the National Accounts. Such a time frame of analysis is still rare in the literature of developing countries. We distinguish between a fiscal-income series (1964–2017) and an adjusted series (1990–2017). The former covers individual income, while the latter also includes corporate undistributed profits, which affects both levels and trends. The fiscal-income estimates start with low levels and a decreasing trend over the 1960s. They then increase rapidly during the dictatorship years (1973–89). The series ends with a high, yet slowly decreasing, concentration for most of the recent democratic period (1990–2017). By contrast, the adjusted series has followed a U-shape since the return of democracy, contradicting the established consensus on falling inequality over the period. Furthermore, Chile ranks among the most unequal countries in both the OECD and Latin American countries over the period.     

The emerging aversion to inequality

This paper provides evidence of the changing attitudes to inequality during transition to the market in Poland. Using repeated cross-sections of the population, it identifies a structural break in the relationship between income inequality and satisfaction. Whereas in the first stage of the transition process, an increase in income inequality was interpreted by the population as a positive signal of wider opportunities, later in the transition period increased inequality became a factor in dissatisfaction with the country's economic situation. This was accompanied by increasing public sentiment that the process of income distribution is flawed and corrupt.     

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors

This article presents a strategic model of liability and litigationunder court errors. Our framework allows for endogenous choiceof level of care and endogenous likelihood of filing and disputes.We derive sufficient conditions for a unique universally divinemixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium under low courterrors. In this equilibrium, some defendants choose to be grosslynegligent; some cases are filed; and some lawsuits are dropped,some are resolved out of court, and some go to trial. We findthat court errors in the size of the award, as well as damagecaps and split awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increasefiling and reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages.We derive conditions under which the adoption of the Englishrule for allocating legal costs reduces filing.