Do exporters really pay higher wages? First evidence from German linked employer-employee data

Many plant-level studies find that average wages in exporting firms are higher than in non-exporting firms from the same industry and region. This paper uses a large set of linked employer-employee data from Germany to analyze this exporter wage premium. We show that the wage differential becomes smaller but does not completely vanish when observable and unobservable characteristics of the employees and of the workplace are controlled for. For example, blue-collar (white-collar) employees working in a plant with an export-sales ratio of 60% earn about 1.8 (0.9) % more than similar employees in otherwise identical non-exporting plants.     

Voluntary internalisations facing the threat of a pollution tax

This paper investigates how the threat of a pollution tax fosters voluntary arrangements under private information and how such arrangements (of the take-it-or-leave-it type) will look like. The objective is (i), to address a topical and policy relevant problem, and (ii), to highlight that the optimal contracts exhibit substantial variations, degrees of complexity and uncommon features. If the pollutee offers an arrangement (and this is the more likely and also more interesting case) the spectrum of solutions covers six different cases: 'no distortion at the top', 'no distortion at the bottom', 'no distortion in the interior' and a boundary solution (a pseudo contract of duplicating the tax outcome) applicable either in all instances of the agent's benefit or coupled with one of the conventional mechanisms. If the polluter offers a contract, the optimal incentive scheme is countervailing with the consequence that the signs of the payments are reversed, that the property of no distortion holds at both ends and that the polluter's best strategy is to duplicate the tax outcome if the actual damage is around the expected value. The government's threat encourages contracting and improves the allocation beyond what an actual intervention could achieve. This provides a potential role for governments in an otherwise Coasean framework. Received: 28 March 2003, Accepted: 10 October 2005 JEL Classification: D62, D82 Both authors acknowledge (exceptionally) helpful and detailed comments from an anonymous referee and suggestions from an associate editor of the journal.     

Joint Implementation: Strategic Reactions and Possible Remedies

This paper investigates the promising proposal of Joint Implementation (JI) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. This was ultimately the only concrete outcome of the Conference on Climate Change in Berlin, albeit restricted to a pilot phase. The basic idea, given the public's awareness of global warming, sounds economically plausible: The industrialized countries, the only ones required to stabilize and lower carbon emissions, can search for cheaper reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries and economies in transition. However, this proposal leads to strategic reactions by developing countries reinforced by the fact that this cheating coincides with the interest of the industrialized country. In short, this proposal will lead to cheating (given asymmetric information) and will thus produce largely faked reductions in emissions. On the constructive side, an efficient mechanism retaining the spirit of JI is derived, which deters strategic reactions. This differs from a usual principal-agent problem through an additional hierarchical layer: a global authority (e.g. the Conference of Parties on Climate Change), an industrialized country and a developing country. The unavoidable loss that is even associated with an optimal scheme due to strategic, behavioural reality (the first best optimum is unattainable, except at the top) leads, of course, to much less glamorous predictions in emission reductions. Moreover, the implicit subsidization scheme focuses and favours on already 'efficient' partners.     

EVALUATING INVESTMENT IN INVENTORY POLICY: A NET PRESENT VALUE FRAMEWORK -AN ADDENDUM-

This paper attempts to fill gaps found in the article by Kim, Philippatos and Cbung which recently appeared in this journal. Simple proofs of the concavity of the three objective functions they postulated are presented.     

Anticipating intended users: prospective sensemaking in technology development

How do developers and designers of a new technology make sense of intended users? The critical groundwork for user-centred technology development begins not by involving actual users’ exposure to the technological artefact but much earlier, with designers’ and developers’ vision of future users. Thus, anticipating intended users is critical to technology uptake. We conceptualise the anticipation of intended users as a form of prospective sensemaking in technology development. Employing a narrative analytical approach and drawing on four key communities in the development of Grid computing, we reconstruct how each community anticipated the intended Grid user. Based on our findings, we conceptualise user anticipation in terms of two key dimensions, namely the intended possibility to inscribe user needs into the technological artefact as well as the intended scope of the application domain. In turn, these dimensions allow us to develop an initial typology of intended user concepts that in turn might provide a key building bloc towards a generic typology of intended users.     

The Institutional Context of an ‘Empirical Law’: The Wage Curve under Different Regimes of Collective Bargaining

The wage curve postulates that the wage level is a decreasing function of the regional unemployment rate. In testing this hypothesis, most studies have not taken into account that differences in the institutional framework may have an impact on the existence (or the slope) of a wage curve. Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset for Western Germany, this article provides a first direct test of the relevance of different bargaining regimes (and of works councils) for the existence of a wage curve. In pooled regressions for the period 1998 to 2006, as well as in worker‐level or plant‐level fixed‐effects estimations, we obtain evidence for a wage curve for plants with a collective bargaining agreement at firm level. The point estimates for this group of plants are close to the ?0.1 elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment postulated by Blanchflower and Oswald. In this regime, we also find that works councils dampen the adjustment of wages to the regional unemployment situation. In the other regimes of plants that either do not make use of collective contracts or apply sectoral agreements, we do not find a wage curve.     

Cost-minimization analysis of sublingual immunotherapy versus subcutaneous immunotherapy for house dust mite respiratory allergic disease in Denmark

Objectives Currently, patients with persistent moderate-to-severe house dust mite (HDM) allergic rhinitis despite use of symptom-relieving medication can be offered subcutaneously administered allergy immunotherapy (SQ SCIT; Alutard SQ) as standard care of treatment in Denmark. Recently, a HDM sublingually administered allergy immunotherapy tablet (SQ SLIT-tablet; ACARIZAX) has been developed for at-home treatment. The purpose of this analysis is to compare the costs related to treatment and administration of SQ SLIT-tablet and SQ SCIT.

Methods Assuming equal efficacy between ther SQ SLIT-tablet and SQ SCIT, the cost-minimization analysis was the most appropriate for the comparison. According to guidelines and Summary of Product Characteristics, the treatment duration of SQ SLIT-tablet is 3 years and 3–5 years for SQ SCIT. The courses of treatment vary among patients and, therefore, the costs of treatment have been calculated for an average patient with HDM respiratory allergic disease (RAD) receiving either SQ SLIT-tablet or SQ SCIT. All costs associated with allergy immunotherapy were collected, i.e., cost of medication, administration and treatment setting, and discounted according to Danish guidelines. Comprehensive univariate sensitivity analyses were carried out.

Results The treatment costs for an average patient with HDM RAD are €3094 for SQ SLIT-tablet and €3799 for SQ SCIT; however, when adding indirect costs to the calculations the total costs of the treatments are €3697 and €6717 for SQ SLIT-tablet and SQ SCIT, respectively. Therefore, if 2500 patients with HDM RAD were treated with SQ SLIT-tablet instead of SQ SCIT, it would elicit a saving to the healthcare system of ～€1.8 million. The conclusion was robust to any changes in the sensitivity analysis.

Conclusion With regards to the cost of treating Danish patients with HDM RAD, it is clearly cost-saving to treat patients with SQ SLIT-tablet compared to SQ SCIT.     

Ein Treffen der Top Management Team Forschung im privaten Kreis

PRAXIS | Magazin

Ein Treffen der Top Management Team Forschung im privaten Kreis Konferenz-Review