The experience of teleworking: an annotated review

The paper reviews the contemporary literature on the experience of teleworking. Particular attention is paid to the socializing aspects of work and its comparative absence when working from home; economic considerations, both for homeworkers and for the firms; work satisfaction and motivation; supervision; roles and gender issues in homeworking; the organization of time and space; and, lastly, questions of self-discipline. The evidence reviewed is based on various teleworking trials conducted mainly during the 1980s; this information is supplemented by original research conducted by the authors which investigated the pros and cons raised by British Telecom operators who were due to take part in a teleworking trial. These operators anticipated many of the issues faced by those who actually had teleworking experience.     

Taxpayer resistance,guarantee uncertainty,and housing finance subsidies

In the absence of external guarantees, a private firm's debt trades in the market at rates reflective of its private default risk. Not all firms go it alone, however. There are entities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), whose debt obligations enjoy federal guarantees. Federal guarantees affect housing finance indirectly in that they tend to enhance the creditworthiness of the debt obligations of the housing intermediary which lessens the debtholder's exposure to default. The market investor then becomes a willing buyer of GSE debt at a lower (subsidized) rate as a result of the government guarantee.Due to the fact that the subsidy rests on the presumption that the GSE debt will be bailed out by the government it can be seen that the subsidy in turn rests upon the presumption by the GSE debtholder that the taxpayers will honor the guarantee in the event of a GSE default. Hence, government subsidies to the housing intermediaries rest not on ongoing government outlays but rather on the confidence that the taxpayers will be willing, if called upon, to cover GSE losses, i.e., the confidence of a bailout.This article analyzes the effects on the GSE subsidy and on the taxpayer, if the debt markets charge for bailout risk. Bailout risk pricing is an economic event. When debtholders seek to protect themselves by pricing for bailout risk, this increases GSE borrowing costs and cuts into both GSE borrowers' subsidies and stockholder earnings. Higher borrowing costs leave the GSE in a weakened condition and increase the ex ante bailout cost to the taxpayer. When bailout risk premiums become priced by the market, it substantially lessens the government's ability to subsidize housing finance or other GSE activities.     

Earnings management and firm valuation under asymmetric information

This paper seeks to provide an explanation for why corporate officers manage the disclosure of accounting information. We show that earnings management affects firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, the strategic management of reported earnings influences investors' assessments of the market values of companies' shares.     

Let’s Not Go Down that Path Again: Lessons from the Past Applied to Immigrant-Targeted Discrimination

Immigrants, both legal and illegal, are a staple of the modern United States workplace. While much of the discussion of this fact centers on negative consequences for the U.S., far less attention has been paid to the detrimental impact on immigrants resulting from their workplace experiences, particularly relating to being targets of discrimination. In this article, we outline: a) a variety of types of workplace discrimination potentially relating to immigrant status; b) potential negative outcomes arising from said discrimination for both immigrant employees and their employers, and; c) how existing and predicted employment law standards place organizations in a legally vulnerable position when such discrimination goes unchecked. We further discuss implications of immigrant-targeted discrimination (ITD) for organizations and managers, and plausible extensions of workplace discrimination laws to specifically include ITD.     

Contracting With Wealth-Constrained Agents

We examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an essential noncontractible input (e.g., effort) when potential operators are privately informed about their limited wealth. Truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a higher probability of operation and, if necessary, a greater share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond that a potential operator posts. The project owner benefits when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential operators. Under plausible conditions, limited knowledge of wealth is not constraining for the project owner.     

Solving the “Lachmann Problem”: Orientation,Individualism, and the Causal Explanation of Socioeconomic Order

This article examines the question of whether social institutions should be treated as possessing the sui generis causal power to influence people's actions. It does so by means of a case study of the work of the Austrian economist Ludwig Lachmann. Lachmann's account of how social institutions facilitate intentional human agency in the face of uncertainty contains significant ambiguities and tensions, stemming from his reluctance to acknowledge the causal efficacy of social institutions. The conceptual resources required to overcome these problems are to be found in realist social philosophy and social theory. The proposed resolution comes at a price, however, for it calls into question Lachmann's self‐avowed commitment to methodological individualism.