The Generic Advertising Controversy: How Did We Get Here and Where Are We Going?

Since the 1980s, generic advertising programs for dozens of farm commodities have been entangled in a great deal of litigation. The author looks at the history of generic advertising policies, discusses why the litigation arose when it did, and argues that the current round of litigation is simply an inevitable outgrowth of fairly recent Supreme Court rulings on commercial speech. The author further examines some of the economic studies that have been performed. The author predicts an increase in generic advertising litigation based upon the degree of collectivization in an industry and urges economists to bring the controversy into their modeling.     

Robust games: theory and application to a Cournot duopoly model

In this paper, the robust game model proposed by Aghassi and Bertsimas (Math Program Ser B 107:231–273, 2006) for matrix games is extended to games with a broader class of payoff functions. This is a distribution-free model of incomplete information for finite games where players adopt a robust-optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. They are called robust players and seek the maximum guaranteed payoff given the strategy of the others. Consistently with this decision criterion, a set of strategies is an equilibrium, robust-optimization equilibrium, if each player’s strategy is a best response to the other player’s strategies, under the worst-case scenarios. The aim of the paper is twofold. In the first part, we provide robust-optimization equilibrium’s existence result for a quite general class of games and we prove that it exists a suitable value \(\epsilon \) such that robust-optimization equilibria are a subset of \(\epsilon \)-Nash equilibria of the nominal version, i.e., without uncertainty, of the robust game. This provides a theoretical motivation for the robust approach, as it provides new insight and a rational agent motivation for \(\epsilon \)-Nash equilibrium. In the last part, we propose an application of the theory to a classical Cournot duopoly model which shows significant differences between the robust game and its nominal version.     

The Financing of Regulatory Agencies

This paper examines the financing of monitoring agencies deriving the welfare-improving combinations of public revenue, industry fees, and penalties that should be used to finance quality regulations. The model shows that if some firms are not expected to comply with quality standards, penalties are optimal to cover the agencys regulatory exposure though these need to be augmented with other instruments as monitoring costs increase. If all firms are expected to comply with the quality standards, a per-firm fee is the optimal method of regulatory financing but needs to be augmented with a lump-sum tax as monitoring costs increase.Jel classification: H21, L51The authors extend their thanks to Editor Michael Crew and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are ours.     

Bargaining rationale for cooperative generic advertising*

The beggar-thy-neighbour aspect of commodity advertising means that benefits to one commodity from advertising come at the expense of other commodities. The effect can be mitigated by cooperation among groups as shown by Alston, Freebairn and James (AFJ). A drawback to AFJ's analysis is that some cooperative outcomes require side payments from one producer group to another. This paper offers a bargaining solution as an alternative to cooperation in the case where cooperative side payments would be needed. We show that while bargaining without side payments is not as effective as cooperation at reducing beggar-thy-neighbour effects, it is a welfare improving alternative to non-cooperation and is likely more practical in many situations.     

When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior

We develop a contingency approach to explain how firm ownership influences the monitoring function of the board—measured as the magnitude of external audit fees contracted by the board—by extending agency theory to incorporate the resource dependence notion that boards have distinct incentives and abilities to monitor management. Analyses of data on Continental European companies reveal that while board independence and audit services are complementary when ownership is dispersed, this is not the case when ownership is concentrated—suggesting that ownership concentration and board composition become substitutes in terms of monitoring management. Additional analysis shows that the relationship between board composition and external audit fees is also contingent upon the type of the controlling shareholder. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bidding for Cattle in the Texas Panhandle

Four beef-processing plants in the Texas Panhandle region procure cattle from feedlots in a form of first-price, sealed-bid auction. These auctions have features that distinguish them from standard auctions. Using transactions-level data, we estimated packer bid functions and, via simulations, compared the extant bidding environment to an alternative framework. The simulated auctions on average produced higher seller revenue, more frequent sales to the plant valuing the cattle most highly, and more switching by feedlots among competing packers. We attribute these results to packers' inconsistent bidding on the available lots of cattle and offer alternative explanations for this behavior.     

Can Quality Certification Lead to Stable Cartels?

Cartel stability is investigated in a context of adverse selection whereconsumers are imperfectly informed about product quality. Producer collusionmay be necessary to signal quality via third-party certification. Whileexamining different cost structures for third-party certification, we showthat a stable cartel that provides information about product quality mayimprove overall welfare even if producers collude to reduce competition.     

A clash of governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring

We ask whether and when shareholder‐oriented foreign owners are likely to change corporate governance logics in a stakeholder‐oriented setting by introducing shareholder‐oriented governance practices. We focus on board monitoring and claim that because the bundle of practices used in a stakeholder context does not protect shareholder‐oriented foreign owners' interests, they seek to introduce their own practices. Our results suggest that board monitoring is only activated when shareholder‐oriented foreign ownership is high and that the influence of foreign ownership is especially strong in firms without large domestic owners, with high levels of risk and poor performance. Our findings uncover the possibility of the co‐existence of different corporate governance logics within a given country, shaped by the nature and weight of foreign owners Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Measuring and Understanding Productivity in UK Market Services

Many productivity studies, if they cover the service sector,commonly enter a caveat that the data are uncertain or justlook at manufacturing. This paper attempts to clarify what UKmarket-service-sector data are available, whether they shouldbe treated as inaccurate, and what conceptual problems mightmake measuring service-sector output so hard. Our overall conclusionis that most problems surround financial intermediation andbusiness services. In financial intermediation, national accountsconventions and adjustments make the output data very hard tointerpret. In business services many of the output measuresare employment based. Elsewhere, for example, retail and wholesaletrade, transport, and hotels and restaurants, the main problemis, in practice, lack of collected deflators. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: g.a.crespi{at}sussex.ac.uk; chiara.criscuolo{at}ons.gsi.gov.uk;j.e.haskel{at}qmul.ac.uk; d.hawkes{at}ioe.ac.uk     

Diversity in innovation and productivity in Europe

The diversity in innovation patterns across manufacturing and service industries and in their outcomes in terms of hourly labor productivity are investigated in this article considering six European countries. The Schumpeterian insights into the variety of innovation are developed in this work by identifying different innovation–performance relationships for industries and countries, relying either on the dominant role of product innovation, or on the diffusion of process improvements. Moreover, the “push” effect of innovation is combined with the “pull” effect of demand, by considering the impact of the dynamics of consumption and investment at the sectoral level. The results point out a “North-South” divide across EU countries, with the three countries of Northern Europe closely associated to the model of productivity growth based on product innovation, and the three Southern countries, mainly relying on the mechanisms by which process innovation is at the root of productivity improvements.