Sweet self-deception

People have a tendency to procrastinate when faced with aversive tasks—but they also procrastinate in relation to beneficial matters whose rewards are instantaneous. If agents value present anticipations of future consumption, revision of consumption plans may be viewed as a benign form of self-deception. We consider a minimal generalization of the Samuelson discounted utility model to allow for utility linked to next period consumption. Agents are assumed to vary with respect to their sophistication. In this context, commitment and self-control are obstacles to the pursuit of increased utility. We also examine different environments that are likely to facilitate repeated revisions.     

Another view on optimal design for estimating the point of extremum in quadratic regression

In this paper we illustrate how certain design problems can be simplified by reparametrization of the response function. This alternative viewpoint provides further insights than the more traditional approaches, like minimax, Bayesian or sequential techniques. It will also improve a practitioner’s understanding of more general situations and their “classical” treatment.     

A note on the anti-herding instinct of interest rate forecasters

With regard to interest rate forecasts, earlier researchers have found mixed evidence of forecaster herding. Using the Livingston survey data, we reexamined the case for forecaster herding. We did not find evidence of forecaster herding. On the contrary, we found strong evidence of forecaster anti-herding.     

Information acquisition in conflicts

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use our results to study information acquisition prior to an all-pay auction. If the decision to acquire information is observable, but not the information received, one-sided asymmetric information can occur endogenously in equilibrium. Moreover, the cut-off values of the cost of information that determine equilibrium information acquisition are higher than those in the first best. Thus, information acquisition is excessive. In contrast, with open or covert information acquisition, the equilibrium cut-off values are as in the first best.     

Modelling country default risk as a latent variable: a multiple indicators multiple causes approach

We study the determinants of country default risk by applying a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model. This accounts for the fact that country default risk is an unobservable variable. Whereas existing (regression-based) approaches typically use only one of several possible country default risk indicators as the dependent variable, the MIMIC model enables us to consider several indicators at once. The simultaneous consideration of sovereign yield spreads and Standard and Poor (S&P) ratings may help to improve the identification of the latent country default risk. Our results confirm most of the literature's main findings regarding important determinants of country default risk, refute others and provide new evidence to controversial questions.     

Oil price forecasting under asymmetric loss

Based on the approach developed by Elliott et al. (2005), we found that the loss function of a sample of oil price forecasters is asymmetric in the forecast error. Our findings indicate that the loss oil price forecasters incurred when their forecasts exceeded the price of oil tended to be larger than the loss they incurred when their forecast fell short of the price of oil. Accounting for the asymmetry of the loss function does not necessarily make forecasts look rational.     

The influence of pension funds on corporate governance

Although pension funds have gained importance in the last two decades, their role has not been described in detail by economic models. This article focuses on the scope of these institutional investors when they are not satisfied with a management team of a company in which the pension fund holds a block of shares. Stock holdings by pension funds are largely dispersed. Therefore, any intervention by pension funds in corporate governance requires the formation of a coalition of pension funds. The realization of a coordinated intervention, in turn, is subject to the problems related to the provision of public goods, such as free riding. We find that the stock dispersion and the combined share of pension funds, coordination costs and the attractiveness of the exit option are relevant factors for determining the probability of the success of interventions.