Auditor Sensitivity to Real Earnings Management: The Importance of Ambiguity and Earnings Context

Differentiating real earnings management (REM) from normal business decisions poses a unique challenge for auditors, researchers, and investors. The ambiguity associated with REM, and the fact that REM does not violate GAAP, may explain why its use is on the rise. While some assert that auditors are not, and should not be, concerned with REM, recent research suggests that REM may influence some auditor judgments. Using Correspondent Inference Theory (CIT) as our theoretical framework, we extend REM research by investigating the ways in which auditors respond to REM and how auditors deal with the intrinsic ambiguity associated with REM. We administer a 3×2 between‐subjects experiment to 113 highly‐experienced auditors, manipulating the level of ambiguity surrounding the observed REM (Explicit REM, Potential REM, or No REM) and the earnings context in which the client engages in REM (the client beat or missed the consensus earnings forecast). We find that auditors respond to REM by lowering assessments of management tone (i.e., management's commitment to a culture of high ethical standards), being more likely to discuss the issue with the audit committee, and being less likely to retain the client. Auditors respond to Explicit REM regardless of the earnings context, but respond to Potential (i.e., ambiguous) REM only when the client beats the forecast. Finally, we find that management tone mediates the relation between REM and auditor responses, even after controlling for various audit‐related risks. Thus, for auditors, REM appears to be primarily a “people” issue, as REM provides a negative signal about management.     

DO TAX CUTS ENCOURAGE RENT SEEKING BY TOP CORPORATE EXECUTIVES? THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper explores the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for executive effort (labor supply) and rent seeking within the firm. We develop a theoretical model that distinguishes between effort and rent‐seeking responses to income taxes, and provides a framework to estimate a lower bound for the rent‐seeking response. Using executive compensation and governance data, we find that rent seeking represents an important component of the response to changes in tax rates, especially among executives in firms with the worst corporate governance. (JEL D31, G30, H21)     

The management of talent: Optimal contracting for selection and incentives

Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private information about their cost of effort, and they exert unobservable effort. The optimal contract menu pairs a higher probability of assignment to a valuable project with a lower bonus in case of success. In limited cases, a fixed salary may be offered to employees with high effort cost. We link our results to job design features encountered in practice.     

Marriage traditions and investment in education: The case of bride kidnapping

The cultural practice of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan may alter the returns to education for young women in an ambiguous direction due to two competing effects. On the one hand, women facing a risk of kidnapping may reduce education investment due to uncertain returns. Alternatively, since kidnapping is less likely to occur while a woman is in school, women may increase education investment to lower their personal risk of being kidnapped into marriage. Understanding how education is affected by kidnapping risk allows us to better anticipate changes in education when the laws are enforced and the risk declines. We develop a two-period utility model to highlight the effects of kidnapping risk on education and to help identify those girls who are most likely to increase their education when faced with positive regional kidnapping risk and thus most likely to reduce education if the risk is eliminated. We test the implications of the theory empirically using the Life in Kyrgyzstan data. Difference-in-difference regression results point to a negative relationship between regional kidnapping rates and education, suggesting that the elimination of kidnapping is likely to induce higher education rates of women in Kyrgyzstan. The results are informative to the literature at the intersection of marriage traditions, women's bargaining power and education attainment.     

Individual responses to competing institutional logics in emerging markets

In this paper, we study individual responses to competing institutional market and community logics. We argue that when individuals experience strong pressures both from market and community logics in hybrid contexts, they are unlikely to choose one logic over another. Instead, they combine both logics act as hybridizers. We identified three roles of local (Kazakhstani and Turkish) managers as hybridizers: bridging between competing logics, boundary spanning and cultural buffering.     

Can Employee Stock Options Contribute to Less Risk-Taking?

The executive compensation literature presumes that shareholders offer risk-averse managers stock options to entice them to take on more risk, resulting in riskier investment decisions and thus a greater return on investment. However, recent empirical work challenges this assumption, and theoretical research even argues that high levels of option-based compensation for generally under-diversified managers may actually lead to greater risk aversion. We evaluate the incentive structure of employee stock options by examining the level of R&D investment and the return on that investment conditional on the portfolio “vega,” which captures the sensitivity of option value to stock price volatility. Our results suggest that both investment in R&D and the return on R&D, as measured by future earnings and patent awards, varies concavely with vega. That is, low to moderate levels of vega correspond to increasing investment in and returns on R&D, consistent with vega inducing more profitable investments, but marginal returns decline as vega increases. Collectively, these results, bolstered by several supplemental analyses, suggest that this surprising relation between vega and risky investment is driven by greater risk aversion at higher levels of vega. Overall, our results imply that employee stock options may not always align the incentives of managers and shareholders.     

Stakeholder Perceptions of Risk in Mandatory Corporate Responsibility Disclosure

Journal of Business Ethics - The extraction of natural resources is a controversial business practice that has profound ethical and economic risk implications for both firms involved in extractive...     

Towards a strategic understanding of global teams and their HR implications: an expert dialogue

Abstract

Drawing on initial insights emerging from a panel at the EIBA 2016 Conference in Vienna, here discussants and expert panelists engage in a follow-on conversation on the HRM implications of global teams for international organizations. First we set out how HRM can enable global teams and their constituent members to overcome the new and considerable challenges of global teams. These challenges span levels of analysis, time and space. Next we debate global teams as a strategic response to the dual pressures of global integration and local adaptation. We consider what HRM is needed for global teams to successfully resolve this dilemma, challenging practitioners to move beyond the ‘best practices’ and ‘alignment’ dichotomy. Lastly we look to the future to consider implications for research. We propose a rich research agenda focused on the complexities of the global team context.     

A Cross-National Study of Government Social Insurance as an Alternative to Tort Liability Compensation

Litigation rates in the United States have long been considered out of proportion with the remainder of the world, leading to a good deal of economic research trying to understand the causes. Much of that literature has focused on lawyer compensation rules and availability of general damage awards. Another possible reason for differences in national litigation rates is the relative generosity of government social programs. Using a sample of 24 countries over a 12-year period, we test the relationship between the size of government social program payments and liability costs as measured by liability insurance premiums, and find a strong negative relationship, controlling for income, accident rates, and a variety of other factors.