Regional integration: an empirical assessment of Russia

Using a statistical model of commodity trade, we quantify the evolution of regional economic integration within Russia during 1995–1999, and explore potential determinants of this evolution. Our integration measure exhibits rich regional variation that, when aggregated to the national level, fluctuates substantially over time. In accounting for this behavior, we draw in part on theoretical models that emphasize the potential role of openness to international trade and regional disparities in income in threatening economic integration. Controlling for a host of additional regional- and national-level variables, we find a strong negative correspondence between openness to international trade and internal economic integration.     

An Analysis of Differences in Earnings Between Small and Large Commercial Banks

This paper introduces a simple, yet rich, measure of efficiency changes based on the revenue-generating-ability (RGA) principle. Using this principle, we explain the connections between efficiency changes and the variables, such as pretax profits, interest expense, non-interest expense, profit margins, loan loss provision, and asset quality. These connections are used to explain earnings differences between small and large commercial banks.     

Copyright Damages and Statistics

This paper discusses the statistical issues that arise in conducting an economic damages analysis in the context of a litigation matter involving copyrights. Calculating damages in copyright cases turns out to be a natural application for econometric modelling methods. Surprisingly, elementary statistical issues can be a source of significant debate between the experts in such matters. In this paper, we present a case study and illustrate how issues such as interpretation of p -values and what "rejection of the null hypothesis" really "means" in such matters.     

Equilibria in large economies with a separable Banach commodity space and non-ordered preferences

The purpose of this paper is to provide an existence result of equilibria for economies with a measure space of agents, a non-trivial production sector and an infinite dimensional commodity space. The commodity space is modeled by an ordered separable Banach space whose positive cone has a non-empty interior. The discretization approach proposed in this paper, allows us to extend the existence results in Khan and Yannelis [Equilibrium in markets with a continuum of agents and commodities. In: Khan, M.A., Yannelis, N.C. (Eds.), Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. Springer, Berlin, 1991] and Podczeck [Economic Theory 9 (1997) 585] to economies with a non-trivial production sector and with possibly non-ordered but convex preferences as well as partially ordered (possibly incomplete) but non-convex preferences.     

Price Variability and Industrial Concentration in U.S. Food Industries

This paper focuses on the sources of intra‐industry price variability in US food industries during a period of increasing concentration, while accounting for the impact of variations in prices of primary agricultural products. Results suggest that intra‐industry price variability in food industries increases with their respective mean rate of inflation and product heterogeneity. However, industrial concentration lowers the sensitivity of relative prices to changes in the mean rate of inflation. Hence, static welfare losses to consumers from increasing concentration in food industries, a subject of recent and intensive investigation, can partly be offset by gains such as reduced price variability.     

Innovation-oriented transformation of industry in Ukraine and Russia

This paper presents an expert assessment of the present state of cooperation of Ukraine and Russia in the innovation sphere, outlines its main stages and analyzes the quality of the process of formation of legislative framework in state regulation of innovation-oriented transformations in the economy of the two countries. A comparative study is made and a quantitative estimate of the level of innovation activities in industrial production and the degree of innovation shifts in the technological structure of manufacturing in Russia and Ukraine is given.     

Forecasting category sales and market share for wireless telephone subscribers: a combined approach

The ability to forecast market share remains a challenge for many managers especially in dynamic markets, such as the telecommunications sector. In order to accommodate the unique dynamic characteristics of the telecommunications market, we use a multi-component model, called MSHARE. Our method involves a two-phase process. The first phase consists of three components: a projection method, a ring down survey methodology and a purchase intentions survey. The predictions from these components are combined to forecast category sales for the wireless subscribers market. In the second phase, market shares for the various brands are generated using the forecast of the number of subscribers that are obtained in Phase 1 and the share predictions from the ring down methodology. The proposed methodology produces the minimum Relative Absolute Error for each market as compared to the forecasts from each individual component in the first phase. The value of the proposed model is illustrated by its application to a real world scenario. The managerial implications of the proposed model are also discussed.     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.