Control-based channel governance and relative dependence

Control and governance theories recognize that exchange partners are subject to two general forms of control, the unilateral authority of one firm and bilateral expectations extending from their social bond. In this way, a supplier both exerts unilateral, authority-based controls and is subject to socially-based, bilateral controls as it attempts to manage its brand successfully through reseller channels. Such control is being challenged by suppliers’ growing relative dependence on increasingly dominant resellers in many industries. Yet the impact of supplier relative dependence on the efficacy of control-based governance in the supplier’s channel is not well understood. To address this gap, we specify and test a control model moderated by relative dependence involving the conceptualization and measurement of governance at the level of specific control processes: incenting, monitoring, and enforcing. Our empirical findings show relative dependence undercuts the effectiveness of certain unilateral and bilateral control processes while enhancing the effectiveness of others, largely supporting our dual suppositions that each control process operates through a specialized behavioral mechanism and that these underlying mechanisms are differentially impacted by relative dependence. We offer implications of these findings for managers and identify our contributions to channel theory and research.     

Firm/interruptible gas pricing patterns in a regulated environment

Conclusion This study provides empirical tests for the effects of rate base regulation, curtailment priorities, fuel clauses, and elected commissioners on firm/interruptible gas pricing patterns. These regulations do alter observed pricing patterns with curtailment priorities, fuel clauses, and elected commissioners all producing net social gains. Rate of return regulation imposes social costs resulting in a net decrease in social welfare. Ignoring the political influences upon regulators, regulation generally encourages consumption at the peak relative to the off-peak. Nonetheless, overall social welfare is improved if all four types of regulatory characteristics are present, since most rates are reduced from their monopoly levels.     

MEDIEVAL MATCHING MARKETS

We study the regulation of brokerage in wholesale markets in premodern Central Western Europe. Examining 1,804 sets of rules from 82 cities, we find brokerage was primarily a centralized matchmaking mechanism. Brokerage was more common in towns with larger populations, better access to sea ports and trade routes, and greater political autonomy. Brokers' fee structures varied systematically: price-based fees were more common for highly heterogeneous goods, quantity-based fees for more homogeneous goods. We show theoretically that this was broadly consistent with total surplus maximization, and that brokerage was more valuable in markets with unequal numbers of buyers and sellers.     

Prices and Regional Variation in Welfare

One would expect regional differences in prices to influence conclusions concerning levels and distributions of well-being. Although there is anecdotal evidence of significant price dispersion across regions, there is no governmental source of data that measures differences in price levels. In this paper I integrate estimates of regional prices with expenditure data from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys to assess the influence of price differences on living standards in the United States. While prices have little effect on inequality, estimates of poverty and the standard of living change substantially with the inclusion of regional price variation.     

Advertising and Political Bias in the Media: The Market for Criticism of the Market Economy

Many observers of the media argue that advertiser support of the news insulates business from critical scrutiny. News organizations know better than to bite the hand that feeds them. I examine several weaknesses in this corporate advertising bias argument. Most significantly, a favorable political climate for business is a public good, so individual businesses have an incentive to support anti–business messages that generate an audience. Transmission of messages that fail to generate sufficient demand is inefficient. In short, advertising does not create a significant political bias.     

How Inequality Affects Trust in Institutions: Evidence from Indonesia

Trust is an important ingredient to improve economic performance and people's welfare by alleviating market failures caused by imperfect information, costly enforcement, or coordination failures. Using the World Values Survey 2018, we estimate the impact of village and district levels inequality on trust in institutions in Indonesia. We find that higher village level inequality has a negative effect only on trust in strangers, while higher district level inequality reduces trust in television, the press, the central government, the courts, and the police. The implication points to the importance of keeping inequality at the aggregate level in check to maintain people's trust in social, political and state institutions.     

银行防范风险要杜绝金融虚假

本文结合当前实际,介绍了我国银行存在的一些虚假行为,分析了其原因及危害,并进一步从建立健全内控制度、强化监管、完善与贯彻规章、提高职工素质等多方面阐述了如何下大力气杜绝这一行为,以提高银行自身整体实力.     

Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’

A major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction — convergence of platforms to the median voter's ideal — is seldom observed. One reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes. Here we associate voters' expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements, and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their ‘reputations’ are perceived as less risky than challengers. In equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms. Typically neither adopts the median voter's ideal point. Either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent's reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively ‘risky’ the electorate perceives the challenger to be.     

城市蔬菜集散中心的优化布局

在对北京市蔬菜集散中心布局分析的基础上,应用斐波那契快速逼近法和按流通费用最小排序的穷举法,有效地解决了城市蔬菜集散中心的个数及位置的优化布局