Compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms*

We propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible. In our model, a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions. Governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing. This comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses, resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms.     

Eating With Your Eyes: How Packaging Visual Cues Affect Content Estimation and Self-control in Virtue and Vice Food

This research investigates the effects of visual cues depicted on food packaging on consumers’ estimates of the contained amount and consumers’ self-control intentions. Results from two experiments show that the number of product units shown on the package drives perceptions and behavioral intentions in food categories where product size tends to be quite standardized, supporting the “see more, expect more” effect reported by previous literature, but adding a “see virtue, expect more” effect triggered by product type. Instead, when product size tends to vary across manufacturers, picture size has a greater effect on consumers’ content estimations and self-control intention than the number of product units depicted, suggesting the existence of a “see small, expect more” effect according to which consumers estimate larger content when the package portrays smaller product units. Results stimulate awareness of the effects that can be conveyed by images on packaging, on content estimates and consumer self-control.     

Imported Intermediate Inputs and Firms’ Productivity Growth: Evidence from the Food Industry

Imported goods play a central role in determining the gains from trade. Using detailed trade and firm‐level data for Italy and France, we investigate the relationship between trade integration, imported intermediate inputs and firm performance in the food industry. Our main findings show that an increase in import competition spurs firm‐level productivity growth. Furthermore, the productivity growth effect attributable to imported intermediate inputs is significantly stronger than the effect due to imported final products. In addition, we find that new imported inputs are of particular importance, especially for Italian food firms, though less so for the French firms. Finally, the productivity growth effect of trade integration tends to be asymmetric across firms: more productive firms gain more from trade integration. These stylised facts have interesting policy implications.     

Riding out of a financial crisis: The joint effect of trust and corporate ownership

We study how generalized trust shapes the ability of firms with different ownership forms to obtain trade financing and perform during a financial crisis. Exploiting geographic variations in trust across Italian regions and the occurrence of the 2008-09 financial crisis in a difference-in-differences setting, we show that generalized trust makes family firms less able to obtain trade financing during the crisis. This finding maps into performance results: trust alleviates the negative effect of a crisis for non-family firms, while it aggravates the negative effect for family firms. This latter result depends crucially on a firm's corporate governance: trust does not harm family firms whose board is open to non-family directors. Collectively, our findings illustrate how culture interacts with corporate attributes in shaping a firm's prospects.     

Evolutionary variational inequalities and applications to complex dynamic multi-level models

In this paper we consider a supply chain network model with three tiers of decision-makers (manufacturers, retailers, and consumers) in the case when prices and shipments are evolving on time. Moreover, we assume that excesses of production and excesses of demand of the commodity are present. For such a framework we furnish, using the infinite dimensional duality theory, the equilibrium conditions for the representatives of each tier of the supernetwork, the time-dependent variational formulation governing the complete supply chain supernetwork, and we provide some existence theorems and a numerical example.     

How do managerial successions shape corporate financial policies in family firms?

Despite recent evidence on the importance of chief executive officer (CEO) successions in family firms, we still know little about the differences in corporate strategies entailed by family and professional managers around transition. We investigate the consequences of managerial successions for the financial policies of Italian family firms. Our findings indicate that the appointment of non-family professional CEOs leads to a significant increase in the use of debt, primarily driven by short-term maturities. We document substantial heterogeneity in the impact of professional successions on debt financing: the increase in debt is particularly pronounced for young firms, firms with a high level of investment, and firms in which the controlling family maintains a dominant representation on the board of directors. Examining the importance of financial flexibility, we find that the increase in debt occurs primarily when firms are cash-poor, and when incoming CEOs can exploit spare borrowing capacity.     

The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity*

In this paper, we investigate how social comparison information about referent others (i.e., learning what similar others do, and how they are treated) affects reciprocal relationships. Using three‐person gift‐exchange games, we study how employees’ reciprocity towards an employer is affected by pay comparison information (what co‐workers earn) and effort comparison information (how co‐workers perform). We find strong evidence of the effects of effort comparison: employees are more willing to reciprocate by choosing high effort in response to a high wage if they observe others doing so. In our setting, we find somewhat weaker evidence of the effects of pay comparison.