An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

Endogenous hospital regulation and its effects on hospital and non-hospital expenditures

Past studies of hospital rate setting regulation conclude that mature programs have been effective in constraining hospital expenditures. However, if rate regulation is influenced by higher hospital expenditures the relationship between expenditures and rate setting is confounded. This study assesses the impact of rate setting on hospital and non-hospital expenditures using a simultaneous-equation model which separates the effects of hospital expenditures on the decision to regulate from the effects of regulation on expenditures. The simultaneous-equation results indicate that mature rate setting is associated with lower per capita health care expenditures, including hospital and non-hospital expenditures.     

The political business cycle: An extension of Nordhaus's model

Summary Nordhaus's (1975) model of the political business cycle is extended in this paper by explicitly formulating the link between the economic sphere (represented by the Phillips curve) and fiscal policy. This extended model yields the hypothesis that during an electoral period the budgetary policy is contractionary in the first half and expansionary in the second half with the consequences of a reduction in unemployment (increase in inflation) before elections and a rise in unemployment (decrease in inflation) after elections. This hypothesis is tested against the data of the Austrian economy by a non-parametric test (which leads to a rejection of our hypothesis for Austria). The extent of the political business cycle bias is demonstrated by policy simulations within a macroeconomic model.

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Zusammenfassung Das Modell vonNordhaus (1975) über den Politischen Konjunkturzyklus wird in diesem Artikel erweitert, indem explizit die Beziehung zwischen dem ökonomischen Bereich (repräsentiert durch die Phillips-Kurve) und der Fiskalpolitik hergestellt wird. Dieses erweiterte Modell führt zu der Hypothese, daß während einer Legislaturperiode die Budgetpolitik in der ersten Hälfte restriktiv und in der zweiten Hälfte expansiv ist. Als Konsequenz dieser Politik kommt es zu einer Verringerung der Arbeitslosigkeit (einem Anstieg der Inflation) vor Wahlen und einem Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit (einer Verringerung der Inflation) nach den Wahlen. Diese Hypothese wird an Hand österreichischer Daten mit Hilfe eines nichtparametrischen Tests geprüft (was zu einer Ablehnung unserer Hypothese für Österreich führt). Das quantitative Ausmaß des durch den Politischen Konjunkturzyklus entstehenden bias wird dann mit Hilfe von politischen Simulationen im Rahmen eines makroökonomischen Modells demonstriert.

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Definitions AK Public purchases of goods and services + public investment (A.S.) - AT Unemployed persons, in total (in 1.000) - AZA Worked hours per worker (in hours) - BAU Central government's expenditures (outlays) in total (A.S.) - BEI Central government's revenues (receipts) in total (A.S.) - BS Budget deficit of the Central government (A.S.) - CB Labour supply (in 1.000) - CH Unemployment rate (%) - CON Public consumption (A.S.) - COR Public consumption (A.S. 1964) - CPN Private consumption (A.S.) - CPR Private consumption (A.S. 1964) - CUB Current balance (A.S.) - DS Direct taxes + public income from property-transfers to households + transfers from households (A.S.) - DX DS-public income from property (A.S.) - D7273 Dummy for monetary policy and Dummy for change from gross turnover tax to VAT (1972+1; 1973–1; other 0) - D7278 Dummy for investment tax (1972+1; 1973–1; 1977+1; 1978–1; other 0) - D73US Dummy for shift of employers to employees (1973+1; other 0) - D7375 Dummy for incomes tax reform (1973–1; 1975–1; other 0) - D7778 Dummy for extra VAT (1977+1; 1978–1; other 0) - EBE Population in total (in 1.000) - EET Employment in total + unemployed (total labour supply; in 1.000) - ESE Employers (in 1.000) - EUS Employees (in 1.000) - FBN Monetary base (A.S.) - FGN Money M1 (A.S.) - FG Money M1 (A.S. 1964) - GDN Gross domestic product (A.S.) - GDR Gross domestic product (A.S. 1964) - GER Energy (1.000 t/TCE) - GIR Industry output (A.S. 1964) - GE Profits in total (A.S.) - GV Profits in total (A.S. 1964) - IS Indirect taxes—transfers to firms (A.S.) - ITN Gross fixed investment (A.S.) - ITR Gross fixed investment (A.S. 1964) - JR Final domestic demand (A.S. 1964) - LA Stocks and statistical discrepancies; National account basis (A.S.) - LEAD Difference of one major party over the other in parliament in percentage points - LB Foreign balance (A.S.) - LKV Long term capital transactions (A.S.) - MA Money M1 + profits (A.S. 1964) - MMN Imports of goods and services (A.S.) - MMR Imports of goods and services (A.S. 1964) - OIN Public investment (A.S.) - OKG Public purchases of goods and services (A.S.) - PC Private consumption deflator (1964=100) - PEN Energy prices (1964=100) - PI Gross fixed investment deflator (1964=100) - PK Imports of goods and services deflator (1964=100) - PL Exports of goods and services deflator (1964=100) - PT Gross domestic product deflator (1964=100) - RES Value change in balance of payments reserves (A.S.) - RIR Interest rate for long term bonds (%) - SD Stocks and statistical discrepancies; National account basis (A.S. 1964) - ST Overall indirect taxes—subsidies; National account basis (A.S.) - STD Direct taxes (A.S.) - STI Indirect taxes (A.S.) - TAH Transfers to households (A.S.) - TBB Trade balance (A.S.) - TTT Time (1960, 1961,..., 1979) - TUN Transfers to firms (A.S.) - TVH Transfers from households (A.S.) - VW Gross fixed investment plus exports of goods and services (A.S. 1964) - WON Changes in foreign currency reserves of the National Bank (A.S.) - WKU Changes in foreign currency reserves of all commercial banks (A.S.) - WW Changes in balance of payments' official reserves (A.S.) - XB Relative energy prices (1964=100) - XXN Exports of goods and services (A.S.) - XXR Exports of goods and services (A.S. 1964) - YLN Wages and salaries (compensation of employees; A.S.) - YOB Public income from property (A.S.) - YVN Net disposable income (A.S.) - YY Net disposable income (A.S.) - YYN National income (A.S.) - ZST Statistical discrepancies in balance of payments (A.S.) - A.S billion Austrian Schilling at current prices - A.S. 1964 billion Austrian Schilling at constant prices (basis 1964)     

Wage inflation and labour conflicts in the Netherlands : An empirical investigation using the co-integration approach

The ‘wage space’, which is defined as the sum of price inflation and labour productivity growth, has played a major role as an indicator of allowable wage increases in the post-war wage negotiations in the Netherlands. This paper shows that: (a) wages and the wage space are co-integrated; (b) the deviation between wages and the wage space may act as an error correction term in the wage equation when both variables are identified as I(2); and (c) political consensus and the threat of labour conflicts (rather than actual strike activity) may be identified as the ‘mechanism’ behind this error correction in the wage equation.     

Seasonality and Markov switching in an unobserved component time series model

It is generally acknowledged that the growth rate of output, the seasonal pattern, and the business cycle are best estimated simultaneously. To achieve this, we develop an unobserved component time series model for seasonally unadjusted US GDP. Our model incorporates a Markov switching regime to produce periods of expansion and recession, both of which are characterized by different underlying growth rates. Although both growth rates are time-varying, they are assumed to be cointegrated. The analysis is Bayesian, which fully accounts for all sources of uncertainty. Comparison with results from a similar model for seasonally adjusted data indicates that the seasonal adjustment of the data significantly alters several aspects of the full model. First Version Received: January 2001/Final Version Received: February 2002 Send offprint requests to: Rob Luginbuhl?Correspondence to: Rob Luginbuhl     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001     

Employment shifts, economic reform and the changes in public/private sector wages in Mexico: 1987–1997

Over the last decade, the public sector in Mexico experienced substantial fiscal reform, divestiture of public enterprises, and the elimination of many regulations affecting pay and employment. This study analyzes the changes in the public/private sector differences in wages during the 1987–1997 period. The results from analyzing microdata from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano show that relative public sector wages increased from 1987 to 1997. Most of the relative wage increase in the public sector can be explained by increases in the price of skills and by changes in sorting across sectors. The results have important public policy implications since they suggest that public sector workers earn more and their wages have grown faster than those of their private sector counterparts. As such, policies contemplating public sector reform should take into account the effect of these measures on the inter-sectoral income distribution and the overall economic growth. First version received: April 2000/Final version received: December 2000     

Voluntary development of environmental management systems: motivations and regulatory implications

Encouraging firms to develop voluntarily more comprehensive environmental management systems (EMSs) is touted as a policy tool to augment mandatory environmental regulations. Using a unique dataset of environmental management practices of Japanese manufacturers and controlling for self-selection bias in survey responses, we find that proxies for regulatory pressures and consumer pressures are the most important factors that motivate firms toward more comprehensive EMSs. Despite the oft-claimed “voluntary” nature of EMS development, our results show that the government may have a role to play in both directly and indirectly affecting EMS development by firms.