Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Intertemporal substitution and the liquidity effect in a sticky price model

The liquidity effect, defined as a decrease in nominal interest rates in response to a monetary expansion, is a major stylized fact of the business cycle. This paper first confirms that, with separable preferences, a low degree of intertemporal substitution in consumption is a necessary condition for the existence of the liquidity effect. In contrast to this result, in a model with non-separable preferences and capital accumulation it takes an implausibly high elasticity of intertemporal substitution to produce a liquidity effect. The robustness of these results to alternative degrees of nominal rigidities, capital adjustment costs and stochastic monetary processes is also analysed. We conclude that price stickiness, by itself, does not guarantee the existence of a liquidity effect.     

Call Options and Liquidation in Commercial Mortgage Financing

This paper models a commercial real estate project where a wealth-constrained manager uses outside debt financing to purchase a project who's return depends on future economic conditions and the manager's investment in the project. It is shown that it is inefficient to finance the project with callable debt. This prediction is consistent with observed real estate financing practice. I also model the outcome of financial distress allowing for (1) debt forgiveness, (2) equity in exchange for debt forgiveness, and (3) foreclosure. The model motivates (1) why commercial real estate loans are often foreclosed, and (2) why lenders foreclose assets at fire-sale prices.     

Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques.     

Hymer and Uneven Development Revisited: Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Inequalities

Picking up on one of Hymer's key contributions, this paper examinesthe impact that inward foreign direct investment (FDI) intothe UK has on the patterns of development, both within and acrossregions. Using a panel of data for the manufacturing sector,the paper illustrates that even where one isolates the effecton the domestic sector alone, inward investment acts to increasethe demand for skilled, relative to unskilled labour, and alsogenerates the expected agglomeration effects in terms of thedemand for capital investment. The paper then goes on to drawcertain policy comparisons between these findings and the desiredaim of attracting FDI, notably to increase demand for labourin those regions suffering structural unemployment, and secondlyto reduce the disparities between regions.     

Komplexität erfolgreich steuern — 27. Österreichischer Controllertag in Wien

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

What Is Fair? Experimental Evidence

There has been growing interest within the economics discipline in the role of equity concerns in the distribution of resources. This paper presents empirical evidence from controlled laboratory experiments where third-party decision makers allocate resources between two individuals. The experimental results indicate that subjects view a wide range of different allocations as the fair distribution of resources. However, regression analysis indicates that both treatment effects and a few demographic variables explain some of this variation in fairness concepts. Most significantly, decision makers rewarded subjects who earned their favorable positions, and the gender of the decision maker was an important predictor of the allocation chosen.