Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common Network Externalities

We study competition in two-sided markets with a common network externality rather those than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satisfies a homogeneity condition then platforms’ profits and price structures have some specific properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to the other, according to the homogeneity degree. Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. In the specific but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms’ profits do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This result differs from those of the two-sided models, which deal with standard positive inter-group network externality.     

Entrepreneurial firms’ network competence,technological capability,and new product development performance

Successfully developing new products is critical to an entrepreneurial firm’s continued success. Based on the resource management model, this study aims to answer the key research question: how entrepreneurial firms leverage network competence and technological capability to enhance their new product development (NPD) performance in a turbulent environment. Using data collected from 134 entrepreneurial firms in China, we investigate the performance effects of network competence and technological capability, and the moderating effects of technological turbulence and market turbulence. Our findings show that network competence has a positive impact on NPD performance and technological capability plays a mediating role between network competence and NPD performance. Technological turbulence enhances the performance effects of network competence and technological capability; market turbulence advances the performance effect of network competence, but fails to exert significant negative impact on that of technological capability. We discuss managerial implications of our findings and offer directions for future research.     

Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions

State agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids when they are in buyer alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. Agencies frequently join together in buyer alliances. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances and that lower prices result because alliances are heterogeneous. Results suggest that when heterogeneity is not controlled, bids decline with alliance size, which has policy implications because Congress recently limited alliance size.     

Economics at the FTC: Office Supply Retailers Redux,Healthcare Quality Efficiencies Analysis,and Litigation of an Alleged Get-Rich-Quick Scheme

We discuss in this essay three of the matters on which economists in the Bureau of Economics (BE) at the Federal Trade Commission have worked this past year. BE revisited familiar ground in the first matter, a proposed merger of office supply retailers. The second part of the essay considers efficiency claims in health care mergers, with focus on the acquisition of a physician group by a health care system in Idaho. The final part of the essay discusses empirical work that was undertaken by the Bureau to investigate claims made by marketers of an alleged get-rich-quick scheme.     

THE SUBSTANCE OF ACCOUNTING FOR PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

This article evaluates Public‐Private Partnerships (PPP) accounting practice and the related financial accounting and reporting requirements. Governments across the world are seeking to access private finance to improve public infrastructure. Accounting for PPPs has encountered many difficulties, one of which is the practice by which PPPs are not accounted for as fixed assets on the balance sheet of either the public sector client or the private sector operator. Accounting for PPPs has grown in importance at a time of transition from national Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Under UK GAAP, both client and operator accounting adopt the reasoning – familiar from leasing standards – of the allocation of risks and rewards between the parties to determine the party which should recognize the fixed asset on its balance sheet. The gap in IFRS with regard to operator accounting has been filled by the interpretation IFRIC 12 on service concession agreements: this moves the reasoning from risks and rewards to control, familiar from consolidation standards. The UK Treasury and the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) have required/proposed the adoption of the mirror‐image treatment of IFRIC 12. In most, but not all, cases, control will be assessed to rest with the client, which will recognize property, plant and equipment, and not with the operator, which will recognize either a financial asset or an intangible asset on the basis of an assessment of which party bears the majority of risks and rewards. Under both UK GAAP and IFRS, accounting policy choices are strongly influenced by, for the client, governmental control frameworks, and for the operator, by the implications for the profile of distributable profits and for taxation. An important public policy issue is that the national accounts, which for European Union member states must comply with European System of Accounts 1995, will remain on a risks and rewards basis. It is these numbers that will be used in assessments of macro‐fiscal policy and fiscal risks, notwithstanding that the Eurostat version of risks and rewards is even more open to manipulation than were the national financial reporting standards.     

A Fresh Look at U.S. Water and Wastewater Infrastructure: The Commercial and Environmentally Sustainable Path Forward

The growing scarcity of water has a silver lining: water is being transformed into an economic resource whose price will better reflect its true value and thus encourage conservation and stimulate new supplies. This in turn can be expected to put more pressure on water and wastewater organizations to become both commercially and environmentally sustainable. And by making its decision‐making more consistent with economic criteria, the U.S. water industry will be in a better position to address its four major challenges: insufficient capital; industry fragmentation; paucity of innovations; and lack of environmental sustainability. The EPA estimates that maintenance and upgrades of public water systems will require over $344 billion in investment over the next 20 years. The good news, however, is that institutional investors have found major long‐term investment opportunities in water and wastewater infrastructure in the U.K., and have also established a small toehold in the U.S. Focused on increasing the value of the assets they purchase, such active investors can be expected to bring investment discipline as well as capital to water utilities. A more rational approach to the industry's economics will facilitate consolidation of what is a highly fragmented industry, thereby reducing service costs and increasing access to capital, which is badly needed by small U.S. community systems. Contributing further to cost reductions and increased access to capital, a vibrant and commercially oriented industry should also spawn valuable innovation. Finally, more accountable and well‐governed water organizations can become natural leaders in achieving environmental sustainability by ensuring that water is priced to reflect its true costs and that water resources are conserved for the future.     

The Economics of Director Heterogeneity

We investigate the potential costs and benefits of firms constituting a heterogeneous pool of directors relative to more homogeneous boards. We measure director heterogeneity along six separate dimensions and divide board heterogeneity into occupational and social components. Our empirical analysis indicates that corporate complexity and managerial control exhibit significant influence on board heterogeneity. Using the heterogeneity of the county population of the firm's headquarters as an instrument, we also find that investors place valuation premiums on heterogeneous boards in complex firms but discount heterogeneity in less complex firms. Overall, our analysis indicates greater heterogeneity may not necessarily improve board efficacy.     

The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms

We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that, because of a lesser need to respond to market pressures to increase the quality of information, connected companies can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information. In particular, lower quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample.     

The market reaction to corporate governance regulation

This paper investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions [e.g., staggered boards and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-chairman duality] are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that reduce executive pay, increase proxy access, and ban such governance provisions are value-enhancing. In contrast, another view of governance suggests that observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and management. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that regulate such governance choices are value destroying. Consistent with the latter view, we find that the abnormal returns to recent events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, decreasing in CEO pay, decreasing in the number of large blockholders, decreasing in the ease by which small institutional investors can access the proxy process, and decreasing in the presence of a staggered board.