Auditor changes,information quality and bankruptcy prediction

In periods of financial distress management may attempt to suppress unfavorable information from creditors and investors through the use of undisclosed changes in accounting methods, estimates and procedures, thus reducing the quality of the information contained in the firm's financial statements. The auditor's role in this context is to ensure that such compromise does not take place. If the auditor does not permit such accounting treatments, the company may choose to switch to another auditor who will. Empirical evidence relating auditor-change behavior to the quality of comparative bankruptcy prediction models provides support for the notion that auditor changes before bankruptcy may be at least partially due to lack of success at suppressing unfavorable information with the current auditor. Conversely, non-auditor switching companies appear to enjoy greater success at suppressing negative income and leverage information.     

Retail Leasehold Interests: A Contingent Claim Analysis

This paper develops a contingent claim model to analyze certain aspects of retail leasehold contracts. The approach allows for the explicit consideration of risk without any ad hoc risk adjustment. Both "straight" leases and "percentage" leases are examined with the value of sales as the underlying asset. Each lease value is expressed as a combination of options on sales. The effects of the lease value's determinants and equilibrium risk measurements are also analyzed.     

Location: A Neglected Determinant of Firm Growth

This paper links the performance of new technology firms, measured in terms of employment growth, to geographic location. We introduce a model of firm growth that is specific to characteristics of the location as well as the firm and industry. The model is estimated using a unique data set identifying the growth performance of small technology-based firms in Germany. We find that firm performance, as measured by employment growth, does appear to be influenced by locational characteristics as well as characteristics specific to the firm and the industry. In particular, the empirical evidence suggests that being located in an agglomeration rich in knowledge resources is more conducive to firm growth than being located in a region that is less endowed with knowledge resources. These results suggest the economic value of location as a conduit for accessing external knowledge resources, which in turn, manifests itself in higher rates of growth. JEL no. L10, R11, O12, O30     

Diagnostics cannot have much power against general alternatives

Model diagnostics are shown to have little power unless alternative hypotheses can be narrowly defined. For example, the independence of observations cannot be tested against general forms of dependence. Thus, the basic assumptions in regression models cannot be inferred from the data. Equally, the proportionality assumption in proportional-hazards models is not testable. Specification error is a primary source of uncertainty in forecasting, and this uncertainty will be difficult to resolve without external calibration. Model-based causal inference is even more problematic.     

加州大学伯利克分校哈斯商学院 社会责任的回报

从商业的角度看，公司讲道德的原因是相信善有善报，这也是公司热衷于从事各种社会责任活动的基本原因。在很多书籍和论文中充斥着一种观点，即公司决策对股东利益和社会利益的影响不存在此消彼长的关系，这听起来很有吸引力。     

Stock market perceptions of the motives for mergers in cases reviewed by the UK competition authorities: an empirical analysis

A number of studies have considered the motivation of managers to follow a merger strategy. However, as far as we are aware none has looked at the influence of competition regulation on merger motives using stock market data and event study techniques. Data drawn from 63 merger cases in the UK between 1989 and 2003 are examined for the stock market's perceptions of what motivated managers to pursue their initial merger bid. The findings suggest that the Synergy and Hubris dominate as motivations for mergers and that, unintentionally, competition policy may help to reduce the number of mergers motivated by Managerialism. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results

We analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results during the course of a patent contest. Despite knowledge spillovers, the leading innovator sometimes discloses to signal commitment to the project, and so potentially inducing a rival's exit. Surprisingly, when development costs are low the leading innovator does not need to disclose to induce the same strategic deterrence effect as that which arises from disclosure. Taking into account wasteful duplication of R&D effort, a patent office can increase welfare by choosing the probability of granting a contested patent and so altering the proportion of rivals that the leading innovator deters.