The Organization of Innovation Brokers: An International Review

Research on networks of innovation has typically focused on relationships of competition and collaboration between firms in the network, sometimes extending the analysis to sources of new ideas such as universities. More recently, attention has been paid to the activities of intermediaries in such networks, which facilitate the innovation process, which are positioned between the sources and users of innovations. This paper focuses on the organization of a distinctive type of intermediary, which we have defined as an innovation broker, by providing an analysis of 10 case studies of organizations dedicated to innovation broking from around the world. Innovation brokers in our definition are organizations that are founded especially to undertake an intermediary role, rather than performing that role as a by-product of their principal activities. The results of this analysis suggest that the key role played by innovation brokers in the innovation process is the independent validation of new ideas, thereby facilitating diffusion. In order to carry out this task, innovation brokers are organized on a not-for-profit basis, typically as a public-private partnership. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for innovation theory and research in networks of innovation.     

Law and Economics: What and Why

Can economics contribute anything to our understanding of law? David Friedman of the University of Chicago Law School, argues that economics can increase our understanding of the law and improve the drafting of legislation.     

Two-Stage Acquisitions, Free-Riding, and Corporate Control

This study examines two-stage acquisitions, focusing upon first- and second-stage excess returns for both acquired and acquiring firms, and analyzing the relation between acquisition returns and ownership interest. The evidence suggests that target firm shareholders do not free-ride. Evidence is also provided indicating that premiums are paid by the majority holder to acquire a remaining minority interest.     

地理标志的重要因素：集体化与控制

本文将重点讨论在市场经济的商标体系下将如何推动地理标志的集体化和控制。     

The Assessment: Games and Coordination

Coordination problems arise in a multitude of economic interactions.Recent advances in the field of game theory have shed new lighton these problems and the ways in which they might be analysed.This issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy first examinessome of the theoretical dimensions to this literature, as wellas some empirical and experimental insights. It goes on to applysome of these ideas to a number of important policy areas, includingmacroeconomic policy coordination, public good provision, andproblems of political coordination.     

Continuous measurement of self-report of emotional response

There has been substantial recent interest in measurement of emotional responses to advertising. One of the promising methods recently introduced has been the continuous measurement of specific feelings through a “warmth monitor” introduced by Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty (1986). This article reports research extending the work of Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty (1986) in two ways. First, it tests whether the warmth monitor method distinguishes feelings from the global reactions that are more commonly measured with continuous self-report measures. Second, it tests the extension of the method to a general emotion monitor that measures feelings other than warmth. Support is found for discrimination between feelings and overall liking and for the validity of a humor, but possibly not irritation, monitor. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Product Diversity under Monopoly: Two High Quality Results

A mild relaxation of Mussa and Rosen's (1978) preference assumption implies that, contrary to their result, a monopoly selling a line of vertically differentiated goods may include higher-quality varieties than would a competitive industry.