All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

We study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.     

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

This article studies the role of risk arbitrageurs in takeoversand the source of their advantage. We show how the presenceof arbitrageurs affects the value of the target shares, sincearbitrageurs are more likely to tender. Therefore an arbitrageurhas the informational advantage of knowing he bought shares.In equilibrium, the number of arbitrageurs buying shares andthe price they pay are determined endogenously. We also presentseveral empirical implications, including the relationship amongtrading volume, takeover premium, liquidity of the shares, andthe number of risk arbitrageurs investing in one particulardeal.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Day-of-the-Week Effects in the Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the influence of day-of-the-week patterns in security returns on long-run IPO underperformance. Comparisons are made between the IPOs in Ritter's [20] database, and a constructed set of matching firms based on SIC code and size, using NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities. It is found that virtually all of the IPO underperformance occurs on Mondays and Tuesdays and that the degree of underperformance significantly differs from other days. Thus, a common explanation may exist for the general day-of-the-week pattern in security returns and IPO long-run underperformance.     

From weed to wealth? Prospects for medic pastures in the Mediterranean farming system of north-west Syria

Medic (Medicago spp.) pastures are widely grown in rotation with dryland cereal crops in Mediterranean climate zones of Australia. Attempts since the 1960's to introduce this system to Mediterranean west Asia and north Africa (the native region of medic) have not lead to significant adoption; farmers in the region recognize medic, but as a weed and natural pasture plant. This first detailed economic evaluation of the rotational medic system was conducted using a whole-farm linear programming model based on the agricultural system of north-west Syria. The model represents in detail impacts of rotation on yields, labor requirements of alternative farm activities, availability of family and hired labor, subsistence income requirements, livestock feed sources and uses at different times and a choice of sheep stocking rates. Biological data for the analysis are based on a large six-year cropping and grazing experiment near Aleppo on terra-rossa soil with rainfall mainly in winter and averaging about 330 mm annually. The trial compared a dryland medic-wheat system and traditional two-year rotations of wheat with: fallow, watermelon, lentil and vetch. Results indicate that, given current prices and yields from the trial, medic is less profitable than traditional rotations. The model was used to investigate situations in which medic would be economically preferred. Selection of a medic rotation by the model was found to be particularly sensitive to the area of the farm and the price of labor. On small farms, labor availability per hectare is high, favouring the production of labor intensive crops such as lentil and watermelon. On larger farms, labor costs of these enterprises are substantial, increasing the relative profitability of medic, especially if labor prices increase. Interestingly, the relative desirability of medic is more sensitive to its impact on subsequent wheat crops than to the level of pasture production. We also found that modest increases in the prices of sheep products (especially milk) have a major impact on the economic performance of medic. These insights will allow improved focusing and targeting of future research and extension activities.     

Believing in employment discrimination: The case of Forrest Mims,Scientific American,and title VII protection

This article reviews the law regarding Title VII employment discrimination protection from religious discrimination. The issues surrounding the principal legal protection in this regard are explored in the context of a recent controversial case in which an author, Forrest Mims, was not hired as a regular contributor forScientific American magazine, ostensibly because of his belief in the theory of creation over the theory of evolution. The definition of what constitutes a protected religious belief or practice is seen to have expanded over time. However, a belief in creationism is not necessarily seen as being tantamount to a religious belief under present legal interpretation of Title VII. The implications of this finding for future needed Title VII revision are discussed.     

Alternative hypotheses and the volume of trade: the gravity equation and the extent of specialization

Abstract.  We examine why the gravity equation works and the implications for its use. First, we demonstrate that the gravity equation as a statistical relationship can be generated from a model with incomplete specialization and trade costs. Second, we analyse the predominance of zero bilateral trade values as a 'puzzle' broadly inconsistent with the complete specialization models typically used to derive the gravity equation, but consistent with the alternative hypothesis of incomplete specialization. Third, we demonstrate that the explanation for why the gravity equation works has considerable relevance for how the gravity equation is interpreted and used and how we view bilateral trade.     

Through Trial and Error to Collusion*

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.