Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?

Most of the literature on the independence of the Central Bank assumes only one policy instrument is available: monetary policy. If we introduce fiscal policy as well, when preferences may differ among policy-makers, the situation is radically different. In this case fiscal policy will substantially weaken the impact of the Central Bank's actions, and may annihilate them altogether. The Stability Pact may then be a liability, instead of an asset, because it renders both policies impotent (even if credible). We examine whether there is any incentive to retain monetary policy independence; and whether accountability can and should be used to ensure fiscal and monetary policies support each other, rather than undermine each other.     

Central Bank transparency in theory and practice

We study the effects of Central Bank transparency on inflation and the output gap. Our intention is to illustrate, with the help of a small analytical model, how an imperfectly transparent Central Bank affects the two main macroeconomic variables, inflation and the output gap. The model tells us that transparency affects the variability of inflation and output but not their average levels. Then we examine the extent to which this conjecture is justified by the index of transparency constructed by Eijffinger and Geraats. Given the limitations of such indices, we only examine the correlations between the index of transparency and the macro variables in question. This analysis shows that the average magnitudes are not affected by transparency but their variability is. In the case of inflation, its variability benefits from the reduction of transparency and about 50% is explained by the variability in the transparency index. The effect on output volatility on the other hand is less clear, and in any case transparency seems to increase it rather than decrease it.     

EU Enlargement: Expanding the Union and Its Potential

Intereconomics - The new EU member candidates, as well as those who have had this status for a decade, present the Union with an opportunity to decide what kind of club it should be.     

How anchored are inflation expectations in EMU countries?

Anchored inflation expectations help stabilize inflation. Previous results indicate that monetary policy has been effective in breaking the link between actual and expected inflation at the euro area level. In this paper we examine whether this is also true at the national level. We define the ‘disconnect’ between inflation and inflation expectations and then proceed to examine the extent to which this disconnect exists for a number of euro area countries. Our findings suggest that for some countries, their own inflation experiences still affect national inflation expectations, and certainly more by comparison to how they affect the aggregate euro area level.     

What are the prerequisites for a euro area fiscal capacity?

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses a pathway towards achieving fiscal union in the euro area. It outlines three steps and their prerequisites. In the first step, Banking Union would be completed to increase the financial stability of the euro area. It would render the “no bailout” clause more credible and thereby allow to deal better with insolvent governments. In the second step, more centralised funds would be created in order to provide important public goods and in order to deal with large asymmetric shocks. The third step, which is currently unattainable, consists of a true federalisation of important government functions.