Ethics,Welfare, and Markets: An Economic Analysis

The present article examines society's welfare when goods with identical physical attributes can be produced using two alternative technologies, one of them less ethically desirable but less expensive for at least some producers. For the scenario where identification costs must be borne by producers and consumers of the high‐quality good, the outcome under unregulated markets is identical to the optimal solution of a central planner constrained to neither ban the undesirable technology nor segregate the low‐quality good. However, under certain circumstances the unregulated market equilibrium may be improved upon by government intervention that shifts the burden of identification costs to the producers of the low‐quality good, or which bans the production of the low‐quality good. The optimal intervention needs to be determined case‐by‐case and depends on consumer preferences, relative production costs, and relative costs of identification and fraud prevention.     

Changing the Rules of the Game

Abstract

This article examines the impact of privatization on the relative bargaining strength of management and trade unions. Findings are based on a study of Ireland's largest telecoms provider, Eircom, which has been privatized since 1999. The privatization of Eircom adopted a stakeholder approach, under which employee share-ownership and management–union partnership played an important role in firm restructuring. Findings show that despite this approach privatization has resulted in a significant decrease in the perceived bargaining strength of unions and an increase in the perceived bargaining strength of management.     

A proposal for the reduction of domestic price variability during the phase-in period of trade liberalization

Countries replacing existing trade barriers with a fixed tariff may find that domestic price variability rises to politically unacceptable levels. This paper shows how the tariff-reduction formula can be modified to delay the transmission of world price variability. The importance of this modification is demonstrated by a simple two-country, one-commodity simulation model. The simulation results show that tariffication of existing EC variable levies/export subsidies would dramatically increase price variability within the European Community and that the transmission of this variability can be delayed by slightly altering the ***adjustment formula.     

Paired difference analysis of size economies in UK credit unions

This study utilizes a paired difference approach to investigate for the existence of scale economies in UK credit unions. The analysis is conducted for both credit unions in aggregate as well as a number of sub-groups with the latter defined in terms of the trade organization to which credit unions are affiliated. This decomposition was viewed as particularly important in that the respective umbrella organizations have different growth strategies. The analysis revealed that significant efficiency gains are available through credit unions adopting a policy of asset growth. This finding held good irrespective of the umbrella organization to which credit unions belong although the analysis also revealed that the opportunity for efficiency gains was not so pronounced for the members of one of the trade organizations - the National Federation of Credit Unions. This finding was due to the NFCU's much more overt emphasis on self-help and community development, particularly in areas of economic disadvantage.