Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision: Incorporating Behavioural Approaches

In the standard model of voluntary public good provision and other game theoretic models, climate-friendly leadership of a country is not successful: A unilateral increase of this country’s greenhouse gas abatement measures, i.e., contributions to the global public good of climate protection, will not lead to a positive reaction by the other countries but instead trigger a reduction of their abatement efforts and thus a crowding-out effect. In this paper it is shown how this undesired consequence need no longer occur when elements of behavioral economics are incorporated in the otherwise standard model of public good provision. In particular, strategic complementarities between the public good contribution of the leading country and those of the follower may result either if the follower has specific non-egoistic or other-regarding preferences or if the leader’s contribution positively affects the follower’s beliefs, i.e., his conjectural variations, about the leader’s behaviour.     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

Technology transfer through imports

Abstract .  We study international technology transfer through R&D spillovers in sixteen countries' manufacturing industries since the early 1970s. The analysis shows that the productivity impact of international technology transfer often exceeds that of domestic technological change, more so in high-technology industries. Moreover, technology transfer is found to be strongly varying across country-pairs and tends to decline in geographic distance, pointing to goods trade as the transfer channel. We directly evaluate this hypothesis, and results suggest that trade is crucial for technology transfer from Germany, France, and the UK, while for the US, Japan, and Canada non-trade channels are more important.     

Changes in the Austrian structure of wages, 1996–2002: evidence from linked employer-employee data

Analyzing data from the Structure of Earnings Surveys we find that wage dispersion in Austria increased only marginally between 1996 and 2002. There was an increase in the returns to education which accrued only to male workers. The positive effects of tenure and especially of experience on wages decreased over time. We adopt the Machado–Mata (J Appl Econ 20:445–465, 2005) counterfactual decomposition technique which allows to attribute changes in each wage decile to changes in worker and workplace characteristics and into changes in returns to these characteristics. Behind the small net increase in inequality we document a number of interesting gross effects that influence the change in the wage distribution. We find that both composition effects due to gender, education and age and market-driven effects such as changes in returns and changing workplace characteristics contributed to a higher dispersion of wages.     

How large are wage differentials in Austria?

The OECD has repeatedly recommended that wage bargaining in Austria be decentralised to allow wage diferentials to widen. But the status quo itself is in question. While studies of aggregate industry data indicate a high degree of wage dispersion, research based on data from household surveys seems suggest that income inequality in Austria is as small as in the Scandinavian countries. This paper seeks to reconcile these opposing views. It shows that data from the household surveys underestimate the size of inter-industry wage differentials. An analysis of the structure of contractual wage rates supports the view that wage inequality is very pronounced in Austria and that a narrowing of the wage gap would lead both to an increase in productive efficiency and an increase in income equality.     

TRADE INTEGRATION,OUTSOURCING AND EMPLOYMENT IN AUSTRIA: A DECOMPOSITION APPROACH

Outsourcing and trade integration of advanced countries is debated with respect to employment effects, in particular for low educated workers – at least in relative terms. We study the employment effects – differentiated by educational attainment levels – of changes in the patterns of trade integration and outsourcing in the Austrian economy over the periods 1995–2000 and 2000–2005 using hierarchical decomposition analysis based on deflated input–output tables. Outsourcing is modeled as changes in the shares of domestically produced intermediates in total intermediates. A similar decomposition of the final demand vector allows us to draw conclusions on the overall employment effects of trade integration. The results suggest that the expected negative employment effects of outsourcing and rising import penetration have been overcompensated by increasing exports. Thus, the overall employment effects of Austrian trade integration have been positive for all educational attainment groups. However, whereas the total effects have been strongest for medium and high educated workers over the period 1995–2000, employment of low educated workers have been strongest and positively affected over the period 2000–2005. This pattern can be explained by a more sluggish export performance together with stronger negative effects of outsourcing and import penetration in medium and high-skill intensive products.     

Asymptotic behavior of the estimated weights and of the estimated performance measures of the minimum VaR and the minimum CVaR optimal portfolios for dependent data

In this paper we derive the asymptotic distributions of the estimated weights and of estimated performance measures of the minimum value-at-risk portfolio and of the minimum conditional value-at-risk portfolio assuming that the asset returns follow a strictly stationary process. It is proved that the estimated weights as well as the estimated performance measures are asymptotically multivariate normally distributed. We also present an asymptotic test for the weights and a joint test for the characteristics of both portfolios. Moreover, the asymptotic densities of the estimated performance measures are compared with the corresponding exact densities. It is shown that the asymptotic approximation performs well even for the moderate sample size.     

Do Overconfident Workers Cooperate Less? The Relationship Between Overconfidence and Cooperation in Team Production

The tendency to underestimate others' relative performance compared with one's own is widespread among individuals in all work environments. We examine the relationship between, and the driving forces behind, individual overconfidence and voluntary cooperation in team production. Our experimental data suggest an indirect and gender‐specific link: overconfident men hold more optimistic beliefs about coworkers' cooperativeness than men who lack confidence and are accordingly significantly more cooperative, whereas overconfidence, beliefs, and cooperativeness are not correlated in women. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assessing the employment effects of the German welfare reform – an integrated CGE-microsimulation approach

The purpose of this article is to quantify the employment effects of the recent German welfare reform. The key element of this reform was to merge the coexisting transfer systems Social Assistance (SA) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) into one unified benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II – ALG II). We also consider a second reform scenario that is intended to further improve the labour supply incentives of low-skilled workers. Our methodological contribution is to use an integrated CGE-microsimulation model. In adopting such an approach, we are able to combine the advantages of microsimulation studies by accounting for the large amount of heterogeneity in terms of households’ preferences and budget constraints with the advantages of an applied general equilibrium model. The latter permits us to identify potential general equilibrium repercussions through changes in wages and unemployment. The simulations indicate that the introduction of ALG II results in a negligible increase in employment of only 45?000 individuals. In contrast, a cut in benefit levels combined with a decrease in transfer withdrawal is shown to produce somewhat larger employment effects of about 190?000 individuals.     

Whom to send to Doha? The shortsighted ones!

Analyses of the effects of trade policies focus on comparisons of two different steady states, restricting the investigation to the long run. In order to account for the adjustments and to capture the relevant transmission mechanisms of changes in trade costs, such as market size, entry and exit, as well as productivity changes of firms, we base our trade policy analysis on a dynamic new trade theory model. This approach has two advantages. (i) It allows us to take account of the transitional process after a change in tariffs. (ii) It allows us to take account of the shortsightedness of policy makers. We show that Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a dynamic trade model are lower than Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a static model. We also show that shortsighted politicians tend to set lower tariffs than politicians with a longer planning horizon.