On the validity and identification of long-run restrictions for a cointegrated system

The identification approach suggested in Blanchard and Quah [1989 The dynamic effects of aggregate supply and demand disturbances. Am. Econ. Rev. 79:655–673] and King et al. [1991 Stochastic trends and economic flucuations. Am. Econ. Rev. 81:819–840] makes use of the long-run properties of structural disturbances. This paper provides economic underpinning for the use of long-run identifying restrictions by showing formally its validity for the class of exogenous growth models under certain conditions. This paper also obtains the minimum number of restrictions, in addition to the long-run restrictions, required for the identification of structural disturbances in a co-integrated system.     

„TOP Controlling“ — Initiative bei Bayer CropScience

Einführung von Management Informationssystem, Integration von Bedarfs- und Ergebnisplanung durch globales SAP-basiertes Planungssystem sowie Aufsetzen einer „Finance Academy“     

Public Affairs Management Activities of German Multinational Corporations in India

In this paper the importance of public affairs management in multinational corporations in India will be examined. After briefly discussing the state of the art in international business and society literature, a conceptual framework for public affairs management in multinational corporations will be developed. This framework serves as the theoretical basis for an empirical study among German multinational corporations in India. In the main part of this paper the results of this study will be presented and discussed. The paper ends with a critical assessment and some major implications for future studies.     

A global database of domestic and international tourist numbers at national and subnational level

We present a new, global database on tourist destinations. The database differs from other databases in that it includes both domestic and international tourists; and it contains, for the most important destinations, data at national level as well as at lower administrative levels. Missing observations are interpolated using statistical models. The data are freely accessible on the internet. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Unpacking the relationship between an innovation strategy and firm performance: The role of task conflict and political activity

This article adds to extant literature by examining the contingent effect of two cross-functional processes on the relationship between the use of an innovation strategy and firm performance, namely, task conflict and political activity. The authors examine the effects of these processes with a sample of 260 firms. The positive relationship between the use of an innovation strategy and firm performance is stronger for higher levels of cross-functional task conflict and lower levels of cross-functional political activity. Furthermore, the authors find support for a configurational hypothesis: the innovation strategy-firm performance relationship is strongest for the high task conflict/low political activity configuration and weakest for the low task conflict/high political activity configuration. The results unveil two important cross-functional mechanisms influencing the extent to which the benefits of an innovation strategy can be reaped.     

SHOULD YOU ALLOW YOUR EMPLOYEE TO BECOME YOUR COMPETITOR? ON NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS*

We discuss a principal–agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a noncompete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal, as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the agent. The principal prefers to impose such a clause if and only if the value created is sufficiently small relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can use an option contract for retaining the agent, she will never prefer a strict noncompete agreement.     

Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.     

Attention,indifference, dislike,action: Web advertising involving users

Since advertising banners in Web pages usually do not relate to the users' interests, banners are often rejected. Much effort has been spent on trying to adapt banners to users. While the usual approach is to try to accomplish that by gathering data about the user, we propose a different approach. Using user‐configurable advertising profiles and direct feedback we give full control to the users themselves. This approach is currently being implemented and evaluated in the context of an Internet TV program guide. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.