On the impact of leverage constraints on asset prices and trading volume

Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation. We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC, IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first author).     

Inflation,real economic growth and unemployment expectations: an empirical analysis based on the ECB survey of professional forecasters

Expectations are at the centre of modern macroeconomic theory and policymakers. In this article, we examine the predictive ability and the consistency properties of macroeconomic expectations using data of the European Central Bank (ECB) Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). In particular, we provide evidence on the properties of forecasts for three key macroeconomic variables: the inflation rate, the growth rate of real gross domestic product and the unemployment rate.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.     

Productivity effects of environmental performance: evidence from TFP analysis on marketing cooperatives

The object of the present article is to offer a decomposition of productivity indices incorporating environmental changes. The model followed is an input oriented approach related to undesirable output (environmental performance attribute) in horticultural marketing cooperatives. This study is motivated by both the lack of analysis of environmental performance's effects on agribusiness productivity and the relevance of cooperative firms in the European agricultural model for attaining sustainability. For this purpose, bootstrapped envelopment analysis is applied and the best practice frontier obtained corresponds to decision making units showing the best environmental behaviour. The Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) is decomposed into technological change, efficiency and environmental change. In the second stage, the correlations of these changes with other management variables of cooperatives are analysed. The indicators obtained, on one hand, advice about the nonseparable distance function estimations when the environmental factor is introduced. On the other hand, the results display a relevant increase in efficiency and environmental components for the period under study showing a high influence from labour qualification, environmental effort and spillover effect in the sector.     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin     

Mixed Duopoly,Merger and Multiproduct Firms

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms, but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they set up a multiproduct firm in which the government owns an exogenous percentage stake. In this framework, we show that the decision to merge by firms depends on the degree to which goods are substitutes and on the percentage of the shares owned by the government in the multiproduct firm.     

Why Sweden's pension reform was able to be successfully implemented

Governments that do not reform pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems will eventually face a pension crisis. In a democracy, reforms require majority support. The problem is that pension reform requires today's generation to bear the burden to avoid burdening tomorrow's generation. Sweden recently passed pension legislation that specifies a gradual transition from a public defined-benefit plan to a defined contribution plan. Why was Sweden successful in reforming its pension system? We find that a political economy perspective helps to answer this question: there are more winners who would vote in favour of the reform than non-winners who would vote against it. When comparing the net effect (present value of expected benefits minus present value of remaining contributions) of the new and old systems, contributions of the working generation (age < 53) are reduced by more than their expected benefits.     

Government Spending, Taxation, and Oil Revenues in Mexico

The paper analyzes the intertemporal relationship between oil duties, taxes, government spending, and GDP in Mexico during the 1981–98 period. The results from estimating a VAR model, impulse response functions, and variance decompositions on the quarterly series of taxes, government spending, oil duties, and GDP suggest that there seems to be a substitution effect between oil duties and tax revenues, and that tax revenues are not able to absorb temporary decreases in oil duties. Also, increases in tax revenue might lead to increasing government spending, but short–run increases in government spending are not likely to lead to political pressure to reduce the expected budget deficit via increased taxation and/or oil revenues. Lastly, GDP is not stimulated in the short–run by temporary increases in government spending and, thus, stabilization measures adopted in recent years to reduce the size of the government are not likely to significantly undermine GDP growth.     

An empirical approach to the organisational determinants of spin-off creation in European universities

Given the importance in recent years of the phenomenon of academic entrepreneurship in European universities, knowledge about determinants and performance of this technology transfer mechanism may have important managerial and policy implications. Applying the resource-based view at universities, we have tested the influence of five bundles of resources and capabilities on spin-off activity rates as well as on the performance of new spin-offs in a sample of seven European universities. These five bundles are: technology transfer policies and strategies; human capital; stock of technology; resources and capabilities of technology transfer offices; and support measures for academic entrepreneurship. Our results show that excellence of human capital and the presence of university-based financial support measures are strongly associated with both spin-off activity and performance. Another interesting finding is related to the availability of university-based non-economic support measures (training, counselling, etc.), which have no influence on spin-off activity but are significantly associated with performance of new spin-offs. We also discuss some interesting relationships between explanatory variables.