Product market competition with differentiated goods and social welfare in the presence of an industry-wide union

Mainstream locus communis indicates that a more competitive product market leads to higher social welfare levels. Using a Conjectural Variation (CV) model, this research note analyzes the effects on welfare of different degrees of product market competition in a duopoly with differentiated goods. Bargaining between the firms and the industry-wide union occurs under the Efficient Bargaining (EB) model. The work indicates that, with close substitute goods, social welfare is maximized for the intermediate levels of market competition, whereas more independent goods lead to the standard result of a high welfare level under competitive markets.     

The ‘wrong skewness’ problem: a re-specification of stochastic frontiers

In this paper, we study the ‘wrong skewness phenomenon’ in stochastic frontiers (SF), which consists in the observed difference between the expected and estimated sign of the asymmetry of the composite error, and causes the ‘wrong skewness problem’, for which the estimated inefficiency in the whole industry is zero. We propose a more general and flexible specification of the SF model, introducing dependences between the two error components and asymmetry (positive or negative) of the random error. This re-specification allows us to decompose the third moment of the composite error into three components, namely: (i) the asymmetry of the inefficiency term; (ii) the asymmetry of the random error; and (iii) the structure of dependence between the error components. This decomposition suggests that the wrong skewness anomaly is an ill-posed problem, because we cannot establish ex ante the expected sign of the asymmetry of the composite error. We report a relevant special case that allows us to estimate the three components of the asymmetry of the composite error and, consequently, to interpret the estimated sign. We present two empirical applications. In the first dataset, where the classic SF has the wrong skewness, an estimation of our model rejects the dependence hypothesis, but accepts the asymmetry of the random error, thus justifying the sign of the skewness of the composite error. More importantly, we estimate a non-zero inefficiency, thus solving the wrong skewness problem. In the second dataset, where the classic SF does not yield any anomaly, an estimation of our model provides evidence for the presence of dependence. In such situations, we show that there is a remarkable difference in the efficiency distribution between the classic SF and our class of models.     

Strategic trade policy with bargaining over managerial contracts

This paper re‐examines the well‐known activist regime's inefficiency (governments set export subsidies) in a sales–delegation game with owner–manager bargaining over contracts. Contrary to the received literature, this bargaining process may (a) induce governments to set a tax if products are not too substitute or complements and (b) lead to an efficient (inefficient) equilibrium provided that products are sufficiently differentiated (not too complements). Therefore, unilateral public intervention can be optimal: in case of rival governments' retaliation, under appropriate product competition degrees, welfares are larger than under free trade even for small managers' power. Thus, managerial delegation practices are crucial also for international trade issues.     

Environmental innovation policy and international competition

We consider one polluting industry in an open economy. The national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control, by inducing appropriate technological innovation to reduce toxic emissions. The emission-reducing innovations are developed through firm-specific costly investments. Under different hypotheses on market structure (perfect competition, Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly), international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation. The appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to the information available to the government and according to market structure. If information is asymmetric, the subsidy must include the information premium necessary to separate different types of firms.     

Optimal two-object auctions with synergies

We design the revenue-maximizing auction for two objects when each buyer has bi-dimensional private information and a superadditive utility function (i.e., a synergy is generated if a buyer wins both goods). In this setting the seller is likely to allocate the objects inefficiently with respect to an environment with no synergies (see Armstrong, RES (2000)). In particular, the objects may be bundled too rarely or a buyer may win the bundle even though her valuations for the goods are weakly dominated by the values of another buyer.Received: 29 October 2001, Accepted: 29 October 2002, JEL Classification: D44, D82This paper has been written while the author was a member of the Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata alle Scienze Umane "Diego De Castro", Universitá degli Studi di Torino, Italy. Valuable comments and suggestions were provided by Antonio Cabrales, Massimo Marinacci, three anonymous referees and, especially, by Mark Armstrong. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Profit sharing as entry deterrence mechanism

In a right-to-manage framework, this paper analyzes the optimal choice of the pay scheme (profit sharing vs. fixed wage) in a unionized duopoly with potential market entry and decentralized bargaining. The paper shows that, depending on the institutional features, both pay systems can arise as equilibria in Nash strategies. Under duopoly with committed bargaining, the fixed wage is the Nash equilibrium; with flexible bargaining, an agreement between the incumbent firm and its union about profit sharing arises as Nash equilibrium, if the union is not too strong. A monopoly with threat of entry reinforces the selection of profit sharing as a deterrent mechanism.     

Pricing the Option to Surrender in Incomplete Markets

New international accounting standards require insurers to reflect the value of embedded options and guarantees in their products. Pricing techniques based on the Black and Scholes paradigm are often used; however, the hypotheses underneath this model are rarely met. We propose a framework that encompasses the most known sources of incompleteness. We show that the surrender option, joined with a wide range of claims embedded in insurance contracts, can be priced through our tool, and deliver hedging portfolios to mitigate the risk arising from their positions. We provide extensive empirical analysis to highlight the effect of incompleteness on the fair value of the option.     

Cumulative and CUB Models for Rating Data: A Comparative Analysis

Ordinal measurements as ratings, preference and evaluation data are very common in applied disciplines, and their analysis requires a proper modelling approach for interpretation, classification and prediction of response patterns. This work proposes a comparative discussion between two statistical frameworks that serve these goals: the established class of cumulative models and a class of mixtures of discrete random variables, denoted as CUB models, whose peculiar feature is the specification of an uncertainty component to deal with indecision and heterogeneity. After surveying their definition and main features, we compare the performances of the selected paradigms by means of simulation experiments and selected case studies. The paper is tailored to enrich the understanding of the two approaches by running an extensive and comparative analysis of results, relative advantages and limitations, also at graphical level. In conclusion, a summarising review of the key issues of the alternative strategies and some final remarks are given, aimed to support a unifying setting.     

JAPAN: THE CASE FOR A TAYLOR RULE? A SIMPLE APPROACH

Abstract.  In this article I propose two different models for analyzing the conduct of monetary policy, facing certain expectations. The first is a autoregressive model, which implicitly accounts for adaptive expectations, while the second accounts for the rational expectations. I used these models to judge whether or not the Taylor rule can be a good benchmark for the conduct of monetary policy in Japan. The conclusion is that a simple AR model fits the data better than the Taylor rule, and that assuming rational expectations in Japan could be highly misleading, at least since the mid-1990s.