Brand wars: consumer–brand engagement beyond client–agency fights

Engaging consumers with their brands has emerged as a priority in marketers’ agenda. Brand decision-makers share a clear representational view of consumer-brand engagement (CBE). Despite this agreement, practitioners are currently finding hard to practically achieve CBE. The clash between an ideal representation of CBE focused on consumer protagonism and its fragile execution urges a rethinking of consumer-brand relationship modes and timeframe. We argue that this clash is nurtured by the long-established conflicting relational dynamics among brand decision-makers illustrated by client–agency (CA) disputes of which consumers represent the ending-point recipient. This paper reflects on how consumer protagonism as an inherent component of CBE is currently reshaping the relation dynamics among all brand actors. We represent CBE as a relational hub resting upon a co-creation rather than a separation logic. We finally provide a pragmatic reflection on the relationship culture required by CBE among actors beyond the CA dyad.     

Futures Contracts in Water Leasing: An Experimental Analysis Using Basin Characteristics of the Rio Grande,NM

Providing for increased water demands during periods of persistent drought and climatic variability may require water managers, users and planners to think differently about how water resources are allocated. A water marketing institution that allows water rights holders to reallocate water on a temporary basis could overcome these challenges with minimal conflict. In this paper, a water marketing institution that allows for the temporary reallocation of water rights in a spot and futures market is investigated. The results provide insight into three key questions: (1) how does trading impact the physical system, (2) does the value of water differ by trading agents, (3) how is economic welfare redistributed as a result of trading? Results of experimental treatments display minor impacts to the physical system, that prices differ across the different type of trading agents and the addition of a futures market has the ability to decrease market prices while increasing economic welfare as a futures market allows users to hedge against future water uncertainty.     

Why good accountants do bad audits

On July 30, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressing corporate accountability. A response to recent financial scandals, the law tightened federal controls over the accounting industry and imposed tough new criminal penalties for fraud. The president proclaimed, "The era of low standards and false profits is over." If only it were that easy. The authors don't think corruption is the main cause of bad audits. Rather, they claim, the problem is unconscious bias. Without knowing it, we all tend to discount facts that contradict the conclusions we want to reach, and we uncritically embrace evidence that supports our positions. Accountants might seem immune to such distortions because they work with seemingly hard numbers and clear-cut standards. But the corporate-auditing arena is particularly fertile ground for self-serving biases. Because of the often subjective nature of accounting and the close relationships between accounting firms and their corporate clients, even the most honest and meticulous of auditors can unintentionally massage the numbers in ways that mask a company's true financial status, thereby misleading investors, regulators, and even management. Solving this problem will require far more aggressive action than the U.S. government has taken thus far. What's needed are practices and regulations that recognize the existence of bias and moderate its effects. True auditor independence will entail fundamental changes to the way the accounting industry operates, including full divestiture of consulting and tax services, rotation of auditing firms, and fixed-term contracts that prohibit client companies from firing their auditors. Less tangibly, auditors must come to appreciate the profound impact of self-serving biases on their judgment.     

无中生财 利用网络以开发无形资产

全球最大的会计师事务所亚瑟·安徒生公司的负责人巴里·里伯特绕着宾馆的会议厅走了一圈,就像大学里的蓝球教练一样,他一边走一边指着听众、就是当地的业务经理们说,"你们一文不值.你们坐的椅子都比你们自己更值钱,他们是资产,你们可是开销."     

Tarnished gold: US farm commodity programmes after 50 years

It is fifty years since the introduction of the US farm commodity programmes launched under the New Deal. Based on the concepts of relief, recovery and reform, the New Deal gave new hope to farmers emerging from the Great Depression. But how successful were these programmes? Don Paarlberg believes they were miscarried, becoming preferential, profligate and perennial. With the recent recession and the introduction of new farm legislation, the author speculates as to whether history will repeat itself.     

The new US farm policies

This article is an early assessment of the agricultural policies of the Carter administration, particularly as they relate to Western Europe. The author examines emerging US farm policy with regard to: price and production, grain reserves, attitude toward the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC, trade in agricultural products, and commodity agreements.     

REACTIONS TO REGULATION OF ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL

Regulations designed to achieve “uniformity in practice” in Australian firms' reporting of goodwill were first adopted in 1985 with the introduction of AAS18. Because of the requirement to amortise purchased goodwill, a number of firms either did not comply or took evasive actions to mitigate the effects of the standard. This paper documents and explains the pre-regulation cross-sectional variation in accounting practices. Reactions to the set of regulations introduced between 1985 and 1989 are then described and explained through a longitudinal study of accounting policy choice. We develop hypotheses which explain why the goodwill accounting rules reversed relations between the accounting methods adopted by firms and both the earnings effect of compliance and the market value of the firm's goodwill. The results are confirmatory.     

Managing predecessors' shadows in executive transitions

New leaders inevitably face comparisons with predecessors. After a short time these comparisons usually give way to judgments about the leader's performance. Occasionally, however, the presence of the predecessor continues to be felt long after the new leader has taken charge. The metaphor of a “shadow” cast by a predecessor is used to describe the process whereby memories of a former leader play a dominant role in shaping current behavior in the organization. A case is analyzed in which a burdensome shadow impeded a new leader's efforts to take charge of a state agency. Counterprojective group techniques helped the new leader and his staff lift the shadow and form a more productive working relationship. © 1995 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.