Your Governance or Mine?

In response to criticism directed at the resource sector's corporate governance, this paper examines the corporate governance and underlying firm characteristics of resource development stage entities (DSEs) relative to a size‐matched sample of non‐resource firms. We find that resource DSEs have different governance characteristics in the measures of board independence, chair/CEO duality and CEO cash bonuses. Furthermore, there are differences in the information environment measures of analyst following, debt levels, stock market return and stock turnover. Considering we document substantial differences in underlying firm characteristics, corporate governance differences are likely appropriate to the mining industry and should not be uniformly labelled as ‘bad’. Our results suggest that media rankings based on corporate governance scores may not accurately portray the resource sector. Overall, our results are of interest to Australian investors and regulators and contribute to a broader understanding of contextually contingent corporate governance.     

Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information

Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant empirical literature has been unable to isolate each of these effects. This paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in that it allows the researcher to have access to some private information about borrower risk that is unobserved by the lender. The data also include public information about borrower risk, loan contract terms, and ex post performance for both secured and unsecured loans. The results suggest that the ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with short borrower–lender relations that are relatively unknown to the lender.     

Bear beta

We test whether bear market risk, time variation in the probability of future bear market states, is priced. We construct an Arrow–Debreu security that pays off in bear market states (AD Bear) from traded Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index options and use its returns to measure bear market risk. We find that bear beta (exposure to bear market risk) has a strong relation with expected stock returns that is robust, persistent, and remains strong among liquid and large stocks. Historical bear beta also predicts future bear market risk exposure. We conclude that bear market risk is priced in the cross section of stock returns.     

Shareholder say on pay and CEO compensation: three strikes and the board is out

From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non‐binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book‐to‐market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non‐strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%.     

The impact of government ownership on dividend policy in China

We investigate the impact of State ownership on Chinese corporate dividend policy. We find that Chinese firms' dividend payout rates respond fairly quickly to earnings changes, and the average actual payout ratio for Chinese firms falls between the payout ratios for emerging-market and developed firms. These results are consistent with the dividend policies of developing economies in general. We also find that dividend payouts among dividend-paying firms, and the likelihood that a firm will pay a dividend, are increasing in State ownership. Our findings are consistent with the State's need for cash flow as a partial motivation for continued State ownership of a significant portion of the corporate economy, and support the agency and tax clientele explanations for dividend policy.     

Investigating sources of unanticipated exposure in industry stock returns

This paper investigates the sources of both foreign exchange rate and interest rate exposure of industry level portfolios in the G7, decomposing exposure into cash flow and discount rate effects. Initial examination of the degree of exposure on industry returns produces results consistent with the prior literature: that there is little evidence of exchange rate exposure in most industries - the exchange rate exposure puzzle. However, rather than relying solely on the sensitivity of industry returns, we examine the cash flow sensitivity to foreign exchange exposure, of primary interest to firm managers. Critically, decomposing the exposure into cash flow and discount rate components unlocks the exact extent and nature of exposure. Our results show industries have significant cash flow and discount rate exposures. These exposures increase with the level of trade openness and the spread between permanent cash flow exposure and transitory discount rate exposure widens.     

The 2008 short sale ban: Liquidity, dispersion of opinion, and the cross-section of returns of US financial stocks

This study examines the cross-sectional impact of the 2008 short sale ban on the returns of US financial stocks. Motivated by the large cross-sectional variation in the extent to which banned stocks suffer an illiquidity shock, we hypothesize that stocks with larger liquidity declines are associated with poorer contemporaneous stock returns. The evidence supports this hypothesis and suggests that this effect is stronger for more liquid stocks, as predicted by Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Moreover, consistent with Miller’s (1977) model, we report a valuation reversal whereby stocks with higher abnormal returns at the onset of the ban have lower abnormal returns at its removal. Our findings are robust when we control for firms most affected by TARP, include non-banned matched firms, and compare banned firms’ stock returns with their bond returns. From a policy standpoint, the ban reduced valuations, ceteris paribus, of the stocks that were hardest hit by illiquidity.