Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs

An increasing number of environmental protection programs offers financial compensation to farmers in exchange for conservation services. Incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but the extant literature suggests that outcomes are always second-best so that other instruments (such as conservation auctions) may be preferred. We argue that the claim regarding the first-best solution never being incentive-compatible is correct if all conservation costs are variable in nature; if there are fixed costs too, the first-best compensation scheme may be incentive-compatible after all. Given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation issues, we conclude that incentive-compatible contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce conservation.     

Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution? Evidence from India’s Green Rating Project

Public disclosure programs that collect and disseminate information about firms’ environmental performance are increasingly popular in both developed and developing countries. Yet little is known about whether they actually improve environmental performance, particularly in the latter setting. We use detailed plant-level survey data to evaluate the impact of India’s Green Rating Project (GRP) on the environmental performance of the country’s largest pulp and paper plants. We find that the GRP drove significant reductions in pollution loadings among dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result comports with statistical and anecdotal evaluations of similar disclosure programs. We also find that plants located in wealthier communities were more responsive to GRP ratings, as were single-plant firms.     

Environmental Policy Theory Given Bounded Rationality and Other-regarding Preferences

Established environmental policy theory is based on the assumption of homo economicus. This means that people are seen as fully rational and acting in a self-regarding manner. In line with this, economics emphasizes efficient policy solutions and the associated advantages of price incentives. Behavioral economics offers alternative, more realistic views on individual behavior. In this paper we investigate opportunities to integrate bounded rationality and other-regarding preferences into environmental policy theory to arrive at recommendations for more effective policies. For this purpose, we will address decisions made under risk and uncertainty, intertemporal choice, decision heuristics, other-regarding preferences, heterogeneity, evolutionary selection of behaviors, and the role of happiness. Three aspects of environmental policy are considered in detail, namely sustainable consumption, environmental valuation and policy design. We pay special attention to the role of non-pecuniary, informative instruments and illustrate the implications for climate policy.     

Abatement and Allocation in the Pilot Phase of the EU ETS

We use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over-allocation that took place across European countries during the pilot phase (2005–2007) of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Using a dynamic panel data model, we estimate the counter factual (business-as-usual) emissions scenario for EU member states. Comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions, we find that both over-allocation and abatement occurred, along with under-allocation and emissions inflation. Over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over-allocation of approximately 280 million EUAs and total abatement of 247 Mt CO₂. However, we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 73 Mt CO₂ also occurred, possibly due to uncertainty about future policy design features.     

A Note on Clean Technology Adoption and its Influence on Tradeable Emission Permits Prices

In this paper, we give an example in which the price of tradable emission permits increases despite firms’ adoption of less polluting technology, a result that is in contrast with Montero (J Environ Econ 44:23–44, 2002) and Parry (J Regul Econ 14:229–254, 1998), among others. If two Cournot players switch to a cleaner technology, the price for permits may increase due to an increase in the net demand for permits and a decrease in the net supply of permits after the clean technology is adopted. This is only the case when output demand is quite elastic.     

A Bio-Economic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Under CAMPFIRE

This paper formulates a bio-economic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Three agents influence the wildlife stock: a parks agency determines hunting quotas, outside poachers hunt illegally, and a local community may choose to protect wildlife by discouraging poaching. Wildlife generates revenues from hunting licenses and tourism; it also intrudes on local agriculture. We consider two benefit-sharing regimes: shares of wildlife tourism rents and shares of hunting licenses. Resource sharing does not necessarily improve community welfare or incentives for wildlife conservation. Results depend on the exact design of the benefit shares, the size of the benefits compared with agricultural losses, and the way in which the parks agency manages hunting quotas.     

Mit sanften Mitteln Medikamente einsparen

Heilpflanzenanwendungen in der Altenpflege - In vielen Bereichen der Altenpflege kann auch die Schulmedizin nur begrenzt helfen. Wie gut, dass die Naturheilkunde viele Anwendungsm?glichkeiten bietet, die die Lebensqualit?t der Patienten und Bewohner verbessern k?nnen. Und die Hilfen von Mutter Natur sto?en nicht nur bei Pflegebedürftigen, sondern auch bei den Pflegenden auf positive Resonanz.     

Helfen Darmhormone bei Diabetes?

Neue Behandlungsm?glichkeiten des Diabetes-Typ-2 - Weltweit ist eine Zunahme der Erkrankungsh?ufigkeit bei Diabetes mellitus zu beobachten. Nach Angaben der International Diabetes Federation (IDF) sind aktuell circa 285 Millionen Menschen betroffen. Hochrechnungen gehen davon aus, dass sich diese Zahl bis zum Jahr 2030 auf 439 Millionen Menschen erh?hen wird.