Building the high-flex/high-value HR team

In many companies, the human resources function is considered necessary, but minimally important. Douglas Ready strongly disagrees and argues that a shoddy HR function will keep the rest of the company from high achievement. It's time to develop the people who are in charge of developing everyone else.     

Taxpayer resistance,guarantee uncertainty,and housing finance subsidies

In the absence of external guarantees, a private firm's debt trades in the market at rates reflective of its private default risk. Not all firms go it alone, however. There are entities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), whose debt obligations enjoy federal guarantees. Federal guarantees affect housing finance indirectly in that they tend to enhance the creditworthiness of the debt obligations of the housing intermediary which lessens the debtholder's exposure to default. The market investor then becomes a willing buyer of GSE debt at a lower (subsidized) rate as a result of the government guarantee.Due to the fact that the subsidy rests on the presumption that the GSE debt will be bailed out by the government it can be seen that the subsidy in turn rests upon the presumption by the GSE debtholder that the taxpayers will honor the guarantee in the event of a GSE default. Hence, government subsidies to the housing intermediaries rest not on ongoing government outlays but rather on the confidence that the taxpayers will be willing, if called upon, to cover GSE losses, i.e., the confidence of a bailout.This article analyzes the effects on the GSE subsidy and on the taxpayer, if the debt markets charge for bailout risk. Bailout risk pricing is an economic event. When debtholders seek to protect themselves by pricing for bailout risk, this increases GSE borrowing costs and cuts into both GSE borrowers' subsidies and stockholder earnings. Higher borrowing costs leave the GSE in a weakened condition and increase the ex ante bailout cost to the taxpayer. When bailout risk premiums become priced by the market, it substantially lessens the government's ability to subsidize housing finance or other GSE activities.     

Is it the Law or the Lawyers? Investment Covenants around the World*

This paper introduces a new dataset from 50 private investment funds from 17 countries around the world. We analyse the frequency of use of investment covenants imposed by institutional investors governing the activities of private investment fund managers in areas pertaining to investment decisions, investment powers, types of investments, fund operations and limitations on liability. While the data indicate a role for country legality in affecting the frequency of use of fund covenants, the data further indicate that the presence of legally trained managers has a more pronounced role in affecting the use of covenants. As private equity and venture capital investment increases across Europe and elsewhere, our results indicate that legal practice factors will matter more than the legal setting for the establishment of covenants governing new funds.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF SEGMENT INFORMATION: FURTHER AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE

This study provides further empirical evidence on incentives for Australian firms to voluntarily report segment information. Various economic reasons why firms may elect to present segment information have been hypothesised in previous research. Bradbury [1992] and McKinnon and Dalimunthe [1993] found firm size, minority interest and industry membership as significant identifiable characteristics motivating voluntary segmental disclosure. Variables found to be insignificant in Bradbury [1992] which were not examined by McKinnon and Dalimunthe [1993] are tested in this paper. Hypotheses relating to size, financial leverage, assets-in-place, earnings volatility, ownership diffusion, outside equity (minority) interest, overseas association as well as diverse and mining and oil classification hypotheses are empirically examined. Univariate tests and multivariate logit analysis suggest that for a extensive sample of diversified firms, voluntary segment disclosure is significantly related to size, leverage and involvement in mining or oil activities.     

What becomes an icon most?

Some brands become icons. Think of Nike, Apple, Harley-Davidson: They're the brands every marketer regards with awe. But they are not built according to the principles of conventional marketing, says Harvard Business School marketing professor Douglas Holt. Iconic brands beat the competition not just by delivering innovative benefits, services, or technologies but by forging a deep connection with the culture. A brand becomes an icon when it offers a compelling myth, a story that can help people resolve tensions in their lives. The deepest source of tension in modern society is the disparity between national ideology and the average citizen's reality. When ideologies shift, myths become even more important, and in America, the most potent myths are depictions of rebels. Mountain Dew has long offered a rebel myth in ads showing exciting, vital men who are far from the ideological model of success. Loyal customers drink the beverage to consume the myth. But Mountain Dew's greatest achievement is that it has retained its iconic power by creating fresh rebel myths to suit the tensions of each era: first the hillbilly, who stood in stark contrast to the organization man of the 1950s and 1960s; then the redneck, who rebelled against the investment bankers and consultants of the 1970s and 1980s; and most recently the slacker, who rejects the values and behaviors that, for the past decade, have marked the successful executive. Holt says marketers can learn from Mountain Dew and other iconic brands if they are willing to move beyond conventional brand management and acquire knowledge and skills they may not have. They must learn to target national contradictions instead of just consumer segments, create myths that make sense of confusing societal changes, and speak with a rebel's voice.     

Regulatory harmonization and the development of private equity markets

This paper introduces a new dataset from 100 Dutch institutional investors’ domestic and international asset private equity allocations. The data indicate that the perceived comparative dearth of regulations of private equity funds impedes institutional investor participation in private equity funds, particularly in relation to the lack of transparency. The data further indicate that the perceived importance of regulatory harmonization of institutional investors has increased Dutch institutional investor allocations to domestic and international private equity funds. The Financieel Toetsingskader (regulation of portfolio management standards such as matching of assets and liabilities) has had the most pronounced and robust effect, followed by Basel II (regulation of risk management and disclosure standards) and the International Financial Reporting Standards (regulation of reporting standards and transparency).     

Welfare Effects of Timely Reporting

A principal-agent model is examined in which a manager acquires private cost information sequentially. All possible communication schemes are equivalent to one of two: (1) timely reporting, where the manager reports as soon as possible, and (2) delayed reporting, where the manager delays the report of the first of two signals. In the primary case identified, timely reporting is shown to be owner valuable. However, the manager is better off under delayed reporting. Finally, total expected surplus is shown greater under delayed reporting. The owner's benefit from timely reporting is less than the manager's loss.     

Regulating prices for shifting between service providers

The price that a regulated access provider charges for shifting customers between service providers has significant welfare implications. Typical regulatory approaches to pricing, such as pricing based on fully allocated cost or incremental cost, ignore the characteristics of consumer demand. A theoretical alternative, Ramsey pricing, considers only the elasticity of demand for given products. This paper directs attention to the competitive process. Using US long-distance telephone services as an example, this paper shows how empirical evidence concerning customer acquisition costs, customer switching costs, and churn among service providers can help to inform price regulation.