Low price guarantees as signals of lowest price: The moderating role of perceived price dispersion

This article presents two experimental studies examining the effects of a low price guarantee on consumers’ pre-purchase evaluations and behavioral intentions. The authors first examine how the effects of a low price guarantee are moderated by consumer perception of market price dispersion. The results show that low price guarantee effects are likely to be attenuated when consumers perceive market price dispersion for a product to be high. The second study shows that higher levels of penalty can help restore a low price guarantee's effectiveness. Specifically, a low price guarantee with progressively higher levels of penalty leads to incrementally more favorable effects on key consumer outcomes when perceived price dispersion is high. Interestingly, penalty level has no such incremental benefit in case of low perceived price dispersion. Theoretical and managerial implications of the authors’ findings, the limitations of the studies, and future research opportunities are discussed.     

Revenue Recognition in a Multiperiod Agency Setting

This paper examines how various revenue recognition rules affect the incentive properties of accounting information in a stewardship setting. Our analysis demonstrates that if revenues are recognized according to the realization principle, a single performance measure based on aggregated accounting information can be used to provide desirable production and effort incentives to the manager. In contrast, mark-to-market accounting does not provide efficient aggregation of raw information to solve the stewardship problem. Mark-to-market accounting, though sensible from a valuation perspective, fails to provide desirable incentives because it relies on the anticipated, rather than the actual, performance of the manager. We also consider a setting in which the manager can control the timing of the firm's sales. It then becomes desirable to modify the realization principle and apply the lower-of-cost-or-market valuation rule. The desirable accounting thus exhibits a conservative bias.     

Leading Indicator Variables, Performance Measurement, and Long-Term Versus Short-Term Contracts

In this article we develop a multiperiod agency model to study the role of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake “soft” investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables that provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract. With short‐term contracts, leading indicator variables are essential in mitigating a holdup problem resulting from the fact that investments are sunk at the end of the first period. With long‐term contracts, leading indicator variables will be valuable if the manager's compensation schemes are not stationary over time. The leading indicator variables then become an instrument for matching the future investment return with the current investment expenditure. We identify conditions under which the optimal long‐term contract induces larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variables as compared with short‐term contracts. Under certain conditions, though, the principal does better with a sequence of one‐period contracts than with a long‐term contract.     

Stable risk-sharing

We analyze the evolution of contract participation and evaluate the selection of risk-sharing contracts in the presence of moral hazard. Organizations specify rules for sharing output among producers, and so affect the extent of private investment in production. Organizations are rigid, as some details of the contract are fixed, but people are free to move around. In the presence of rigidity, equilibrium displays coordination failure because potentially efficient contracts can fail to attract participants. Methods of evolutionary stability are used to select equilibria when organizations compete for members. We identify stable contracts which survive competition against any other. Stable contracts need not be efficient, but for large groups the loss becomes small.     

China's industrial revolution: challenges for a macroeconomic agenda

China's industrialization over the past 30 years has been an epochal event. As of 2000, the industrial sector's share of GDP has grown to be about two-third of the total. The share of agricultural sector of GDP has expectedly declined from 42.2% in 1970 to 11.9% in 2000. The sector's total output however continues to grow as productivity increases. Has the service sector grown enough to support the overall growth of the Chinese economy?China has earned her recognition as a foreign investment friendly economy. Foreign direct investment with 100% foreign ownership came in plenty, supported by a robust system of profit repatriation based on earnings in convertible currencies of exports of a part of newly manufactured products in China. China imported capital and paid for it by exports. China demonstrates a clear case of the import-export led model of industrialization and economic growth, not the simple export-led growth model, as discussed by some.This paper discusses that challenges ahead of China are overwhelming. We present three issues for immediate attention, (a) Can China sustain a rate of growth of GDP at an annual rate of 10% for an indefinite period? (b) How can China address the issues of income distribution across her 31 province and also amongst the various income groups in a given industrialized province/region? (c) Can China ensure progressive augmentation of high-tech oriented productivity of her workforce by way of ensuring building up of necessary human capital?It is argued that much of this can be accomplished by developing a macroeconomic framework with monetary and fiscal policy guidelines, well specified and transparent. Can China restructure its central bank, the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC)? A progressive money, banking and financial sector with ability to absorb shocks of an industrial economy must be in order. How about the fiscal policy management by the Government of China—its Ministry of Finance?Finally this paper argues that China's economic presence will help optimize the economic gains for the rest of the world. China has joined her Asian neighbors toward sponsoring Asian economic cooperation. Let the European Union paradigm be a learning model, and China has a leadership role to play in further developing Asia's continental economic regional model.     

Vulnerability to Low-Price Signals: An Experimental Study of the Effectiveness of Genuine and Deceptive Signals

Low-price guarantees help buyers make inferences about retailers’ prices. However, researchers are concerned that consumers might be vulnerable to relying on guarantees associated with high market prices. Furthermore, truly low-priced retailers that issue low-price guarantees might be vulnerable to consumers’ discounting of such guarantees. This article experimentally assesses these concerns and finds that the effects of adding a low-price guarantee to a low or high offer price on consumers’ pre-purchase perceptions depend on consumers’ confidence in their product category price knowledge and their decision involvement. The article explores the implications of the findings and provides directions for further research.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality: A general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a static three sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labour is mobile between a traded good sector and a non-traded good sector and unskilled labour is specific to another traded good sector. The capital is perfectly mobile among all these three sectors. We examine the effects of change in different factor endowments and of globalization on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that the effect of a change of a factor endowment on wage inequality depends on the factor intensity ranking between two skilled labours using sectors and on the relative strength of the marginal effects on demand for and supply of non-tradable good. We also find that a decrease in the price of the product produced by skilled (unskilled) labour using traded good sector lowers (raises) the skilled–unskilled wage inequality.     

Skilled–unskilled wage inequality,nontraded good and endogenous supply of skilled labour: A theoretical analysis

The paper develops a static four sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labour is endogenously produced by the education sector and is mobile between a traded good sector and a nontraded good sector. Capital is also perfectly mobile among the education sector, skilled labour using traded good sector and the nontraded good sector. However, land and unskilled labour are specific to another traded good sector. We analyse the effects of change in different factor endowments and reduction in tariff rate on skilled–unskilled wage inequality. We find that the effect of a change in different parameters on wage inequality depends on the factor intensity ranking between two skilled labour using sectors and on the relative strength of the marginal effects on demand for and supply of nontraded final good. We also analyse the effects of changes in different parameters on the supply of skilled labour.     

The comparative performance of the iterative instrumental variables estimator using structural and predictive criteria

The purpose of this paper is to give experimental evidence on the small-sample properties of the iterative instrumental variables estimator originally proposed byLyttkens [1970], relative to the more conventional methods including ordinary least squares, limited information single equation maximum likelihood and three stage least squares.     

Low price signal default: an empirical investigation of its consequences

Low-price guarantees (LPG) signal the market position of a seller’s offer price and promise to compensate consumers in case that information is erroneous. In this research, we demonstrate that when retailers default on the information provided by an LPG, consumer perceptions of the retailer suffer, but the extent of the damage depends on the conditions associated with the default. On the basis of attribution theory, we posit that consumers may attribute default to the retailer’s opportunism but emphasize this attribution differently in various default conditions. Furthermore, we show that the restoration of consumer perceptions after a refund depends on consumers’ focus in terms of the signal itself. If they consider the protective, compensatory function of a low price signal, their post-refund outcomes are more favorable; when they focus on the informational function, these outcomes are less favorable. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.