Government Policy and the Evolution of the Market for Dutch Daily Newspapers

This paper investigates whether governments can change market structures through interventions. We study the effects of four political events over the life cycle of the market for daily newspapers in the Netherlands. We find that policy measures meant to lower entry barriers in an expanding industry created new entry and increased survival chances for potential entrants and incumbent newspapers. Exit barrier enhancing policies to reduce concentration tendencies have not been successful.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

Redesigning hospitals around patients and technology

Hospitals must drastically redesign themselves and revise their operations to be successful. Four major redesign initiatives will enable the traditional hospital to provide effective patient care while attaining its own profitability goals.     

Copyright Damages and Statistics

This paper discusses the statistical issues that arise in conducting an economic damages analysis in the context of a litigation matter involving copyrights. Calculating damages in copyright cases turns out to be a natural application for econometric modelling methods. Surprisingly, elementary statistical issues can be a source of significant debate between the experts in such matters. In this paper, we present a case study and illustrate how issues such as interpretation of p -values and what "rejection of the null hypothesis" really "means" in such matters.     

PRINCIPAL AND AGENCY TRADES BY STOCKBROKERS ARE COMPLEMENTARY: THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATING AGENCY TRADING AND BANNING PRINCIPAL TRADES

This paper models the demand for stockbrokers' services in Australia, consisting of two related services, agency trades and principal trades. The relationship between agency and principal trades is estimated. The results indicate that the two services are complements rather than substitutes. Using unique accounting information, a model of agency and principal trading activities is estimated to determine the welfare effects of (i) deregulating brokerage commissions and (ii) a ban on principal trading by brokers. The results show a sizeable welfare gain to investors (amounting to about 60% of the gross revenue of brokers) stemming from deregulation of the minimum charge for agency trades. The loss in profitability by brokers due to deregulation is also computed and shown to be negligible. The results also show that due to complementarity, a ban on principal trading, even with deregulation of agency trading, can impose an arbitrarily high cost on investors which could, in principle, offset the gains from agency deregulation.     

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF RELATIONSHIP MAGNITUDE

Based upon a review of the extant literature, it is proposed that the structure of an interorganizational relationship is composed of relationship type and the under‐researched construct of relationship magnitude. Specifically, it is hypothesized that relationship magnitude, a second order construct composed of trust, commitment, and dependence, affects relationship type, which affects the perception of value of the relationship. The results of a survey analyzed through structural equation modeling support these hypotheses.     

The Effect of Earnings–Announcement Timing on Earnings Management

This paper examines whether firms which delay earnings announcements engage in earnings management. The cross–sectional version of the modified Jones 1995 model is used to estimate 'normal' accruals. Prior research has documented that, on average, delayed earnings announcements are associated with negative earnings surprises. Our evidence suggests that the market anticipates unfavorable earnings news when it observes reporting delays. As a consequence, late reporters appear to make the most of a bad situation by employing income–decreasing accruals in big–bath–type earnings management and in contractual renegotiations. We find that the magnitude of income–reducing abnormal accruals is related to the reporting lag.