Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Managing Financial Trouble

Against the current backdrop of troubled credit markets and the possibility of growing defaults, a distinguished group of bankruptcy academics and practitioners explore a number of questions raised by the emergence of increasingly active distressed investors: Are these relatively new market forces and mechanisms at least partly responsible for today's historically low default rates? Can they be expected to continue keeping default rates low, even if the economy goes into recession? And perhaps most important, by preventing or delaying defaults, will these new reorganization methods end up increasing recoveries and preserving value? The second half of the discussion focuses on some of the potential problems, or obstacles to the working of these market forces. For example, how will distressed situations play out in cases involving dispersed creditors, such as the holders of CDOs and CLOs? Will there be negative side effects from other financial innovations such as credit derivatives? While acknowledging the challenges of resolving some relatively new kinds of inter‐creditor conflicts, most of the panelists expressed confidence that today's distressed investors, working within the context of a streamlined Chapter 11 process, can be expected to play a major role in preserving values for creditors. At the same time, such investors will help perform the critical economic function of ensuring, in Douglas Baird's words, “that those companies that should survive do survive” and that corporate assets, whether liquidated piecemeal or kept within the firm, end up in their highest‐valued uses with their most efficient users.     

入美企业如何避开国家安全限制

2008年11月14日,美国财政部发布《2007年外国投资与国家安全法》（FINSA）的实施细则,此项法律旨在改革美国外国投资委员会（CFIUS）关于国外机构收购、兼并和接管美国企业国家安全审查体制。2008年12月,美国财政部发布了有关经过CFIUS审核认为存在国 家安全问题的交易类别指引,正式条例和相关指引传递的明确信息是,在个案基础上,CFIUS将保持其对外国投资交易进行国家安全审查的广泛自由裁量权。那么,美国这些法规的出台将会给我国企业以外资并购的方式进入美国市场带来怎样的影响？     

Reserve ratios: A proposal for change

The paper addresses the problem of Fed control of the money supply and the inherent instability of a fractional reserve banking system which Friedman covered in A Program for Monetary Stability. While Friedman proposed a 100 percent reserve requirement as a solution, this work suggests a change from imposing legal reserve ratios on specific liabilities to one of imposing them on total bank liabilities. Reserve ratios are compared to tax rates. Friedman's proposal is to increase the tax rate to 100 percent on specific liabilities and pay interest on reserve balances at the Fed. The proposal of this paper is to keep the tax rates (present reserve ratios) but change the tax base. It is shown that the Fed would gain control over the maximum expansion of banks, but would lose direct control over specific liabilities. The Fed would not tax some liabilities and subsidize others. The Fed could concentrate on setting the tone of the money market and allow the public to use whatever set of bank liabilities it desires as money without specific penalty.