Two-Part Trade Policy under Imperfect Competition

In this paper we consider the potential gain of a government pursuing a two-part trade policy: an import license for entry, along with a per-unit tariff on imports. The model is a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information. In the first stage, the domestic government sets trade policy, while in the second stage the home and foreign producers behave as Cournot competitors. The paper demonstrates that the optimal trade policy depends upon the number of firms, the degree of heterogeneity in cost functions, and the degree of convexity in cost functions.     

The Structure of Protection in Indonesia in 1989 1

Around the mid-1980s, Indonesia's protectionist regime supported an industrial structure in which industries were mainly oriented towards producing for the domestic market. Since then, trade policies have shifted to a more outward-looking strategy, stimulating the growth and diversification of non-oil manufactured exports. This paper attempts to quantify the nominal and effective rates of protection resulting from trade policies at the end of the 1980s. After an introduction in which the 1989 trade policies are discussed, estimates of nominal and effective rates of protection are presented. It is shown that though the level of protection has declined since 1987, it still varies widely across economic sectors. Furthermore, despite the more open trade strategy, the paper's findings show that the trade regime remains biased against exports. Finally, by examining some trade policy issues, the paper presents further ways of rationalising the structure of protection in Indonesia's industrial sector.     

REBALANCING EC CEREALS PROTECTION AND THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND

This paper considers the proposals put forward by the EC at the GATT Uruguay Round in December 1990. The EC's objective of rebalancing the Common Agricultural Policy in the context of a partial liberalisation of agricultural support on the world cereals market is assessed, as is the choice of base year from which liberalisation would have been initiated. The US's proposal for more significant reduction in agricultural support is also considered. The results show that the EC would not necessarily have benefited from rebalancing, since the effects would have depended on the choice of base period. For example, with 1986 (1988) as the base year, net welfare changes would have been 20 (50) percent higher (lower) with rebalancing, relative to the case without. Not surprisingly, the more substantial liberalisation proposed by the US would have resulted in greater net welfare gains even if rebalancing was conceded by the US.     

Teams,Teamwork and Absence*

We argue that firms with interdependent worker productivity, team production, have a higher cost of absence and, as a consequence, spend additional resources on monitoring absence. As a result, firms with team production should have lower absence rates. We estimate the determinants of absence for blue‐collar workers using a sample of German manufacturing establishments. Workplace teams are used as a proxy for team production. The estimates reveal that firms with teams have lower absence rates, as do smaller establishments. The size effect, however, is unique to establishments with teams, which fits prior theoretical work that has not been previously tested.     

Testing for Unit Roots with Breaks: Evidence on the Great Crash and the Unit Root Hypothesis Reconsidered

Nelson and Plosser (1982), in a classic paper, failed to find strong evidence against the null hypothesis of a generating process with a unit autoregressive root for thirteen US macroeconomic time series. Perron (1989) claimed that such evidence was available for a majority of these series if the alternative hypothesis was of trend stationarity with a break in 1929. Zivot and Andrews (1992) treated the break date as endogenous, then finding strong evidence agcainst the null for a minority of these series. Our own analysis extends theirs by permitting a break under the null as well as the alternative hypothesis, and allowing for the sequential nature of the testing. Our empirical findings complete the circle. We find no strong evidence against the unit root hypothesis for any of the thirteen Nelson–Plosser series.     

Employment Contacts and Minority-White Wage Differences

We study effects of job contacts on wages in inner-city Boston in 1989 and in the 1982 NLSY. Race/Hispanicity differences in wages are not explained by an absence of contacts among minority youths. Rather, in the Boston data, lower wages of black youths are explained by lower "returns" to their contacts. In the NLSY there is little evidence of lower return to black youths' contacts, but there is evidence of lower returns to Hispanic youths' contacts.     

Large Non-Union Companies: How Do They Avoid a Catch 22?

Large non-union companies might be expected to enjoy extensive work-force flexibility deriving from their high-wage, high-involvement strategies. However, where there is a strong local union presence, this might be expected to exert a strong dampening effect on the levels of internal flexibility achieved. Such companies, fearful of union organization, could not then enjoy the freedoms that might be associated with a non-union strategy. Research conducted in the Republic of Ireland on large non-union US companies operating in the electronics industry suggests a conceptual framework indicating how a Catch-22 situation is avoided in these companies.