DECODING DEMAND OPPORTUNITIES

Classic marketing techniques, such as the use of focus groups or ethnographies, miss the enormous opportunities that can be leveraged once companies commit to understanding consumers in the context of life experiences. Erich Joachimsthaler and Markus Pfeiffer believe it's time to think about the ecosystem of demand.     

Are your consumers variety seekers? The moderating impact on the effectiveness of free gift promotions vs. price discounts

The purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of consumers’ variety-seeking tendency on their preference for monetary versus nonmonetary promotions (i.e. a price discount versus a free gift, respectively) and to identify possible reasons for this preference. A sample population of 150 students was surveyed. The research employed a 2 (discount/free gift)?×?2 (high variety seeking/low variety seeking) between-subjects design. A two-way ANOVA was applied to analyse the effects of the promotion frame and variety seeking on perceived transaction value. The ANOVA revealed a general consumer preference for a free gift over a price discount. This outcome is moderated by the variety-seeking tendency of the consumer; that is, repetitive consumers prefer a price discount, but variety-seeking consumers favour a free gift. This study gives managers insights into the issue of what kind of price promotion is most effective under which circumstances, namely for which type of consumer segment. The practical implications of our findings recommend that if the targeted consumer segment is variety-seeking, a free gift may be optimal, yet if the target segment represents returning customers, a price discount yields better results. If no clear assignment of consumers to either segment is possible, a free gift is the preferred option.     

Two-stage capital budgeting,capital charge rates,and resource constraints

We study two-stage, multi-division budgeting mechanisms that allocate scarce resources among divisions using capital charge rates. Each divisional manager observes private sequential project information and competes for scarce resources over two stages. The optimal capital charge rates in our two-stage setting can be quite different from those that arise in a single-stage setting. If the firm faces a resource constraint at only the second stage, a less severe constraint can imply more first-stage project initiation, which can lead to higher second-stage capital charge rates. If resources are constrained at both stages, a decrease in the severity of the constraint at just one stage decreases the capital charge rate at that stage but increases the capital charge rate at the other stage because each constraint affects the intensity of competition at both stages. This result holds regardless of whether the scarce resources are fungible or non-fungible across stages.     

The effect of message credibility,need for cognitive closure,and information sufficiency on thought-induced attitude change

Marketing Letters - Self-generated thought has been shown to have a significant impact on attitude change. Merely thinking about an attitude can result in more extreme attitudes. Although research...     

Using imagine instructions to induce consumers to generate ad-supporting content

Some recent advertisements attempt to increase persuasiveness by directly asking consumers to imagine arguments supporting the ad's message. This research provides a critical test of the effectiveness of this imagine strategy, while also identifying specific situations in which this technique can be most effective in increasing persuasion. Three studies reveal that imagine instructions are most effective when there is a lack of fit between consumers' regulatory orientation and the ad content, when consumers are dispositionally oriented toward a high need for cognitive closure, and when consumers are at a high construal level. These results are consistent with the possibility that the imagine strategy is most effective when used to enhance the motivation level of otherwise unmotivated consumers.     

Planning for self-employment at the beginning of a market economy: Evidence from individual data of East German workers

We investigate the plans of individual workers concerning future self-employment in the former German Democratic Republic shortly before the economic, monetary and social union in June/July 1990. Our data base is the Socio-Economic Panel East. We find that the desire to become an entrepreneur is basically determined by individual and household characteristics, including income and asset indicators, and not as much by the current job situation of the individual. The work experience attained in the socialist economy seems to be irrelevant for the decision to become self-employed in a market economy. Furthermore, we find evidence of barriers to entry which may come from capital market constraints and institutional restrictions. We also present an estimation of the determinants of the probability of being self-employed in Summer 1990. Due to institutional restrictions we find only a few individual characteristics to be important.For estimation, we use the binary and the ordinal logit model. The corresponding stochastic assumptions are tested extensively using pseudo-Lagrange multiplier tests against omitted variables, non-linearity, asymmetry of distribution, and heteroscedasticity.     

CEO Power and Relative Performance Evaluation

We model relative performance evaluation (RPE) when a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has the power to opportunistically influence the design of RPE by choosing the weight on an index‐based peer group or by customizing the selection of peers comprising a peer group. A powerful CEO compares the benefits of reducing common risk affecting his compensation with the benefits of receiving a higher bonus by economizing on expected peer‐group performance. As a consequence, the Board of Directors (BoD) is less likely to use RPE. Our analytical model yields hypotheses predicting that powerful CEOs choose to reduce common risk only partially and that BoDs choose to not implement RPE if expected peer performance is sufficiently high. Our model has further empirical implications in (i) providing new interpretations of tests for detecting strong‐form and weak‐form RPE in the presence of powerful CEOs, and (ii) suggesting a new empirical measure of CEO power with a focus on the delegation of RPE decision rights.     

The Value of Information in the Hold-Up Problem

Abstract In the literature, the information structure of the hold‐up problem is typically assumed to be exogenous. In this paper, we introduce an additional stage at which the head office may grant individual divisions access to an information system before they undertake their specific investments. Although more information ceteris paribus enhances each divisions' profits, more information can reduce divisions' investments and destroy synergies for the other division that would have been generated by the investments. If this negative effect dominates, then information can be harmful for the entire company. Hence, information control can be a subtle force to deal with the hold‐up problem to a certain extent. In this paper we analyze those conditions under which information is either harmful or beneficial for central management.     

Cost-based transfer pricing

This paper compares the performance of alternative cost-based transfer pricing methods. We adopt an incomplete contracting framework with asymmetric information at the trading stage. Transfer pricing guides intra-company trade and provides incentives for value-enhancing specific investments. We compare actual-cost transfer prices that include a markup over marginal costs with standard-cost transfer prices that are determined either by the central office ex ante (centralized standard-cost transfer pricing) or by the supplying division at the trading stage (reported standard-cost transfer pricing). For the actual-cost methods, we show that markups based on the joint contribution margin (contribution-margin transfer pricing) dominate purely additive markups (cost-plus transfer pricing). We obtain the following results. (1) Centralized standard-cost transfer pricing dominates the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face low cost uncertainty. (2) The actual-cost methods dominate the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face high cost uncertainty and later, at the trading stage, the buying division receives sufficient cost information. (3) Reported standard-cost transfer pricing dominates the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex ante face high cost uncertainty, and the buyer has insufficient cost information at the trading stage.