Modeling Consumers’ Adoption Intentions of Remote Mobile Payments in the United Kingdom: Extending UTAUT with Innovativeness,Risk, and Trust

Mobile payments (MPs) are predicted to be one of the future's most successful mobile services but have achieved limited acceptance in developed countries to date. PCs are still the preferred technology for online shopping in the United Kingdom but the continued growth of mobile commerce (MC) is highly correlated with the success of remote MPs (RMPs). Currently MP research has largely ignored the variations between different MP solutions, and existing MP adoption studies have predominantly utilized Davis’ (1989) Technology Acceptance Model, which has been criticized for having a deterministic approach without much consideration for users’ individual characteristics. Therefore, this study applied the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), extended with more consumer‐related constructs, to explore the factors affecting nonusers’ intentions to adopt RMP in the United Kingdom. Quantitative data were collected (n = 268) and structural equation modeling was undertaken. The findings revealed that performance expectancy, social influence, innovativeness, and perceived risk significantly influenced nonusers’ intentions to adopt RMP, whereas effort expectancy did not. Inclusion of MP knowledge as a moderating variable revealed that there was a significant difference in the effect of trust on behavioral intention for those who knew about MP than for those who did not. These findings have important theoretical and practical implications, particularly for the development and marketing of RMP, which will support the long‐term success of MC.     

Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

Summary. We consider a differential information economy with infinitely many commodities and analyze the veto power of the grand coalition with respect the ability of blocking non-Walrasian expectations equilibrium allocations. We provide two different Walrasian expectations equilibrium equivalence results. First by perturbing the initial endowments in a precise direction we show that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium if and only if it is not privately dominated by the grand coalition. The second characterization deals with the fuzzy veto in the sense of Aubin but within a differential information setting. This second equivalence result provides a different characterization for the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and shows that the grand coalition privately blocks in the sense of Aubin any non Walrasian expectations equilibrium allocation with endowment participation rate arbitrarily close to the total initial endowment participation for every individual. Finally, we show that any no free disposal Walrasian expectations equilibria is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible. Since the deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model is a special case of the differential information economy model, one derives new characterizations of the Walrasian equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities.Received: 29 October 2003, Revised: 24 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D82, D11. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for his/her careful reading and helpful comments and suggestions.C. Hervés and E. Moreno acknowledge support by Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER); and support by the Research Grant SA091/02 (Junta de Castilla y León).     

Regulating Borrower Hardship in Australia,Singapore, and Hong Kong: Payment Holidays During COVID-19 and Beyond

Journal of Consumer Policy - Borrower hardship, while a critical issue, is not often addressed by consumer protection frameworks across the Asia–Pacific. The widespread use of payment...     

Walrasian analysis via two-player games

We associate to any pure exchange economy a game with only two players, regardless of the number of consumers. In this two-player game, each player represents a different role of the society, formed by all the individuals in the economy. Player 1 selects feasible allocations trying to make Pareto improvements. Player 2 chooses an alternative from the wider range of allocations that are feasible in the sense of Aubin. The set of Nash equilibria of our game is non-empty and our main result provides a characterization of Walrasian equilibria allocations as strong Nash equilibria of the associated society game.     

Cities, mobility and climate change

Societies gain enormous benefits from travel, as economies have become more globalised and as the new communications infrastructure allows international networking and travel at a low cost. There has been a true internationalisation of all activities, and travel forms an essential part of that process. However, this mobility is fuelled by carbon, and there is clear scientific agreement that carbon emissions are affecting the global climate with irreversible long term consequences. Transport is the one sector where a reduction in energy use and emissions is proving to be extraordinarily difficult to achieve despite some success in urban areas. This paper focuses on cities, mobility and climate change, highlighting recent trends in both developed and developing countries. It is argued that the current situation is unsustainable, and that transport must contribute fully to achieving carbon reduction targets. An alternative is presented, based on the sustainable mobility paradigm (Banister, 2008) that looks at ways to reduce the need to travel in cities. The belief that high mobility and technology provides the solution is misplaced, as technological innovation can only get us part of the way to sustainable transport, and this may facilitate more travel. There are opportunities for cities to switch to low carbon transport futures, where vision and action are based on a combination of economic, planning and technological innovations working in mutually supporting ways. Potentially, the future is bright for low carbon transport in cities, but the real question is whether there is the commitment and leadership to follow such a path.     

THE ORANGE BOOK – TURNING RIGHT OR CHANGING GEARS?

The Liberal Democrats becoming kingmakers in 2010 did not depend solely on the numbers adding up on May 5th. Did The Orange Book pull the party to the right, making coalition with the Tories a meeting of minds? Or was it better viewed as an element in an overall strategic shift towards greater professionalism, making a deal with either of the major parties more likely?