Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

Endogenizing leadership in tax competition

In this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions commit themselves to move early or late, i.e. to fix their tax rate at a first or second stage. We highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second-mover advantage. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) correspond to the two Stackelberg situations yielding to a coordination problem. In order to solve this issue, we consider a quadratic specification of the production function, and we use two criteria of selection: Pareto-dominance and risk-dominance. We emphasize that at the risk-dominant equilibrium the less productive or smaller jurisdiction leads and hence loses the second-mover advantage. If asymmetry among jurisdictions is sufficient, Pareto-dominance reinforces risk-dominance in selecting the same SPE. Three results may be deduced from our analysis: (i) the downward pressure on tax rates is less severe than predicted; (ii) the smaller jurisdiction leads; (iii) the ‘big-country-higher-tax-rate’ rule does not always hold.     

跨国公司在华子公司循环型发展战略

本文通过分析研究跨国公司在华子公司实施循环型发展战略的五大动因,结合2005年关于跨国公司在华子公司战略研究方面的调研结果．认为跨国公司在华子公司制定的发展战略正在我国发展循环经济的影响下呈现出一些新的特点,即出现了循环型发展战略。本文在提出跨国公司在华子公司循环型发展战略方格图的基础上．对目前跨国公司在华实践的循环型发展战略五个主要模式进行了归纳、总结。     

Do SMEs in deprived areas find it harder to access finance? Evidence from the UK Small Business Survey

Encouraging enterprise in deprived places is an important objective of the UK government policy. Evidence on the perceptions of entrepreneurs suggests that access to finance may be harder for firms in deprived areas, who may have fewer contacts, less collateral or worse access to mainstream banks. Yet there is little empirical evidence on whether this is actually the case. This paper investigates whether firms in deprived areas are more likely to find it hard to access finance than other firms, using a sample of around 3500 UK small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that firms in deprived areas are more likely to perceive access to finance is a problem. However, controlling for SME characteristics, firm growth, credit scores and selection effects, we find no evidence that they actually do find it harder to obtain. The results suggest that geographical disparities in access to finance are unimportant for the average firm.     

Do People Accurately Anticipate Sanctions?

We provide lab data from four different games that allow us to study whether people have accurate expectations regarding monetary sanctions (punishment/reward) and nonmonetary sanctions (disapproval/approval). Although the strength of the sanction is always predicted with some error (particularly in the case of monetary sanctions), we observe that (i) most subjects anticipate correctly the sign of the average sanction, (ii) expectations covary with sanctions, (iii) the average expectation is very often not significantly different than the average actual sanction, and (iv) the errors exhibit no systematic bias, except in those situations where rewards are frequent. In this line, we find some evidence that punishment is better anticipated than rewards.     

Economic impact of onabotulinumtoxinA for overactive bladder with urinary incontinence in Europe

Background: Overactive bladder (OAB) is a common condition that has a significant impact on patients’ health-related quality-of-life and is associated with a substantial economic burden to healthcare systems. OnabotulinumtoxinA has a well-established efficacy and safety profile as a treatment for OAB; however, the economic impact of using onabotulinumtoxinA has not been well described.

Methods: An economic model was developed to assess the budget impact associated with OAB treatment in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, using onabotulinumtoxinA alongside best supportive care (BSC)—comprising incontinence pads and/or anticholinergic use and/or clean intermittent catheterisation (CIC)—vs BSC alone. The model time horizon spanned 5 years, and included direct costs associated with treatment, BSC, and adverse events.

Results: Per 100,000 patients in each country, the use of onabotulinumtoxinA resulted in estimated cost savings of €97,200 (Italy), €71,580 (Spain), and €19,710 (UK), and cost increases of €23,840 in France and €284,760 in Germany, largely due to day-case and inpatient administration, respectively. Projecting these results to the population of individuals aged 18 years and above gave national budget saving estimates of €9,924,790, €27,458,290, and €48,270,760, for the UK, Spain, and Italy, respectively, compared to cost increases of €12,160,020 and €196,086,530 for France and Germany, respectively. Anticholinergic treatment and incontinence pads were the largest contributors to overall spending on OAB management when onabotulinumtoxinA use was not increased, and remained so in four of five scenarios where onabotulinumtoxinA use was increased. This decreased resource use was equivalent to cost offsets ranging from €106,110 to €176,600 per 100,000 population.

Conclusions: In three of five countries investigated, the use of onabotulinumtoxinA, in addition to BSC, was shown to result in healthcare budget cost savings over 5 years. Scenario analyses showed increased costs in Germany and France were largely attributable to the treatment setting rather than onabotulinumtoxinA acquisition costs.     

IS IT IS OR IS IT AIN'T MY OBLIGATION? REGIONAL DEBT IN A FISCAL FEDERATION*

This article studies the repayment of regional debt in a multiregion economy with a central authority: Who pays the obligation issued by a region? With commitment, the central government will use its economy‐wide taxation power in support of its objective to smooth distortionary taxes and consumption across regions. Absent commitment, this tool of the central government may be exploited to induce it to bail out regional government deficits. We characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications. In particular, we show when the gains from a federation may outweigh the welfare costs of a bailout. We use these insights to comment on actual fiscal relations in three quite different federations: the United States, the European Union, and Argentina.